Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Northumbria Police, R (on the application of) v. Vickers & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, the appropriate authority responsible for investigating complaints against officers of Northumbria Police under the Police Reform Act 2002, challenges the decision of the Defendant, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), which upheld appeals by interested parties against the Plaintiff's rejection of their complaints. The complaints arose from arrests made on 25 May 2013, ordered by Chief Superintendent Neill, now retired, relating to demonstrations in Newcastle upon Tyne involving the English Defence League (EDL) and counter-demonstrators. The interested parties, members of a group known as Fight Racism Fight Imperialism (FRFI) or The Revolutionary Communist Group (RCG), were arrested for conspiracy to commit violent disorder after refusing to move to a designated protest site.
Following initial complaints and investigations, the IOPC upheld some complaints concerning Chief Superintendent Neill, finding he had a case to answer for misconduct. The Plaintiff challenges this decision, using the case of one interested party as representative. Procedurally, permission to proceed was granted by HHJ Saffman on 4 April 2019. The interested parties did not appear at the hearing, citing funding issues.
Separately, two of the interested parties issued a claim in the County Court for wrongful arrest and other torts, which was dismissed following a jury trial in October 2019. An appeal has been filed but does not challenge the jury's finding that the officers' suspicions were genuine.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the IOPC's decision was unlawful or procedurally improper due to deficiencies in the regulation 16 notice served on Chief Superintendent Neill.
- Whether the IOPC applied the correct legal test for the lawfulness of the arrest, specifically regarding reasonable grounds to suspect.
- Whether the IOPC's finding that there was a case to answer for misconduct was irrational in the Wednesbury sense.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The regulation 16 notice did not refer to the first ground of complaint, rendering the IOPC's finding of a case to answer on that ground procedurally improper and an abuse of process.
- The IOPC failed to apply the correct test for lawfulness of arrest, wrongly conflating reasonable grounds to suspect with the necessity for arrest, and not properly considering the low threshold for suspicion.
- The IOPC's decision was irrational because it compartmentalised evidence and did not identify relevant police policies or the applicable standard of care, wrongly upholding misconduct based on a mere difference in judgment.
- The dismissal of the County Court claims supports the assertion that the IOPC decision was irrational.
Appellee's Arguments
- Deficiencies in the regulation 16 notice do not limit the IOPC's scope in reviewing complaints, as it must give fresh consideration to the evidence and is not constrained by the investigator's approach.
- The obligation to serve the regulation 16 notice lies with the Plaintiff, not the IOPC, and any prejudice from an inadequate notice arises at the misconduct hearing stage, which did not occur here due to the officer's retirement.
- The IOPC correctly understood the low threshold for reasonable suspicion and was entitled to find a case to answer based on an absence of sufficiently clear evidence from the officer.
- Misconduct does not require bad faith or malice; an unlawful arrest, even if based on misjudgment, can amount to misconduct.
- The dismissal of the County Court claim does not negate the reputational interests of the officer and Plaintiff in this misconduct context, which remains relevant and non-academic.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex parte Calveley & Others [1986] QB 424 | Importance of timely and proper service of disciplinary notices to protect officers' procedural fairness. | Supported the view that regulation 16 notices provide essential protections but defects affect fairness primarily at misconduct hearing stage. |
R (Wheeler) v Metropolitan Police Service [2008] EWHC 439 (Admin) | Charges must be clear and precise to avoid unfairness in disciplinary proceedings. | Used to highlight the need for clarity in allegations, though the notice deficiencies here were not fatal. |
R (Redgrave) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2002] EWHC 1074 | Fair hearing is possible despite procedural delay or defects if prejudice can be avoided. | Supported the principle that prejudice must be assessed at the hearing stage. |
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Jeyeanthan [2001] 1 WLR 354 | Tests for whether procedural non-compliance renders decisions null or irregular, including substantial compliance and waiver. | Applied to reject waiver argument and support substantial compliance of regulation 16 notice. |
O'Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1977] AC 286 | Reasonable grounds to suspect must exist in the arresting officer; instruction alone insufficient. | Clarified that directing officer must also have reasonable suspicion; no error found in this case. |
R (Rawlinson and Hunter) v Central Criminal Court [2013] 1 WLR 1634 | Liability for wrongful arrest extends to officers briefing others without requisite belief. | Supported that directing officer must have reasonable suspicion, reinforcing no merit in appellant's first point. |
Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey (1988) Court of Appeal transcript | Elements of lawful arrest: suspicion and reasonable grounds; Wednesbury unreasonableness applies to exercise of discretion. | Used to define the low threshold for suspicion and rationality review standard. |
Hussien v Chong Fook Kam (1970) AC 942 | Suspicion is a state of conjecture or surmise, not proof; arrest may precede proof. | Supported the proposition that suspicion threshold is low and arrests can be made on reasonable conjecture. |
Cumming v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2003] EWCA Civ 1844 | Reasonable grounds for suspicion may apply to a group, not requiring individualized basis for each suspect. | Applied to justify suspicion of the group arrested, including the interested parties. |
Armstrong v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2008] EWCA Civ 1582 | Evidence must be considered cumulatively, not compartmentalised, in assessing reasonable suspicion. | Used to criticize compartmentalisation of evidence by IOPC caseworker. |
Buckley v Chief Constable of Thames Valley [2009] EWCA Civ 356 | Similar to Armstrong, emphasizing cumulative assessment of information in suspicion analysis. | Supported the principle that the arresting officer's assessment must be considered as a whole. |
Walker v Bar Standards Board (unreported, 2013) | Professional misconduct requires serious, reprehensible conduct beyond trivial or momentary lapses. | Guided the court's view that negligence must be serious enough to constitute misconduct. |
Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 | Judicial review standard: decision must be within the reasonable range of decisions open to the decision maker. | Applied as the standard for assessing the IOPC decision's rationality. |
R (Chief Constable of West Yorkshire) v IPCC [2015] ICR 184 | IOPC's role is to decide if there is a case to answer, not to determine lawfulness of officer's conduct. | Clarified the limited scope of IOPC findings in misconduct appeals. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the three grounds of challenge systematically. Regarding the regulation 16 notice, it found that although the notice did not explicitly state all grounds of complaint, substantial compliance existed because Chief Superintendent Neill was sufficiently informed to respond to the allegations. The court emphasized that procedural fairness concerns arising from notice deficiencies are most relevant at the misconduct hearing stage, which could not occur here due to the officer's retirement.
On the application of the correct legal test for lawfulness of arrest, the court rejected the appellant's argument that only the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect. It confirmed that a superior officer directing an arrest must also have such grounds, supported by relevant case law. The court found no error in the IOPC's approach to the distinction between reasonable suspicion and necessity for arrest, noting the latter was not part of the complaint.
The court expressed concern that the IOPC caseworker appeared to compartmentalise evidence rather than assess it cumulatively, which is required by established authority. It noted the caseworker's failure to identify specific police policies breached or to articulate the standard of care applicable to the officer's conduct. The court held that mere disagreement with the officer's judgment does not establish misconduct; negligence must be shown to fall below recognized professional standards.
On the irrationality ground, the court concluded the IOPC's decision to uphold complaint 2 (failure to properly process intelligence) was irrational because the caseworker lacked evidence of policy breaches and did not adequately justify the conclusion. However, the finding of a case to answer on complaint 1 (lack of reasonable grounds to suspect) was sustained on the basis that the caseworker could rationally conclude a tribunal might find misconduct, despite the low threshold for suspicion. The court noted deficiencies in the IOPC decision's reasoning, particularly the absence of clarity on which standards of professional behaviour were implicated.
Ultimately, the court held that the IOPC decision was one that a reasonable authority could not have reached in relation to complaint 2, but was within the reasonable range on complaint 1. The reputational interests of the officer and the Plaintiff justified judicial intervention despite the absence of a misconduct hearing due to retirement.
Holding and Implications
The court QUASHED the IOPC decision dated 29 August 2018.
The matter is remitted to the IOPC for reconsideration under Section 31(5) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. This is necessary because the current position leaves a dismissed misconduct complaint and an outstanding appeal unresolved. The decision clarifies that defects in procedural notices do not automatically invalidate appeal decisions absent prejudice at misconduct hearings and emphasizes the need for clear identification of misconduct standards and proper application of legal tests regarding reasonable suspicion. No new precedent was established; the ruling primarily affects the parties by requiring a fresh IOPC determination consistent with this analysis.
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