Irish Skydiving Club Ltd v An Bord Plean�la

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns a judicial review application brought by the Applicant, a limited liability company engaged in sports parachuting and licensed to operate an aerodrome, challenging a decision of the Respondent Board made on 14th January, 2015. The decision arose from a referral by the First Named Notice Party under section 5 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended ("the Act"), whereby the Board determined that the Applicant's use of Kilkenny Airfield for sponsored parachute jumping constituted development rather than exempted development. The Applicant sought to quash the Board's decision on grounds including lack of notice and disregard of the Board inspector’s recommendations.

Leave to apply for judicial review was granted on 27th March, 2015. The Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the Applicant's challenge was out of time under the strict eight-week limitation period imposed by section 50 of the Act. The Court directed a modular hearing focusing initially on the procedural question of whether the Applicant was out of time. The Applicant was represented by legal counsel after an initial attempt by a company director to represent it was refused.

The notice parties included local government and private individuals who opposed adjournment, citing adverse impact from the parachuting activities.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Applicant’s judicial review challenge was brought within the time limit prescribed by section 50(6) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended.
2. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion under section 50(8) to extend the time for bringing the judicial review application, having regard to the statutory criteria.
3. Whether the running of time for judicial review begins on the date of the decision or on a later "date of knowledge" when the Applicant became aware of the decision.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant contended it was particularly and specially affected by the decision and that the statutory eight-week period was insufficient to prepare its case.
• It argued that time should be calculated from a later date—either 29th January, 2015 (when the Applicant first became aware of the decision), or 5th February, 2015 (when the Board first confirmed its decision and said its jurisdiction was "spent").
• The Applicant asserted that the Respondent deliberately delayed responding to correspondence to cause the Applicant to miss the statutory deadline.
• The Applicant relied on case law suggesting that time may run from a "date of knowledge" or when a party is informed of relevant decisions.
• It submitted that it required time to understand the basis of the decision and obtain professional advice before initiating proceedings.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent maintained that time runs strictly from the date of the decision under section 50(6) of the Act, which was 14th January, 2015.
• It rejected the "date of knowledge" test, citing precedent where such a test was expressly rejected in other statutory contexts.
• The Respondent denied any deliberate delay in correspondence and noted the Applicant had no legal disability preventing timely action.
• It argued that the statutory provision for time extension under section 50(8) requires that the delay be caused by circumstances outside the Applicant’s control, which was not established.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully analysed the statutory provisions governing the time limits for judicial review under section 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended. It emphasised the strict eight-week limitation period starting from the date of the decision, as mandated by section 50(6), and the narrow discretion to extend time only where the applicant shows both good and sufficient reason and that the delay was caused by circumstances outside their control under section 50(8).

The Court rejected the Applicant’s argument for a "date of knowledge" test, holding that the legislation clearly fixes the running of time from the date of the decision, not from when the Applicant became aware or formulated a decision to challenge it. The Court found that the Applicant had actual knowledge of the decision by 29th January, 2015, when a director became aware of the decision and the relevant documents were accessible on the Board’s website.

The Court was not persuaded that the Respondent deliberately delayed correspondence to cause the Applicant to miss the deadline. It found no legal disability preventing the Applicant from acting promptly once aware of the decision. The Applicant’s continued correspondence after 5th February, 2015—when the Board said its jurisdiction was "spent"—was not explained and did not justify delay.

The Court held that the Applicant had sufficient information and control over the relevant factors by 29th January, 2015, to seek legal advice and commence judicial review within the statutory period. The Applicant’s argument that it needed to understand the full substance of the decision before acting was rejected, as the grounds for challenge were procedural and known to the Applicant early on.

Given the cumulative and mandatory nature of the extension test, the Court found the Applicant failed to satisfy the requirement that the delay was caused by circumstances outside its control. The Court therefore refused to extend time.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision was to REFUSE TO EXTEND TIME for the Applicant to bring judicial review proceedings challenging the decision of the Respondent Board dated 14th January, 2015.

This ruling means that the Applicant’s judicial review application is out of time and cannot proceed. The decision upholds the strict time limits set by statute for challenging planning decisions, reinforcing public policy considerations favouring legal certainty and finality in planning matters. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles concerning statutory time limits and the exercise of discretion to extend them.