R v Williams

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted by a jury at Cardiff Crown Court of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice, following a trial before HHJ Jacobs on 8th November 2001. She was sentenced to two years imprisonment on 30th November 2001. The Appellant appealed against the conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge permitted the prosecution to introduce inadmissible hearsay evidence.

The case concerned an incident on 23rd November 2000 involving the Appellant's client, who was arrested on suspicion of possession of offensive weapons found in a motor car belonging to a family car dealership, operated by the client’s family. The Appellant, employed as a solicitor’s clerk accredited to advise detainees, intervened during the client’s police interview, making a statement that was alleged to be false and intended to pervert the course of justice.

Police surveillance, including covert listening devices, recorded conversations relevant to the case. The prosecution sought to rely on these recordings and transcripts, including conversations between employees and family members of the car dealership, to establish a common design to pervert justice involving the Appellant and others. The Appellant was charged alone with the substantive offence, not with conspiracy.

The appeal focuses on the admissibility of hearsay evidence derived from these recorded conversations and the adequacy of the trial judge’s directions to the jury regarding this evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the hearsay evidence admitted at trial was admissible as an exception to the general rule against hearsay.
2. If admissible, whether the jury were properly directed on how to assess the disputed hearsay evidence.
3. Whether acts and declarations of alleged co-conspirators can be admitted against the Appellant, charged alone with a substantive offence, without independent evidence of a common design.
4. Whether the trial judge should have excluded the disputed evidence as unfairly prejudicial under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
5. Whether the absence of specific jury directions regarding the conditional nature of the hearsay evidence rendered the conviction unsafe.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

• The disputed hearsay evidence was admissible because the offence was committed in furtherance of a common design involving the Appellant and others, authorising each to act on behalf of the others.
• The conversations recorded were contemporaneous with the relevant events and formed part of the res gestae, explaining the Appellant’s call to an employee at the car dealership.
• The evidence rebutted the Appellant’s defence that she had misheard the employee and that the employee was lying about her words and tone of voice.
• There was reasonable circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of a common design to prepare a false defence regarding the car having been valeted.
• The jury received adequate directions on the limited use of the hearsay evidence and the caution required in assessing the credibility of the witness providing that evidence.

Appellant's Arguments

• The prosecution should not have been permitted to adduce acts and declarations of alleged co-conspirators to prove the Appellant’s guilt when she was charged alone with the substantive offence.
• There was no independent evidence of the Appellant’s participation in a common design, so the hearsay evidence was inadmissible.
• The evidence should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 because the Appellant could not cross-examine the absent alleged co-conspirators.
• If admissible, the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the conditions under which the hearsay evidence could be used against the Appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the context of the Appellant being charged alone with a substantive offence. It examined the principle that acts and statements of one conspirator may be admissible against another if done in furtherance of a common design, but only if there is independent evidence of the defendant's complicity in that design.

The Court reviewed authorities including Gray, Jones, Williams and Barham, Tripodi, and Blake, confirming that the common design must be sufficiently defined and independently established for hearsay evidence to be admitted against a defendant charged alone.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that there was reasonable circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of a common design involving the Appellant and others to prepare a false defence concerning whether the car had been valeted. This included the timing and content of telephone calls and text messages, and the recorded conversations of an employee, George Day.

However, the Court identified a critical issue with the trial judge’s directions: the jury was not properly instructed that the hearsay evidence (Day’s narrative conversations with others) could only be used against the Appellant if there was independent evidence of a common design. The jury was not warned against convicting solely or primarily on this hearsay evidence, raising a real risk that the conviction was unsafe.

The Court rejected the prosecution’s alternative arguments that the evidence was admissible as res gestae or to rebut the Appellant’s defence, finding these reasons insufficient.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the absence of appropriate jury directions regarding the conditional nature and risks of relying on the hearsay evidence rendered the conviction unsafe.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the conviction is quashed.

The Court held that although there was reasonable evidence to support a common design and the admission of hearsay evidence, the trial judge failed to give adequate directions to the jury about the conditional use of that evidence. This failure created a real possibility that the jury improperly relied on hearsay evidence alone, making the conviction unsafe.

Regarding a retrial, the Court acknowledged the Crown’s submission that a retrial would serve the interests of justice given the seriousness of the offence and the evidence. However, considering that the Appellant had already served a substantial part of the sentence and had been released, the Court decided that the public interest did not require a retrial. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the requirements for jury directions in similar hearsay contexts.