Permanent TSB plc v Langan & anor

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A (the Plaintiff/Appellant) advanced six mortgages to Defendant (the Defendant/Respondent). After default, Company A issued two Civil Bills in the Circuit Court seeking possession of all relevant properties. On 23 February 2015 the Circuit Court granted possession orders. Defendant appealed to the High Court. While the appeal was pending, two inconsistent High Court decisions emerged on the scope of the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction over property that has no rateable valuation. Faced with that conflict, a High Court judge stated a case to the Court of Appeal, which concluded that the Circuit Court generally lacked jurisdiction. Company A obtained leave to appeal that decision to the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General was permitted to intervene because of the wider public importance of the issue.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Circuit Court’s property-related jurisdiction under section 22(1) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 is excluded when the relevant residential property is not “rateable” under the Valuation Act 2001 and carries no rateable valuation.
2. If not excluded, whether the Circuit Court enjoys unlimited jurisdiction over such property or remains confined to cases in which any existing rateable valuation does not exceed €253.95.
3. Which party bears the onus of proving the existence or absence of a rateable valuation, and what forms of evidence are sufficient for that purpose.
4. Whether constitutional requirements that courts of local and limited jurisdiction be “limited” constrain the statutory interpretation of the 1961 Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Company A (Appellant)

• The literal wording of the 1961 Act excludes Circuit Court jurisdiction only where the land exceeds a specified rateable valuation; property with no valuation therefore remains within jurisdiction.
• Section 67 of the Valuation Act 2001 permits interested parties to obtain a deemed valuation when necessary, demonstrating that such property was not removed from the valuation system.
• The statutory lineage from the Civil Bill Courts through the 1924 and 1961 Acts shows a legislative intent to retain Circuit Court involvement in lower-value property disputes.
• Interpreting the legislation to strip the Circuit Court of jurisdiction would force modest cases into the High Court, contrary to access-to-justice considerations.

Defendant (Respondent)

• Because domestic premises are “not rateable” under the 2001 Act, they fall outside the valuation-based scheme that defines Circuit Court jurisdiction, leaving the High Court as the only forum.
• The legislative purpose of the Third Schedule is to reserve larger or indeterminate property claims to the High Court; giving the Circuit Court unlimited jurisdiction would defeat that purpose.
• Prior High Court authority (Company B v. Individual A) supports the view that the Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction over un-rateable property.

The Attorney General (Intervenor)

• Emphasised the public importance of resolving conflicting case-law and the knock-on effect for other statutes that use rateable-valuation thresholds.
• Submitted that section 67 of the 2001 Act expressly anticipates pre-2001 enactments, such as the 1961 Act, that impose conditions by reference to rateable valuation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court drew a critical distinction between (1) property that is “rateable” for the purpose of levying rates, and (2) property that has a “rateable valuation,” whether historical or established under section 67 of the 2001 Act. The textual focus of the 1961 Act is the latter. Because the statutory exclusion applies only “where the land concerned exceeds” €253.95 in rateable valuation, property with no valuation does not trigger the exclusion clause.

General interpretative principles offered no reason to depart from this literal meaning. The Court observed:

• Section 67 explicitly allows any interested party, including a mortgagee, to seek a deemed valuation, ensuring that no property is wholly outside the valuation regime.
• The legislature’s failure to amend the 1961 Act when abolishing domestic rates could not be remedied by the judiciary; courts must apply enacted text.
• From a constitutional standpoint, conferring unlimited jurisdiction on the Circuit Court within a narrow, clearly defined category of cases (possessory actions concerning domestic premises) does not offend the requirement that such courts be “of local and limited jurisdiction.” The limitation arises from the subject-matter, not a monetary cap.

Accordingly, the Court held that:

• The Circuit Court retains jurisdiction unless the plaintiff’s own evidence establishes that the property has a rateable valuation above €253.95.
• To prove jurisdiction, a plaintiff must either: (a) furnish a certificate showing the valuation is within the limit; or (b) adduce admissible evidence—such as an affidavit from the Commissioner of Valuation—that no valuation exists.
• Where a property lacks any valuation, questions about estimating valuation under nineteenth-century legislation do not arise.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED. The Supreme Court replaced the Court of Appeal’s answers to the case-stated questions with findings that the Circuit Court:

• Is not deprived of jurisdiction merely because the property is not rateable.
• May hear possession proceedings provided the property either has no rateable valuation or carries one not exceeding €253.95.
• Requires plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction through appropriate evidence.

Implications: The decision restores consistency to possession litigation by confirming that the Circuit Court remains the principal forum for most residential mortgage cases, avoiding the cost and delay of High Court proceedings in lower-value matters. It also clarifies that section 67 of the Valuation Act 2001 can be invoked to obtain a deemed valuation where necessary, thereby harmonising pre-2001 jurisdictional thresholds with the modern rating regime.