Kenny v TCD

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, a local resident, has engaged in multiple legal challenges to a 1999 planning permission obtained by the Defendant (The University) for the redevelopment of student accommodation at Trinity Hall in The City. In the principal judicial review (“the first judicial review”) heard by Judge McKechnie in December 2000, leave to challenge the planning permission was refused. The Plaintiff’s subsequent request for a certificate to appeal was also denied.

After obtaining documents under freedom-of-information legislation, the Plaintiff commenced the present plenary action on 7 November 2002, alleging that the Defendant had fraudulently misled Judge McKechnie regarding the intended location of boilers within the development. The Defendant applied to strike out the proceedings under Order 19 rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Judge Finnegan refused that application on 2 April 2003, but the Defendant appealed. An earlier Supreme Court order striking out the claim was itself set aside for unrelated reasons, leading to the present rehearing of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the amended statement of claim discloses any reasonable cause of action sufficient to survive an application under Order 19 rule 28.
2. Whether, in the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, the action is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process and therefore should be dismissed.
3. What legal standards govern the setting aside of a final judgment on the ground of fraud, including the requisite degree of fraud, the need for particularised pleading, and the causal impact on the impugned judgment.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Defendant knowingly concealed an application for a fire-safety certificate showing boilers in basement areas and thereby fraudulently induced Judge McKechnie to refuse leave for judicial review.
• The alleged concealment deprived the Plaintiff of natural justice and warrants setting aside the High Court decision and rehearing the first judicial review.
• The refusal of leave in 2000 was not a “final judgment” for the purposes of the strict fraud standard cited by the Defendant.

Defendant's Arguments

• Order 19 rule 28 permits the striking out of the claim because the pleadings, even as amended, fail to establish fraud capable of vitiating a final judgment.
• Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, continuing the action would be an abuse of process; the Plaintiff is effectively relitigating issues conclusively determined in 2000.
• A final judgment may only be reopened for “conscious and deliberate dishonesty” that fundamentally influenced the decision. The alleged basement boiler plans were immaterial to Judge McKechnie’s reasoning, which turned on adequacy of information before the planning authority, not the Defendant’s future intentions.
• The Plaintiff has not pleaded fraud with the necessary particularity as required by authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Fennelly, delivering the judgment of the Court, began by treating the High Court refusal of leave in 2000 as a final judgment under section 82(3B)(b) of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1963. Consequently, the judgment could only be set aside for fraud.

The Court distilled three essential requirements for setting aside a final judgment for fraud:

1. Allegations must amount to conscious and deliberate dishonesty.
2. The fraud must have fundamentally influenced the impugned decision.
3. Fraud must be pleaded with full particularity.

While the amended statement of claim alleged fraud in general terms, the Court held it lacked sufficient particularity and, more critically, failed the causation requirement. Examination of Judge McKechnie’s 2000 judgment revealed:

• The key issue there was whether adequate information had been before the planning board, not the Defendant’s ultimate engineering choices.
• The possibility of basement boilers had been expressly ruled out during the planning oral hearing and was therefore immaterial to Judge McKechnie’s conclusion.
• Even if the Defendant had sought a fire-safety certificate showing basement boilers, such a step could not alter or validate the planning permission, and thus could not have influenced the High Court’s refusal of leave.

Accordingly, any alleged non-disclosure about the fire-safety certificate could not have “changed the whole aspect of the case.” On that basis, the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Applying Order 19 rule 28, the Court found the proceedings frivolous and vexatious. Independently, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the Court concluded the claim was bound to fail and should be dismissed to prevent abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; PROCEEDINGS DISMISSED.

The Plaintiff’s action to set aside the 2000 High Court decision was struck out. The ruling reaffirms the stringent threshold for reopening final judgments: allegations of fraud must be particularised, prove conscious deceit, and demonstrate that the deception fundamentally affected the earlier decision. The judgment emphasises the courts’ readiness to use both Order 19 rule 28 and inherent jurisdiction to protect defendants and preserve finality in litigation where those high standards are not met. No new substantive precedent was created, but existing principles on abuse of process and fraud were restated and applied.