Gormley v D.J. Smyth & anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was charged in The District Court on 8 December 2004 with two “hybrid” offences: (1) assault causing harm under s. 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 and (2) criminal damage under s. 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991. A Garda officer mistakenly informed Judge Smyth that the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) consented to summary disposal. The judge accepted jurisdiction, entered a plea of not guilty, and the case was adjourned several times.

On 21 February 2005 the court was advised—again in error—that the DPP had “changed his mind” and now directed trial on indictment. Objection was taken on the basis that, once summary jurisdiction was accepted, the District Court lacked power to recommit the matter for indictment. The judge ultimately ordered service of a book of evidence and, on 5 April 2005, sent the Appellant forward for trial under s. 4A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 (as amended).

The Appellant sought judicial review, contending that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. The High Court (Judge O’Neill) refused relief. This is the Appellant’s appeal from that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in the circumstances of a hybrid offence where the District Court has initially accepted summary jurisdiction, Judge Smyth retained power to terminate the summary process and send the accused forward for trial on indictment.
2. Whether s. 4A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 supplied statutory authority for such an order, or whether the absence of an express power required the District Court simply to strike out the proceedings.
3. Whether the decision in Reade v. Judge Reilly precluded the District Court from ordering a return for trial on indictment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Once the District Court accepted summary jurisdiction, it became functus officio; it had no power to revisit that decision or to send the case forward for trial on indictment.
• The purported change of position by the DPP (or discovery that no consent had been given) could not confer jurisdiction retrospectively.
• Reade v. Judge Reilly establishes that, absent statutory authority, the District Court must strike out proceedings when it declines summary jurisdiction.

Respondents' Arguments

• The DPP had never, in fact, consented to summary disposal; the initial statement to the court was a Garda error.
• Under the hybrid-offence scheme, the decision on mode of trial lies with the DPP, subject only to the judge’s assessment of whether the offence is “minor.”
• Section 4A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 mandates the judge to send an accused forward for trial on indictment once the case is not being tried summarily.
• Reade is distinguishable: there, the judge alone altered course; here, the DPP directed indictment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court (Judges Geoghegan, Fennelly and Finnegan) undertook a detailed examination of “hybrid” offences. It emphasised that such offences remain “indictable” because they are capable of trial on indictment; summary jurisdiction is purely statutory and contingent.

Key steps in the court’s analysis:

• Statutory Framework: Section 4A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 obliges a District Court to send an accused forward for trial on indictment unless the case is being tried summarily. Once it emerged that the DPP had not consented to summary disposal, none of the s. 4A(1) exceptions applied.
• DPP’s Primacy: Under McKevitt v. Delap, the DPP’s decision governs the mode of trial for hybrid offences; the accused has no right to override it.
• Error of Communication: Whether the situation was viewed as a “change of mind” or as initial absence of consent, the judge properly terminated the summary process because jurisdiction never validly attached.
• Distinguishing Reade: In Reade, the judge, not the DPP, altered course; moreover, no statutory power to send forward existed in that context. Here, the DPP had given a formal direction for indictment, and s. 4A provided explicit authority.
• Inherent/Implied Powers: Even if procedural gaps existed, the District Court possessed inherent powers ancillary to its statutory jurisdiction to give effect to the legislative scheme.
• Fairness: No oppression or unfairness arose; the proceedings were at an early stage and could lawfully recommence on indictment.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s refusal to quash the District Court order. Judge Smyth acted within jurisdiction in sending the Appellant forward for trial on indictment.

Implications: The decision confirms that, for hybrid offences, a District Court may terminate an attempted summary process and commit an accused for trial on indictment when the DPP has directed indictment, even if the court had earlier accepted summary jurisdiction. It clarifies the limited reach of Reade v. Judge Reilly and underscores the continuing indictable character of hybrid offences. No new precedent was set, but existing principles regarding the DPP’s primacy and s. 4A were reaffirmed.