X AGAINST GLASGOW CITY COUNCIL

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a member of a household comprising the petitioner, her spouse, and four children, was granted refugee status in February 2020, resulting in the loss of Home Office accommodation and homelessness status. The local authority, as the respondent, assumed the duty to provide accommodation and placed the petitioner’s family in a temporary four-apartment property. The petitioner’s son is autistic and disabled under the Equality Act 2010.

An occupational therapist assessed the family’s housing needs and recommended a five-apartment property to accommodate the son’s additional support needs. Despite this, the respondent continued to provide four-apartment accommodation, citing a shortage of suitable larger properties within the housing association sector and resource constraints.

The petitioner’s solicitor requested an urgent review of the accommodation’s suitability. The respondent acknowledged the difficulties in sourcing appropriate housing due to reliance on third-party providers and limited availability of larger properties. The petitioner initiated judicial review proceedings challenging the respondent’s obligation to provide suitable accommodation.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the local authority is under an absolute legal duty to provide accommodation suitable for occupation by a homeless household, taking into account the household’s needs, including disability-related needs.
2. Whether the respondent’s discretion to balance household needs against finite resources permits provision of accommodation that does not meet the assessed needs.
3. The applicability and scope of the Equality Act 2010 duties, including reasonable adjustments and public sector equality duties, in the context of homelessness accommodation.
4. The appropriateness of granting an order for specific performance compelling the respondent to provide suitable accommodation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The accommodation provided did not comply with the Homeless Persons (Unsuitable Accommodation) (Scotland) Order 2014 ("2014 Order") as it failed to meet the disabled son’s needs.
• The respondent’s explanation for failing to provide suitable accommodation was irrational and Wednesbury unreasonable.
• The respondent is legally permitted to source temporary accommodation privately or commercially and is not restricted to registered social landlords.
• No reasonable local authority would decline to take action where accommodation is unsuitable under the 2014 Order.
• Under the Equality Act 2010, reasonable adjustments should have been made to provide a five-apartment or larger property to avoid substantial disadvantage to the disabled child.

Respondent's Arguments

• Article 4(b) of the 2014 Order does not impose an absolute duty but confers discretion to balance household needs against finite resources.
• Section 29(1)(c) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 permits provision of unsuitable temporary accommodation.
• The respondent has taken into account the household’s needs and continues to endeavour to provide suitable accommodation within resource constraints.
• The respondent’s practice is to source accommodation from registered social landlords, and this practice is lawful and reasonable.
• The public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 requires regard to goals but does not impose a duty to achieve specific outcomes.
• Specific performance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted because it is impossible for the respondent to provide a five-apartment property due to unavailability, not cost.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory provisions of section 29 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 and the 2014 Order, focusing on whether the duty to provide accommodation is absolute or discretionary. The wording of section 29, requiring the local authority to "secure that accommodation is made available," combined with Article 4 of the 2014 Order, which defines unsuitable accommodation, was interpreted as imposing an absolute duty to provide accommodation suitable for the household's needs.

The respondent’s argument that Article 4(b) confers discretion was rejected, as there was no textual or structural basis to treat the suitability requirement differently from other absolute requirements. The phrase "taking into account the needs of the household" was held to require that accommodation meet those needs, not merely be considered in a balancing exercise against resource constraints.

The court also held that section 29(1)(c), which allows temporary accommodation not meeting the description of permanent accommodation, does not override the absolute duty to provide suitable accommodation. Unsuitable accommodation is excluded from the statutory definition and thus does not satisfy the duty.

Regarding the Equality Act 2010, the court found that the respondent’s practice of sourcing accommodation from registered social landlords must be adjusted if it prevents provision of suitable accommodation for disabled persons. The respondent is not legally restricted to this practice and can source accommodation privately or commercially as a reasonable adjustment.

The public sector equality duty was acknowledged as a duty to have due regard rather than to guarantee outcomes. The court found no evidence to determine whether the respondent had complied with this duty at the policy level, but individual officers had been aware of the disabled child’s needs.

On the issue of specific performance, the court emphasized the fundamental principle that public authorities must obey statutory duties and court orders, regardless of practical difficulties or resource constraints. The respondent must find a way to comply, including sourcing accommodation beyond usual providers if necessary.

The court recognized potential practical challenges in immediate compliance and indicated that further procedural steps would address the timetable and manner of compliance.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the respondent local authority is under an absolute duty to provide temporary accommodation suitable for occupation by the petitioner’s household, specifically a five-apartment property to meet the additional support needs of the petitioner’s disabled son.

The respondent’s reliance on resource constraints and limited availability of suitable accommodation does not excuse non-compliance with this duty. The respondent must take all necessary steps, including sourcing accommodation outside of its usual arrangements, to fulfill its statutory obligations.

The court did not make a definitive finding on compliance with the public sector equality duty but indicated that the respondent’s practice must be capable of reasonable adjustment to meet disabled persons’ needs.

The respondent’s stated intention not to comply with the court’s decision was rejected as incompatible with the rule of law. The case will proceed to further interlocutory directions to determine a reasonable timeframe and means for compliance.

No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the absolute nature of the duty under section 29 and the 2014 Order in the context of homelessness accommodation.