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Matta v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & ors
Supreme Court Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant issued judicial review proceedings on 27 July 2009 seeking an order of mandamus compelling the Respondent Minister to determine an application for long-term residency. Three weeks later, on 18 August 2009, the Minister granted the residency. Because the substantive relief had then been obtained, the proceedings became moot.
On 21 July 2010, the High Court (Judge Harding Clark) declined to award costs to the Appellant and, in effect, made no order as to costs. The Appellant appealed that ruling, contending that he should have obtained his costs. The Respondents filed a cross-appeal arguing that the High Court ought to have awarded costs in their favour. The present judgment of the Supreme Court (Judge MacMenamin, Judge Dunne and Judge O’Malley concurring) resolves both the appeal and the cross-appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in making no order for costs after the proceedings became moot.
- If so, whether costs should be awarded to the Appellant or to the Respondents.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Minister granted long-term residency only because the mandamus proceedings had been commenced; the temporal proximity—decision within three weeks—shows causation.
- Because the proceedings prompted the desired administrative decision, there was an “event” and, applying the principle that “costs follow the event” recognised in Gillian Godsil v. Ireland, the Appellant should receive his costs.
Respondents' Arguments
- The matter became moot for reasons outside the control of either party, namely the belated receipt of police clearance, not because of the litigation.
- On the approach outlined in Cunningham v. The President of the Circuit Court, the proper order is no order as to costs; alternatively, costs should be awarded to the Respondents.
- An affidavit from Official A (an officer in the residency section) confirmed that the judicial review had no bearing on the timing of the decision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cunningham v. The President of the Circuit Court [2012] IESC 39; [2012] 3 I.R. 222 | Where a case becomes moot due to factors outside the parties’ control, the court should ordinarily make no order as to costs; if mootness is caused by a party’s unilateral act, costs may be awarded against that party. | Used as the primary framework. The Court asked whether mootness resulted from an external factor (police clearance) rather than the Minister’s unilateral action. |
| Gillian Godsil v. Ireland & The Attorney General [2015] IESC 103 | Even where a substantive issue is moot, if the proceedings have precipitated an “event”, costs should follow that event. | Distinguished. The Court held the facts did not disclose an “event” attributable to the litigation; therefore the Godsil approach did not apply. |
| Nawaz v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 354 | Warning against using mandamus to “jump the queue” where administrative delays are explained; possible adverse costs. | Cited as background to the High Court’s concern about queue-jumping in residency cases. |
| Nearing v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 489; [2010] 4 I.R. 211 | Mandamus should issue only where there is an illegal refusal or egregious delay; courts should not manage administrative schemes. | Reinforced the view that the Minister’s chronological system was lawful, informing the High Court’s stance. |
| Hay v. O’Grady [1992] I.R. 210 | Appellate courts should not overturn a trial judge’s factual findings if supported by evidence. | Invoked to justify deference to the High Court’s inference that no causal link existed. |
| Garibov v. The Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2006] IEHC 371 | Earlier authority on costs in moot cases. | Not followed; said to have been superseded by Cunningham and Godsil. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court framed the decisive inquiry as whether the proceedings became moot through an external factor (Cunningham) or through the Respondents’ unilateral action prompted by the litigation (Godsil). The Appellant relied on the three-week interval between issuing the proceedings and receipt of long-term residency, contending that the Minister’s decision must have been prompted by the case.
The Court noted that Official A averred, on affidavit, that the decision was taken only after police clearance was obtained in early August 2009 and that the litigation played no role. The Appellant did not cross-examine Official A, leaving the evidence uncontradicted. Applying the principles in Hay v. O’Grady, the Supreme Court held it was bound to respect the trial judge’s acceptance of that evidence and her consequent finding that no causal nexus existed.
Because mootness resulted from the arrival of the police clearance—an occurrence outside the control of both parties—the case fell within the Cunningham category. Accordingly, the High Court was entitled to make no order as to costs. The Court further observed that the High Court’s judgment had clarified the law on costs in immigration-related mandamus applications, lending it precedential value.
Holding and Implications
The Supreme Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the High Court’s order of no order as to costs.
Immediate effect: each party bears its own costs in the High Court; the Court reserved applications concerning the costs of the appeal itself. Broader implications: the decision reinforces the distinction between the Cunningham and Godsil approaches and confirms that, where mootness stems from factors beyond the parties’ control, the default position remains that no order as to costs will be made.
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