| In re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17 |
General statement that legislation is usually “always speaking.” |
Cited to show modern orthodoxy of the doctrine before its limits were examined. |
| R v Ireland [1998] 1 AC 147 |
Statute can reflect advances in scientific knowledge (psychiatric injury as “bodily harm”). |
Example distinguishing scientific change from technological change. |
| R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13 |
Illustrates purposive interpretation and reference to contemporary values. |
Quoted to emphasise difference between meaning and application of statutory terms. |
| R (on the application of ZYN) v Walsall MBC [2015] 1 All ER 165 |
Ambiguity in statutory language may be resolved by later legislation. |
Applied when discussing the 2020 amendment to Schedule 8. |
| Owens v Owens [2018] AC 899 |
Application of evaluative statutory terms must reflect contemporary standards. |
Used to contrast value-based changes with technological changes. |
| Birmingham CC v Oakley [2001] 1 AC 617 |
Meaning of a concept stays constant though its application evolves. |
Cited for distinction between meaning and application. |
| Fitzpatrick v Sterling HA Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27 |
Changing social attitudes can expand who falls within an existing statutory term. |
Used to illustrate change in application, not change in meaning. |
| R v Munks [1964] 1 QB 305 |
Error in giving word its newer, narrower meaning. |
Offered as caution against “updating” statutory language improperly. |
| Taylor v Goodwin (1879) 4 QBD 228 |
General words may cover inventions unknown at enactment. |
Example of purposive interpretation regarding bicycles as “carriages.” |
| Williams v Ellis (1880) 5 QBD 175 |
Taxing statutes are construed narrowly. |
Contrasted with Taylor v Goodwin to show differing outcomes. |
| Simpson v Teignmouth & Shaldon Bridge Co [1903] 1 KB 405 |
Distinction between protective statutes and taxing statutes. |
Supports strict construction of taxing provisions. |
| Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [1981] AC 800 |
Interpretation where new medical technique arose after enactment. |
Discussed as ordinary purposive analysis, not “always speaking.” |
| R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034 |
Meaning of statutory expression is fixed; application may change. |
Reinforces meaning/application distinction. |
| Victor Chandler International Ltd v CEC [2000] 1 WLR 1296 |
Purpose-oriented reading of “advertisement.” |
Contrasted with present case; taxing purpose differs. |
| English Bridge Union Ltd v HMRC (C-90/16) [2017] STC 2317 |
EU-mandated VAT exemptions must be interpreted strictly. |
Analogy applied to national zero-rate exceptions. |
| A & G Fahrschul-Akademie GmbH (C-449/17) |
Strict interpretation of mandatory exemptions. |
Same principle as above. |
| SAE Education Ltd v HMRC [2019] UKSC 14 |
Strict approach to interpreting VAT exemptions. |
Supports narrow reading of “newspapers.” |
| Talacre Beach Caravan Sales Ltd (C-251/05) [2006] STC 1671 |
National zero-rates must be construed narrowly. |
Used to justify strict interpretation of Item 2. |
| Commission v United Kingdom (Case 416/85) [1990] 2 QB 130 |
“Social reasons” criterion for national zero-rates is broad but reviewable. |
Explains political nature of selecting zero-rate items. |
| Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (C-390/15) [2017] BVC 13 |
Different VAT treatment of electronic vs. physical supplies can be justified. |
Supports rational basis for treating digital editions differently. |
| IRC v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [1991] 1 AC 306 |
Later legislation may clarify earlier ambiguous wording. |
Mentioned regarding 2020 amendment adding Item 7. |