Rickards v Lothian

Factual and Procedural Background

The Defendant was the long-term lessee of a multi-storey commercial building in The City. The Plaintiff occupied rooms on the second floor. A communal lavatory on the fourth floor was equipped with an ordinary wash-hand basin, supplied by a screw-down tap and protected by conventional waste and overflow pipes. Overnight on 18–19 August 1909 an unidentified person maliciously stuffed nails, pen-holders, string and soap into the waste outlet, closed the overflow route, and opened the tap fully. Water flooded through the building and damaged the Plaintiff’s stock-in-trade (principally schoolbooks).

The Plaintiff sued for £156 in the Melbourne County Court, alleging negligence, breach of an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, and (later) strict liability for permitting water to escape. A jury found: (1) the waste pipe had been deliberately blocked; (2) the basin had been in order when the caretaker left; (3) a “lead safe” beneath the basin would have reduced risk; and (4) the act was malicious. Judgment was entered for the Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court of Victoria set that judgment aside and entered judgment for the Defendant. The High Court of Australia (by majority) restored the Plaintiff’s judgment. The Privy Council granted leave and, on this final appeal, rendered the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendant was liable in negligence for omitting to install additional precautions (a lead safe) when the immediate cause of the flood was a malicious act of an unknown third party.
2. Whether the Defendant incurred strict liability under the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands for the escape of water, notwithstanding the absence of negligence and the presence of third-party malice.
3. Whether, as a matter of law, the Defendant was obliged to foresee and guard against deliberate interference with the water apparatus by strangers.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The caretaker was negligent in allegedly leaving the tap open and failing to notice a blocked waste pipe.
• The Defendant was negligent in construction and maintenance by not installing a lead safe beneath the basin to intercept any overflow.
• Even without negligence, the Defendant was strictly liable under Fletcher v. Rylands for permitting a dangerous thing (water) to escape.
• The Defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated malicious interference and taken precautions against it.

Defendant's Arguments

• The flood was caused solely by the malicious act of an unknown person, breaking the causal chain and eliminating liability.
• No negligence existed: the basin was of ordinary, approved construction; the caretaker left it in good order; and a lead safe would not have stopped intentional blockage.
• The Rylands doctrine does not apply because (a) a domestic water supply is an ordinary, “natural” use of premises, and (b) the law recognises an exception where escape results from vis major or the act of a stranger.
• There is no legal duty to foresee or prevent deliberate wrongdoing by third parties over whom the Defendant has no control.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Privy Council began by accepting the jury’s explicit finding that the pipes were intentionally blocked by a malicious third party. It then analysed liability under three separate headings:

1. Negligence. A negligence claim requires that the Defendant’s breach be the proximate cause of damage. Because the immediate cause was a stranger’s deliberate act, any negligence in omitting a lead safe could not be the legal cause. Moreover, a lead safe would have been equally susceptible to being blocked.
2. Foreseeability of Malicious Acts. Relying on Lynch v. Nurdin and similar authorities, the Council held that liability would depend upon a factual finding that the Defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated such interference. The Plaintiff secured no such finding; indeed, the evidence gave no basis upon which a jury could so conclude.
3. Strict Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher). The Council reaffirmed that the Rylands rule applies only to a “special” or “non-natural” use of land and is subject to exceptions where escape is caused by vis major, act of God, or acts of strangers. Domestic water supply in an urban building was characterised as an ordinary, socially beneficial use. Even if it were otherwise, the stranger’s malicious act fell within the recognised exception, removing liability.

Because none of the Plaintiff’s theories survived these analyses, the initial trial judge should have entered judgment for the Defendant upon the jury’s findings. The contrary decisions of the High Court of Australia and the County Court were accordingly unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR THE DEFENDANT WITH COSTS.

Directly, the decision absolves the Defendant of liability and requires the Plaintiff to pay costs in all courts. More broadly, the Privy Council confirms two important limitations on the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine: (1) ordinary domestic water installations constitute a “natural” use of land, and (2) even where the use is non-natural, liability does not extend to damage caused solely by malicious or unforeseeable acts of third parties. The ruling therefore narrows the circumstances in which landlords or occupiers face strict liability for escapes of water.