Permanent TSB Formerly Irish Life & Permanent PLC and (By Order) Start Mortgages Designated Activity Company v. Mooney

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A advanced IR£59,500 to the Defendants in March 1992 to purchase a residence in The City. The loan was structured as an endowment mortgage. Contractual terms provided that, if the required insurance policy lapsed, the account would convert to an annuity repayment basis. This occurred in 1996 and 1998 but was reversed each time.

At the Defendants’ request, the loan was formally converted to an annuity mortgage from 1 January 2000. Company A’s confirmation letter mistakenly stated that the term would expire in July 2007 instead of July 2022. Relying on the stated 2007 expiry date, the Defendants ceased repayments in October 2007 despite earlier correspondence from Company A (via their solicitor) clarifying that the loan would not mature until 2022 and that approximately IR£60,500 remained outstanding.

Company A began possession proceedings in 2015. Judge Linnane of the Circuit Court granted an order for possession on 4 July 2017, with a six-month stay. On appeal, the Defendants argued that the matter should proceed to plenary hearing; Company A sought summary judgment. Judge Hyland of the High Court dismissed the appeal on 2 August 2021, refusing remission and granting possession.

The Defendants then applied for a “leap-frog” appeal directly to the Supreme Court under Article 34.5.4° of the Constitution. The present determination addresses that application.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the High Court departed from the summary-judgment test articulated in Cody by assessing whether evidence at a plenary hearing “could make a difference to the outcome of the case”.
2. Whether the High Court erred in treating the absence of conflict between certain affidavit averments as a reason against remitting the matter to plenary hearing.
3. Whether, in light of the foregoing, the application met the constitutional threshold of (a) a matter of general public importance or (b) the interests of justice so as to justify a direct (“leap-frog”) appeal to the Supreme Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants’ (Defendants’) Arguments

• The High Court introduced an impermissible variant of the Cody test by asking whether evidence at a plenary hearing could alter the outcome.
• The judge wrongly regarded the lack of factual dispute as militating against remission, thereby narrowing the circumstances in which plenary hearing should be ordered.
• These issues are of general public importance because they potentially affect the summary-judgment jurisprudence nationwide.

Respondents’ (Companies’) Arguments

• The proposed appeal raises no question of general public importance; it concerns only the Defendants’ individual circumstances.
• Judge Hyland simply applied established principles: the relevant evidence was already on affidavit, and no factual conflicts or viable defences existed.
• The High Court did not modify the Cody test; it applied it faithfully to the uncontested facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by restating the constitutional prerequisites for a direct appeal: demonstration of (a) a matter of general public importance or (b) the interests of justice, plus exceptional circumstances. It reiterated that these standards are stringent, citing settled case law.

Assessing the application, the Court held that the High Court merely applied “well-established principles regarding summary judgment.” Judge Hyland’s conclusion that no factual disputes or viable defences existed rendered remission unnecessary; considering whether additional evidence could alter the outcome did not constitute a new or inconsistent test. Likewise, reliance on the absence of conflicting averments was a legitimate factor pointing away from plenary hearing.

Because the disputed issues involved only the correct application of settled law to uncontested facts, they lacked the requisite public importance. Further, the Defendants had already enjoyed a full Circuit Court trial and a High Court appeal; justice did not require a third appellate layer. Consequently, the Supreme Court was not obliged to consider whether “exceptional circumstances” for a leap-frog appeal were satisfied.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED.

The refusal leaves the High Court’s possession order intact and brings the litigation to an end for the parties. The determination sets no new precedent; it confirms the continued application of established criteria for both summary judgment and leap-frog appeals.