Lisle-Mainwaring v Associated Newspapers Ltd

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2015, the Plaintiff attracted public attention after repainting the exterior of her residence in distinctive red and white stripes. The Defendant, a publisher of a major newspaper and operator of an associated website, published articles about the repainting and its motivations. The Plaintiff alleged that between April and July 2015, the Defendant engaged in conduct amounting to harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, focusing on the published articles.

On 22 February 2018, the Plaintiff applied for an order of specific disclosure against the Defendant. The application was heard by Judge Eady on 21 March 2018, who dismissed it on 23 March 2018. No permission to appeal was sought during that hearing. Later on 23 March, the Plaintiff sought permission to appeal via a written application sent only to Judge Eady and not served on the Defendant. Judge Eady, mistakenly believing his judicial authority expired at midnight on 23 March due to retirement, purported to grant permission to appeal that afternoon without hearing submissions from the Defendant. Subsequently, Judge Eady acknowledged that the grant of permission was likely invalid.

The issues before the appellate court were: whether permission to appeal had been validly granted; if not, whether permission should now be granted; and whether the appeal had merit. The court concluded that permission had not been validly granted, that it should not now be granted, and that the appeal lacked substance.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether permission to appeal had already been validly granted by the lower court judge.
2. If permission to appeal had not been validly granted, whether the appellate court should grant permission.
3. Whether the substance of the appeal was made out on its merits.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the procedural correctness of the purported grant of permission to appeal by Judge Eady. It held that under CPR 52.3 and Practice Direction 52A, permission to appeal must be sought at the hearing where the decision is given or by applying to the appeal court. The unilateral, post-hearing application by the Plaintiff, not served on the Defendant, was procedurally improper. The judge's mistaken belief about his retirement and authority did not validate the grant. The court relied on the reasoning in Monroe v Hopkins (No 2) to affirm the proper procedure and rejected the Plaintiff's attempt to circumvent it.

Substantively, the court reviewed the nature of specific and standard disclosure under CPR Parts 31 and Practice Direction 31A. It clarified that specific disclosure orders are discretionary and usually arise where standard disclosure is inadequate. The court found no novel principle in the Plaintiff's appeal and noted that the application was a routine case management decision. The judge's detailed refusal of disclosure across multiple categories was within his discretion and not plainly wrong.

The court also analyzed the individual categories of documents sought by the Plaintiff, concluding that many were overly broad, irrelevant to the harassment claim, or sought to reopen issues previously ruled out. The Defendant had already disclosed documents relevant to motivation, and the Plaintiff failed to identify additional specific documents. The court agreed with the lower judge's reasoning that the application appeared motivated by tactical aims rather than genuine evidential need.

Holding and Implications

The court DENIED permission to appeal, holding that the purported grant of permission by the lower court judge was invalid and that no fresh permission should be granted by the appellate court.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Plaintiff's appeal against the refusal of the specific disclosure application will not proceed. The court emphasized adherence to procedural rules governing appeals and underscored judicial discretion in case management decisions. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing procedural principles and the proper exercise of discretion in disclosure applications.