Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
REFERENCES (Bills) by the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland - United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and European Charter of Local Self-Government (Incorporation) (Scotland)
Factual and Procedural Background
On 16 March 2021 the Scottish Parliament passed the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Incorporation) (Scotland) Bill (“UNCRC Bill”), and on 23 March 2021 it passed the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Incorporation) (Scotland) Bill (“ECLSG Bill”). Both Bills seek to give domestic effect in Scotland to international treaties already ratified by the United Kingdom.
Acting under section 33(1) of the Scotland Act 1998, the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland (collectively, the “Referring Law Officers”) asked the Supreme Court to determine whether specified provisions of each Bill would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. The Lord Advocate (the Scottish Government’s chief law officer) and the Counsel General for Wales were represented and made submissions. The judgment, delivered by Judge Reed and agreed by four other Justices, answers six referred questions—four concerning the UNCRC Bill and two concerning the ECLSG Bill.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether specific interpretative and remedial provisions in the UNCRC Bill (sections 19(2)(a)(ii), 20(10)(a)(ii), 21(5)(b)(ii) and 6) are outside devolved competence because they would “modify” section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998 or relate to reserved matters.
- Whether analogous provisions in the ECLSG Bill (sections 4(1A) and 5(1)) are likewise outwith competence for the same reason.
- Whether section 101(2) of the Scotland Act (the “read-down” provision) can rescue any impugned clauses by permitting a narrower, competence-compliant interpretation.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments of the Referring Law Officers
- The impugned sections would make the effect or interpretation of Acts of the UK Parliament subject to conditions imposed by the Scottish Parliament or Scottish courts, thereby “modifying” section 28(7) of the Scotland Act, which preserves Westminster’s unqualified power to legislate for Scotland.
- Sections granting courts power to strike down or declare Acts of Parliament incompatible impermissibly trench upon reserved matters and parliamentary sovereignty.
- Section 101(2) cannot be used to rewrite provisions that are, on their face, beyond devolved competence.
Arguments of the Scottish Law Officer
- The interpretative provisions merely mirror section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and do not truly limit Westminster’s power because Parliament may always legislate to disapply them.
- Where strike-down powers apply only to pre-commencement UK statutes, they do not fetter Parliament’s future legislative authority.
- Any competence difficulties can be cured by reading the provisions narrowly under section 101(2) of the Scotland Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re UK Withdrawal from the EU (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill [2018] UKSC 64 | Meaning of “modify” a protected enactment; limits on devolved competence | Central authority for finding that making Westminster legislation conditional on devolved bodies’ actions violates section 28(7) |
| Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 | Scope of the interpretative obligation under section 3 HRA 1998 | Used to contrast the far-reaching HRA model with the Scotland Act’s more limited section 101(2) |
| Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765 | Parliamentary sovereignty; courts cannot disregard Acts of Parliament | Illustrates how strike-down powers would be “strange and startling” in UK constitutional law |
| AXA General Insurance v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46 | Sovereignty of the UK Parliament and rule-of-law limits on devolved legislation | Supports proposition that devolved bodies cannot qualify Westminster’s sovereignty |
| Attorney General v National Assembly for Wales Commission [2012] UKSC 53 | Use of “read-down” provision analogous to section 101 | Contrasted to show section 101 is narrower than section 3 HRA |
| Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51 | Accessibility and foreseeability requirements; inability to salvage over-broad provisions via section 101 | Relied on to refuse using section 101(2) to rewrite section 6 of the UNCRC Bill |
| Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116 | Limited effect of unincorporated treaties on statutory interpretation | Distinguishes ordinary interpretative approach from the Bill’s ambitious model |
| JH Rayner v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 | Same principle as Salomon | Further support for difference between ordinary and “far-reaching” interpretative duties |
| Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 | Need for legal certainty | Used in discussion of rule-of-law requirements for accessible legislation |
| Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 | “Quality of law” requirement under Article 8 ECHR | Supports insistence on clarity and foreseeability in legislative drafting |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court applied a two-stage analysis:
- Does the provision “modify” section 28(7)?
a. Following the Continuity Bill decision, a protected enactment is modified not only by express amendment but whenever its practical effect is limited or conditioned.
b. Requiring courts to reinterpret Acts of Parliament (section 19 UNCRC; section 4 ECLSG) or to issue strike-down or incompatibility declarators (sections 20 and 21 UNCRC; section 5 ECLSG) effectively renders Westminster legislation contingent upon devolved institutions, thus qualifying Parliament’s sovereignty. - Can section 101(2) save the clauses?
a. Section 101(2) is an interpretative tool, aimed at narrow linguistic adjustments, not wholesale rewriting.
b. Using it to transform provisions “deliberately framed in maximalist terms,” as with section 6 UNCRC, would gut the pre-enactment safeguards (ministerial statements, Presiding Officer scrutiny, section 33 references) built into the devolution scheme.
c. The Court contrasted section 101 with the broader Human Rights Act 1998, emphasising the word “narrowly” and the constitutional necessity of certainty.
Because each impugned clause either imposed conditions on Westminster’s legislative power or related to reserved matters, and because none could be read-down without effectively redrafting them, every questioned provision lay beyond the Scottish Parliament’s competence.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: All six referred provisions are outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and, if enacted without amendment, would be “not law” under section 29(1) of the Scotland Act 1998.
Implications: The judgment re-affirms the protective reach of section 28(7) and clarifies that devolved legislatures cannot, even indirectly, compel UK legislation to be construed, suspended or invalidated by devolved courts or ministers. It underscores the limited role of section 101(2) as an interpretative, not remedial, device. While the decision leaves incorporation of international treaties to devolved choice, it insists that any such legislation must respect the reserved powers of the UK Parliament and the constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty. No new precedent is set; rather, existing doctrine from the Continuity Bill case is applied and reinforced.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.
Comments