Maharaj v National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant requested, under the Freedom of Information Act 1999, the curriculum vitae and qualifications of the Respondent’s most senior executive. The Respondent refused, claiming an exemption under section 30 of the Act. After unsuccessful pre-action correspondence and an aborted attempt at alternative dispute resolution, the Appellant applied on 20 January 2010 for leave to seek judicial review of the refusal.

On 21 January 2011 Judge Boodoosingh granted leave ex parte. The Respondent then moved to set aside that leave, arguing that the claim had not been brought promptly. While the motion was pending, a parallel FOIA case involving similar issues was decided in the Appellant’s favour, and the parties agreed that only delay and costs would be argued in the present proceedings.

Judge Boodoosingh set aside leave on 3 October 2011, holding that the delay after 7 December 2009 was unreasonable. The Court of Appeal (majority: Judges Smith and Bereaux; dissent: Judge Jamadar) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on 26 April 2017. Final leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“the Board”) was granted on 24 July 2017. By the time of the Board hearing the requested information had been supplied, but the Respondent maintained its opposition to the judicial review claim.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the lower courts erred in finding that the application for leave was made with unreasonable delay.
2. Whether, even if delay was unreasonable, the courts erred by treating the absence of “good reason” as a self-standing basis to refuse an extension of time without considering prejudice to third parties or detriment to good administration.
3. Whether it was proper to set aside the original grant of leave solely on the ground of delay.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Delay should be assessed together with any resulting prejudice or administrative detriment; the absence of such factors favoured an extension of time.
• The parallel proceedings demonstrated the substantive merits of the claim, strengthening the case for an extension.
• The lower courts applied section 11 of the Judicial Review Act 2000 and Civil Proceedings Rule 56.5 too technically by treating “good reason” as a threshold that excluded consideration of wider factors.

Respondent's Arguments

• The application was not made “promptly” as required by statute and rules; no satisfactory explanation for the delay existed.
• Under section 11(1) and CPR 56.5(1) the court could refuse leave for unreasonable delay without examining prejudice or detriment.
• The discretion exercised by the judge at first instance was not plainly wrong and should not be disturbed on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Writing for the Board, Judge Lloyd-Jones rejected the “insulated threshold” approach adopted by the majority below. The Board held that:

• Section 11(1) (prompt filing) and section 11(2) (undue delay plus prejudice/detriment) must be read together; Civil Proceedings Rule 56.5(3) expressly obliges the judge to consider prejudice and detriment when delay is in issue.
• Prejudice to third-party rights and detriment to good administration are relevant not only after “good reason” is shown but also when assessing promptitude and deciding whether to extend time.
• Sub-section 11(3) permits (indeed, requires) the court to take “such other matters as it considers relevant” into account, including merits, public interest, constitutional values and the factual absence of prejudice.
• By focusing solely on the absence of a satisfactory explanation and ignoring the conceded lack of prejudice, Judge Boodoosingh misdirected himself; the Court of Appeal majority repeated this error.
• While the Board disapproved of the categorical statement in Abzal Mohammed that delay without prejudice can never defeat a claim, it affirmed that lack of prejudice often powerfully supports an extension.

The Board noted several unusual case-specific factors: (i) the substantive FOIA issue had been resolved in parallel litigation, (ii) the Respondent conceded it had no evidence of prejudice, and (iii) the requested information had ultimately been disclosed. In those circumstances a remittal would serve no practical purpose.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the order setting aside leave is overturned and the Respondent must pay the Appellant’s costs.

Implications: The decision clarifies Trinidad and Tobago practice by confirming that judges must weigh prejudice to third parties and detriment to good administration when assessing both promptness and any application to extend time for judicial review. Delay is not a self-contained bar; its significance is assessed in a holistic evaluation that includes merits, public interest and the presence or absence of prejudice. Although absence of prejudice is not an automatic passport to relief, courts may not ignore it when exercising discretion. The ruling aligns local jurisprudence with the structured English approach articulated in Caswell and related authorities.