Stanley v An Bord Pleanala & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant occupies premises at 132a Richmond Road, Dublin 3, which changed use from furniture manufacturing and associated storage to commercial self-storage. The Applicant sought a declaration under section 5 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") that this change did not constitute a material change of use and therefore was not development requiring planning permission. The second notice party, as the relevant planning authority, determined that the change was material and not exempted development, a decision which was referred to the Respondent for review. The Respondent upheld the finding that the change of use was material development requiring planning permission.

Enforcement proceedings pursuant to section 157 of the 2000 Act were ongoing before the District Court against the Applicant, adjourned pending the outcome of this judicial review. The Applicant challenged the Respondent's decision by way of judicial review, seeking to quash the decision on the grounds that the determination of materiality lacked adequate reasoning and evidential basis.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the change of use from furniture manufacturing and associated storage to commercial self-storage constituted a "material" change of use amounting to "development" under section 3 of the 2000 Act.
2. Whether the Respondent's decision was adequately reasoned and supported by sufficient evidence to satisfy the legal requirements for a decision under section 5 of the 2000 Act.
3. Whether the duty to provide reasons under section 5 of the 2000 Act requires detailed, discursive reasoning comparable to that required under section 34 of the Act.
4. Whether the Applicant was prejudiced by the reasoning provided in the decision, particularly in relation to his defence in related enforcement proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The change of use is not material in planning terms, and the Respondent's decision lacks sufficient reasoning explaining why the change was material.
• The Inspector’s report and the Respondent’s decision merely state in generic terms that issues such as traffic, servicing, car parking, and amenity are "quite evident" without detailed explanation or evidential support.
• The Applicant is prejudiced as the decision binds him in enforcement proceedings before the District Court, preventing him from arguing that no material change of use occurred.
• The duty of procedural fairness requires the Respondent to provide clear reasons to enable the Applicant to challenge the decision effectively.

Respondent's Arguments

• The decision was properly grounded in evidence and adequately reasoned, relying on the Inspector’s report and the planning file.
• The Inspector correctly identified the legal test for material change of use and applied it, considering planning concerns such as traffic, servicing, car parking, and amenity.
• The planning history, including a refused retention application for a change of use to car sales with similar concerns, provided an evidential basis for the decision.
• The duty to give reasons under section 5 is less onerous than under section 34, and it is sufficient that the main reasons and considerations are recorded and available.
• The Applicant assumed the risk of the decision affecting enforcement proceedings by making the section 5 application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court acknowledged that the Applicant accepted the correct legal test for material change of use as established by the Supreme Court, requiring identification of whether planning concerns arise from the change. The Court examined whether the Respondent and Inspector properly identified the actual change in use, the planning effects or consequences, and the scale of those impacts.

It found that the change from furniture manufacturing (light industrial) to commercial self-storage (wholesale warehouse/repository) was correctly identified as a change of use between different use classes. The Inspector and Respondent identified planning concerns including traffic, servicing, car parking, and residential amenity impacts, drawing on the planning history of the site, notably a refused retention application for a car sales use that raised similar concerns.

While the Court agreed that the reasons given were terse and lacked detailed elaboration on the specific impacts, it held that the reasoning was sufficiently clear when read in conjunction with the Inspector’s report and the planning file. The concerns from the previous retention refusal were logically and reasonably extended to the current use, given the nature of the self-storage business involving multiple customers accessing the site 24 hours a day, deliveries, and removals.

The Court emphasized that the duty to provide reasons under section 5 requires main reasons and considerations to be recorded with sufficient particularity to identify the legal test applied and why it was satisfied. Although more detailed reasoning would have been preferable, the decision did not fail for lack of reasons or evidential basis. The Court noted the high threshold for overturning such expert administrative decisions on grounds of unreasonableness.

The Court rejected the Applicant’s contention that the decision was unreasoned and unreasonable, finding that the Respondent properly applied the legal test and that the decision was sustainable in law.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the Applicant's challenge and refused to quash the Respondent's decision dated 21 January 2020 that the change of use constituted development and was not exempted development under section 5 of the Planning and Development Act 2000.

The direct effect of the decision is that the Applicant must now seek to regularise the change of use through an application for planning permission. The ruling affirms the Respondent's authority to determine material changes of use under section 5 and underscores the sufficiency of terse but coherent reasoning in such decisions when supported by the planning file and inspector’s report. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts.

The Court ordered that costs be adjudicated in default of agreement in favour of the Respondent against the Applicant. No order as to costs was made regarding the first notice party.