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Blake v. A.G.
Factual and Procedural Background
Two separate High Court actions, both brought by Plaintiffs, sought declarations that Parts II and IV of the Rent Restrictions Act 1960 (as amended by the 1967 and 1971 Acts) were unconstitutional. Judge McWilliam in the High Court granted the declarations. The Attorney General (acting as Appellant) appealed to the Supreme Court, and both appeals were heard together.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the rent-control provisions in Part II of the Rent Restrictions Act 1960, as amended, constitute an unjust attack on landlords’ property rights contrary to Article 40 §3 2 of the Constitution.
- Whether the possession-control provisions in Part IV of the same Act likewise infringe those constitutional property rights.
- How Article 43 (protection of private property as an institution) interacts with Article 40 §3 2 (protection of individual property rights) when assessing the validity of the impugned legislation.
- If Part II is unconstitutional, can Part IV survive as an independent and severable legislative scheme?
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Parts II and IV arbitrarily single out pre-1941 dwellings below specified rateable values, ignoring the means of tenants and landlords.
- Freezing rents at 8 June 1966 levels—without any possibility of future review—virtually eliminates economic return and amounts to an unjust, uncompensated taking.
- Requiring landlords to bear full repair obligations exacerbates financial hardship; evidence showed controlled rent was between 1/9 and 1/19 of market rent.
- The restrictions violate Articles 40 and 43, are not dictated by social justice or the common good, and any emergency justifying temporary control has long since passed.
Appellant's Arguments
- The challenged provisions are a permissible “regulation and delimitation” of property rights under Article 43 §2 in the interests of social justice and the common good.
- Because the Oireachtas holds plenary power under Article 6, legislation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality; the Court should not second-guess socio-economic policy.
- Constitutionality must be assessed at the date of enactment; subsequent economic changes cannot render the provisions invalid.
- Even if periodic review were constitutionally required, the Acts of 1967 and 1971 showed that the Oireachtas had in fact reviewed the scheme.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Attorney General v. Southern Industrial Trust Ltd (1957) 94 I.L.T.R. 161 | Earlier view that property rights protected only under Article 43. | The Court declined to follow this approach, holding that individual property rights receive separate protection under Article 40 §3 2. |
| Maher v. Attorney General [1973] I.R. 140 | Test for severability of unconstitutional statutory provisions. | Relied on when deciding that Part IV could not stand independently once Part II was struck down. |
| The State (Attorney General) v. Shaw [1970] I.R. 317 | Further authority on severability and legislative intent. | Cited for the proposition that the court must consider whether the Oireachtas would have enacted the impugned part in isolation. |
| King v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1981] I.R. 233 | Illustration of differing judicial views on severability doctrine. | Referenced to underline the complexity of separating constitutional from unconstitutional elements within a statute. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Presumption of validity. The Court acknowledged that Acts of the Oireachtas enjoy a presumption of constitutionality but emphasised that this can be rebutted where an “unjust attack” on property rights is shown.
2. Relationship between Articles 40 and 43. Article 43 safeguards private property as an institution, while Article 40 §3 2 protects each citizen’s particular property. The Court held that the impugned provisions must be tested under Article 40 §3 2 because they affect individual landlords’ specific rights, not the institution of private property.
3. Examination of Part II (Rent Control).
- Rent control applies only to dwellings erected before 7 May 1941 with low rateable values, excluding all other housing and local-authority lettings; no rationale linked to tenant need or landlord ability was provided.
- Basic rent is fixed at 8 June 1966 levels (themselves based on 1914 or 1941 rents). All review mechanisms have lapsed, freezing landlords’ income indefinitely.
- No compensation exists for landlords, and statutory repair obligations further reduce returns. The scheme is thus arbitrary, one-sided and permanent.
- These features amount to an “unjust attack” on landlords’ property rights, contravening Article 40 §3 2.
4. Examination of Part IV (Recovery of Possession).
- Part IV severely restricts landlords’ ability to recover possession, extending rights to tenants’ successors and potentially making loss of possession virtually permanent.
- The restriction is inseparable from the rent-control scheme; both Parts were enacted as a single package targeting the same category of dwellings.
- Because Part II is unconstitutional, and because the Oireachtas never considered Part IV as a standalone measure, Part IV likewise falls.
5. Severability. Applying the principles in Maher, Shaw and related cases, the Court concluded that Parts II and IV were not severable; neither could be “given a life of its own” once the other was struck down.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court declarations that Parts II and IV of the Rent Restrictions Act 1960 (as amended) are null and void as repugnant to Article 40 §3 2 of the Constitution.
Implications: The decision removes statutory rent control and security of tenure from tens of thousands of tenants occupying formerly “controlled dwellings.” The Court expressly anticipated that the Oireachtas would enact replacement legislation addressing fair rents and security of tenure. Pending such action, lower courts were advised to use adjournments or stays of execution, where justice requires, to mitigate hardship for tenants.
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