MUHAMMAD MOHSAN JAVAID FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Factual and Procedural Background

The Petitioner, a citizen of Pakistan born in 1993, arrived in the United Kingdom in 2006 as a visitor. His leave expired in 2010, and he was issued with removal papers in 2012. The Petitioner made multiple unsuccessful applications for leave to remain, primarily relying on rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), claiming that removal would disrupt his family and private life. The Secretary of State refused his most recent application made in 2018, and the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) ("F-tT") dismissed his appeal in 2019. The F-tT also refused permission to appeal (PTA). The Petitioner then sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) ("UT"), which was also refused. The Petitioner initiated judicial review proceedings challenging the UT's refusal to grant permission to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Petitioner could rely on or rehabilitate original grounds of appeal not included in the application to the UT.
2. Whether the UT erred in law by adopting the reasoning of the F-tT in refusing permission to appeal.
3. Whether the UT failed to identify and consider readily discernible and obvious points of Convention jurisprudence ("Robinson-obvious points") in favour of the Petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The UT improperly adopted the F-tT's reasons for refusing permission to appeal, thereby perpetuating the same legal errors.
• Under the principle established in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Robinson, the UT failed to identify obvious points of Convention law that should have favoured the Petitioner.
• The Petitioner sought to rely on grounds of appeal that were not presented to the UT but had been presented to the F-tT.

Respondent's Arguments

• The UT did not adopt the F-tT's reasoning but considered only the grounds properly before it, which did not include the original grounds presented to the F-tT.
• The UT was entitled to assume that grounds not included in the renewed application to the UT were abandoned.
• Any contention that the UT failed to consider a Robinson-obvious point must have been included in the petition for judicial review, which was not the case here.
• The supervisory court has no obligation to identify Robinson-obvious points of Convention law on its own motion if not raised in the petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether the UT had adopted the F-tT's reasoning in refusing permission to appeal. It found that the UT's reference to the F-tT's reasons was a procedural background statement and that the UT clearly identified only the two grounds properly before it. The court emphasized the Joint Presidential Guidance requiring all grounds to be included in the UT application, and in the absence of incorporation of original grounds, the UT was entitled to assume abandonment of those grounds. The court noted substantial overlap between the grounds before the UT and those before the F-tT, indicating substitution rather than supplementation.

Regarding the Robinson-obvious argument, the court held that the obligation to identify and apply such points lies with the immigration authorities (F-tT and UT), not the supervisory court. Since the petition did not include a contention that the UT failed to consider any Robinson-obvious point, the court was not obliged to consider such points sua sponte.

The court then considered the substantive grounds raised by the Petitioner to see if any amounted to Robinson-obvious points. It found no misdirection or error in the F-tT's reasoning regarding the "near miss" principle, medical prognosis, maintenance of contact via modern communication, or the test applied for obstacles to re-integration in Pakistan. The court concluded that no Robinson-obvious error was present in the F-tT's decision or the UT's refusal of permission to appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED the petition for judicial review.

The direct effect of this decision is to uphold the UT's refusal to grant permission to appeal, thereby maintaining the dismissal of the Petitioner’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal to grant leave to remain. No new legal precedent was established, and the ruling reinforces procedural requirements that all grounds of appeal must be properly presented to the UT to be considered. The court confirmed the limited role of supervisory review in immigration cases and clarified the scope of the Robinson doctrine as applying to immigration authorities rather than the supervisory court.