PTSB Formerly Irish Life & Permanent PLC -& Anor v Mooney & Anor (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns an appeal against an order for possession made by the Circuit Court on 4 July 2017. The plaintiffs, originally Irish Permanent Plc and subsequently renamed, granted an Endowment Home Loan of IR£59,500 on 4 March 1992 to the defendants, a married couple, for the purchase of a house at a specified address in The City. The mortgage was for 30 years with an initial interest rate of 10.9%. The defendants chose an endowment mortgage, which required maintaining an insurance policy to repay the principal at the end of the term; failure to maintain this policy would switch the mortgage to an annuity repayment method.

The defendants requested conversion of the mortgage to an annuity loan in November 1999. A letter from the plaintiffs dated 26 January 2000 confirmed conversion effective 1 January 2000, stating a monthly repayment amount and an expiry date of July 2007, which was later described as a typographical error that should have read July 2022. The defendants ceased repayments after October 2007, believing the mortgage had expired in 2007.

Correspondence between the defendants’ solicitor and the plaintiffs in 2006 clarified that the mortgage term had not expired and that a substantial balance remained. Despite this, repayments stopped in 2007. The plaintiffs issued proceedings in 2015 seeking possession. The Circuit Court made an order for possession in July 2017, stayed for six months, and the defendants appealed.

The High Court hearing was adjourned pending a Supreme Court decision in a related matter concerning the High Court’s jurisdiction to remit summary possession appeals to the Circuit Court for plenary hearing. After the Supreme Court’s decision, the High Court considered whether a plenary hearing was necessary or whether summary judgment was appropriate.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the contract of mortgage entered into in 1992 was amended or varied by the exchange of correspondence in late 1999 and early 2000, thereby shortening the repayment term.
2. Whether the defendants can rely on the doctrine of estoppel by representation to prevent the plaintiffs from enforcing the original mortgage terms, based on the alleged representation in the January 2000 letter.
3. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to remit an appeal from the Circuit Court for a plenary hearing in the Circuit Court or whether such a hearing must be conducted in the High Court.
4. Whether the matter can be resolved on a summary basis or requires a plenary hearing due to disputed facts or complex legal issues.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

• The January 2000 letter, despite its reference to a 2007 expiry date, was a typographical error and did not alter the original 30-year mortgage contract.
• The defendants’ argument of estoppel fails because the letter does not amount to a clear, unambiguous promise or assurance as required by law.
• Correspondence from 2006 made it clear the mortgage had not expired and there was a substantial outstanding balance; the defendants had the opportunity to query the matter but did not do so.
• Following the Supreme Court decision, this case falls within those capable of summary determination as no factual disputes exist and the issue is purely legal.
• A plenary hearing would be unnecessary and contrary to the efficient, cost-effective aims of summary judgment.

Defendants' Arguments

• They have a full defence to the possession claim and summary disposal is inappropriate.
• Material issues of fact and complexity exist that require resolution at a plenary hearing.
• The defendants contend that the mortgage was effectively amended by the January 2000 letter to expire in 2007, and that they fulfilled their obligations under this amended agreement.
• Alternatively, they argue estoppel applies because they relied on the January 2000 letter and changed their position accordingly.
• Following the Supreme Court decision, their case falls into the category requiring plenary hearing due to contested affidavit evidence or complex legal questions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the mortgage contract was amended by the exchange of letters in 1999 and 2000. It found that the letter of 26 January 2000 contained internal contradictions and ambiguities, notably an inconsistent expiry date and loan term, which prevented it from constituting a clear acceptance or amendment to the original contract. The court held that no effective contractual amendment was made, as offer and acceptance were not aligned, and the terms were uncertain.

Regarding estoppel, the court acknowledged that estoppel requires reasonable reliance and detrimental change of position. However, correspondence in 2006 from the plaintiffs to the defendants’ solicitor clearly stated the mortgage had not expired and a substantial balance remained. The defendants, being legally represented, were put on notice that reliance on the 2000 letter was misplaced. The court found that any ambiguity was resolved by 2006, and the defendants’ cessation of payments in 2007 was not justified.

On the question of jurisdiction and procedure, the court referenced the Supreme Court decision in Cody, confirming that the High Court cannot remit summary possession appeals back to the Circuit Court for plenary hearing but may order a plenary hearing itself. The court considered whether a plenary hearing was necessary and concluded that no factual disputes or complex legal issues warranted one, and summary judgment was appropriate.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered vacant possession of the property.

The direct effect is that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession based on the original mortgage terms. No new legal precedent was established beyond applying the Supreme Court’s ruling on jurisdiction and procedural requirements. The decision reinforces that summary possession cases lacking credible defences or factual disputes may be resolved without plenary hearing, preserving judicial efficiency.