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Brannach v Brothers of Charity Services Galway (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff initiated a claim for damages arising from personal injuries allegedly caused by bullying and harassment in the workplace. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant initially on a temporary basis from April 1993 and became a permanent employee in May 1995. The issues leading to the claim relate to events beginning in July 1997, when the Plaintiff raised concerns about inadequate staffing levels for service users. Subsequent workplace investigations, suspensions, and allegations occurred until the Plaintiff resigned in April 2008 due to difficulties stemming from the work environment, citing severe anxiety, fatigue, insomnia, and depression.
The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant failed to provide a safe workplace, did not investigate complaints properly, and targeted the Plaintiff for raising concerns. Two sets of proceedings commenced in the Circuit Court in November 2009 were consolidated and transferred to the High Court in November 2014. The Defendant filed a full Defence in December 2015, including allegations of contributory negligence and pleas based on the Statute of Limitations, as well as claims that the Plaintiff failed to invoke internal anti-bullying procedures.
The Defendant sought dismissal of the claim for want of prosecution and delay, relying on the inherent jurisdiction of the Court and Order 122, rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. Motions to dismiss were issued in this and two related cases, with hearings in this case and a related case proceeding together.
The procedural history includes a detailed chronology of court appearances, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence spanning from 2009 through 2020, highlighting significant delays in progressing the case, including a delay of over six years before the Defence was filed and multiple delays in discovery and mediation attempts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for want of prosecution due to inordinate and inexcusable delay pursuant to the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or Order 122, rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
- Whether the balance of justice favors dismissal of the proceedings given the extent of delay and any prejudice to the Defendant.
- Whether there exists a real and substantial risk of an unfair trial or unjust result arising from the delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The proceedings should be dismissed for want of prosecution due to inordinate and inexcusable delay, particularly the delay between the last step in proceedings in January 2017 and the motion to dismiss in June 2020.
- The Plaintiff failed to progress the case diligently, resulting in significant delay that prejudices the Defendant’s right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- The delay constitutes an improper and inefficient use of the legal process contrary to the effective administration of justice.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The delay is partly explained by the historic nature of the bullying and harassment claims, which involve a pattern of behavior over many years, making pre-commencement delay less readily characterized as inordinate.
- The Plaintiff actively sought to progress the proceedings, including attempts to procure expert reports and to engage in mediation, but faced non-responsiveness from the Defendant’s solicitors.
- The Defendant contributed significantly to the delay, including a six-year delay in filing a Defence and failure to respond to correspondence regarding mediation and discovery.
- No specific prejudice to the Defendant has been demonstrated; any prejudice from delay in witness memory can be mitigated by documentary evidence maintained by the Defendant.
- Dismissing the claim would result in significant prejudice and hardship to the Plaintiff, depriving her of a remedy for the alleged wrongs.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Gilroy v. Flynn [2004] IESC 98 | Judicial attitude towards delay and responsibility of professional advisers for delay. | Used to illustrate a hardening of judicial attitudes toward delay, emphasizing that delay by professional advisers may not excuse dismissal. |
Comcast v. Minister for Public Enterprise [2012] IESC 50 | Requirement for reasonable progression of cases in light of the European Convention on Human Rights. | Supported the principle that cases cannot be allowed to lie dormant and must be progressed reasonably. |
Mangan v. Dockeray [2020] IESC 67 | Factors for assessing delay and prejudice in dismissal applications; case-by-case approach. | Guided the court to consider specific criteria including delay, prejudice, and fairness when assessing dismissal for delay. |
Rainsford v. Limerick Corporation [1995] 2 ILRM 561 | Touchstone authority on dismissal for post-commencement delay. | Reiterated foundational principles governing dismissal for delay. |
Primor v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459 | Principles governing dismissal for inordinate and inexcusable delay post commencement. | Set out the test for dismissal: establishing inordinate and inexcusable delay and balancing justice. |
Cassidy v. The Provincialate [2015] IECA 74 | Distinction between pre-commencement and post-commencement delay principles. | Clarified burden of proof and standards required for dismissal based on delay. |
Desmond v. MGN [2009] 1 IR 737 | Relevant case law on delay and prejudice. | Referenced as part of the body of authority on delay applications. |
Mannion v. Bergin [2016] IECA 163 | Delay and prejudice principles. | Considered in the context of delay applications. |
McNamee v. Boyce [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 168 | Delay and dismissal principles. | Referenced in the court’s review of delay jurisprudence. |
Sweeney v. Keating [2019] IECA 43 | Inordinate and inexcusable delay; balance of justice test; burden on Plaintiff to show countervailing circumstances. | Applied to emphasize the burden on the Plaintiff and the necessity to weigh prejudice and conduct. |
Cassidy v. Butterly & Ors [2014] IEHC 203 | Effect of Defendant’s conduct and failure to demonstrate prejudice on dismissal applications. | Used to highlight difficulty of dismissal where Defendant did not actively seek to progress proceedings or demonstrate prejudice. |
South Dublin County Council v. CF Strutures Limited [2021] IEHC 5 | Delay and prejudice considerations. | Referenced in the context of delay jurisprudence. |
Irish Water v. Hypertrust Ltd. [2021] IEHC 323 | Refusal to dismiss for delay where no specific prejudice identified. | Supported refusal to dismiss where prejudice was not clearly demonstrated. |
Mansfield v. Roadstone Provinces Limited [2022] IEHC 223 | Delay and prejudice; refusal to dismiss where prejudice inadequately identified. | Applied to refuse dismissal due to lack of demonstrated prejudice despite inordinate delay. |
Bergin v. McGuinness [2022] IEHC 151 | Defendant’s contribution to delay and prejudice in dismissal applications. | Considered Defendant’s responsibility for delay and impact on dismissal decision. |
Anglo Irish Beef Processors Ltd v. Montgomery [2002] 3 IR 510 | Countervailing circumstances in delay dismissal applications. | Referenced regarding the burden on Plaintiff to show reasons to proceed despite delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged the significant delay in the proceedings, noting an almost eleven-year pre-commencement delay related to the historic nature of the bullying and harassment claims. The Court recognized that such delay is relevant but difficult to classify as inordinate prior to hearing evidence, given the pattern-based nature of the claim.
Post-commencement, the Court identified substantial delays, including a two-and-a-half-year delay in replying to particulars and a three-and-a-half-year delay between the last procedural step and the motion to dismiss. The Defendant's contribution to delay was significant, including a six-year delay in filing the Defence and failure to respond to mediation correspondence, thus mitigating against dismissal.
The Defendant’s affidavit in support of the dismissal motion was found to be sparse and generalized, lacking specific evidence of prejudice such as unavailability of witnesses or impact on memory. The Court emphasized that prejudice must be clearly articulated and was not demonstrated here.
The Court balanced the Plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to the courts against the Defendant’s right to a fair and timely hearing and to protect reputation. It found that although delay was inordinate and inexcusable, the balance of justice favored allowing the proceedings to continue, as dismissal would impose significant prejudice on the Plaintiff by denying a remedy.
The Court noted no real and substantial risk of an unfair trial or unjust result was established and that the case was ready for hearing subject to resolution of outstanding procedural matters. Directions would be made to ensure no further unnecessary delay.
Holding and Implications
The Court refused the Defendant’s application to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution and delay. While inordinate and inexcusable delay was found, the balance of justice favored continuation of the case.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff’s claim will proceed to hearing without dismissal. The Court emphasized that further delays will not be tolerated and indicated that directions will be made to expedite the conclusion of the proceedings. No new precedent was established; the decision applied established legal principles to the facts of this case.
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