Davies, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, born on 7th March 2002, was almost 16 years and 3 months old when, on 2nd June 2018, he and others committed a gang-related revenge attack resulting in the murder of a 17-year-old victim in The City. Following a lengthy trial at the Crown Court at The City before Judge Levett and a jury, the appellant and three others were convicted of murder, with another convicted of manslaughter. On 30th April 2019, the appellant was sentenced to detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure, with a minimum term of 21 years, less 327 days spent on remand. The appellant now appeals against the sentence by limited leave of the single judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the increase of the appellant's minimum term to 21 years from the 12-year statutory starting point for a defendant aged under 18 was excessive.
2. Whether the trial judge gave sufficient regard to the appellant's age and its effect on culpability.
3. Whether the trial judge adequately considered the appellant's personal circumstances as described in the pre-sentence report.
4. Whether the sentencing disparity between the appellant and his adult co-defendants was appropriate, given the differing statutory starting points.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The increase to a 21-year minimum term from the 12-year statutory starting point for a defendant aged 16 was disproportionate.
• The judge insufficiently accounted for the appellant's youth and its impact on culpability.
• The judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellant's personal circumstances detailed in the pre-sentence report.
• The sentences imposed on the adult co-defendants indicate insufficient differentiation in minimum terms considering the different statutory starting points applicable to adults and children.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The trial judge's approach to the applicability of the Sentencing Council's guideline for children and young people contained an error, but youth and maturity remained relevant factors.
• There is limited justification for significantly divergent minimum terms for offenders of equal culpability around the age of 18, although the appellant's younger age compared to co-defendants was acknowledged.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully analysed the appellant's role and circumstances. It acknowledged the appellant's significant leadership role in a premeditated, targeted revenge attack involving multiple stab wounds inflicted with knives brought to the scene. The court noted the appellant's extensive criminal background, including early involvement in gang culture, drug addiction, and drug dealing from a young age, as detailed in the pre-sentence report. The sentencing judge had regarded the Sentencing Council's guideline for children as inapplicable to mandatory life sentences but recognized youth and immaturity as relevant. The court found this approach flawed, referencing later authority emphasizing the importance of assessing the young offender's maturity, impulsivity, and emotional state.

The court accepted that the aggravating factors, particularly the use of knives, justified a minimum term above the statutory 12-year starting point for young offenders. However, it respectfully disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that the minimum term should be as high as 21 years, given the appellant's youth and background. The age difference between the appellant and co-defendants was significant and warranted weight. The court emphasized that the minimum term is not a guarantee of release but a threshold for parole consideration. Balancing all factors, the court concluded that a 16-year minimum term was appropriate, reflecting both the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's mitigating circumstances.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and substituted the appellant's minimum term of 21 years with a reduced minimum term of 16 years, with the time spent on remand to count towards this term.

This decision directly affects the appellant by reducing the minimum custodial period before parole eligibility. No new precedent was established; rather, the court applied existing principles emphasizing the importance of youth and personal circumstances in sentencing young offenders convicted of murder, while maintaining the gravity of aggravating factors such as knife use.