Grovit and Others v. Doctor and Others

Factual and Procedural Background

The action began in August 1989 when the Appellant, chairman of a group of companies, issued a writ alleging defamation and other business-related torts against seven defendants. The allegedly defamatory statement, contained in an employment reference, described the Appellant as “a very difficult man to work for.” By March 1990 all claims except libel had been abandoned, and all defendants except the two individual Respondents (acting in person) and Company B (later placed in liquidation) had been dismissed. No meaningful steps were taken after September 1990 despite two letters from the Respondents’ solicitors urging progress or discontinuance.

On 30 October 1992 Judge Crowley (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) struck out the writ and statement of claim for want of prosecution, finding “inordinate and inexcusable delay” and an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal (before Judge Evans LJ and Judge Glidewell LJ) dismissed the ensuing appeal on 28 October 1993. The matter then came before the House of Lords, where the Appellant was represented by Attorney Jacob; the Respondents were unrepresented.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether mere inordinate and inexcusable delay, absent proved specific prejudice, can justify striking out an action as an abuse of process.
2. Whether the court may combine elements of delay with other conduct falling short of intentional and contumelious default to create a “hybrid” ground for dismissal.
3. Whether maintaining proceedings with no genuine intention of pursuing them constitutes an abuse of the court’s process independent of the two limbs in Birkett v. James.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The delay, though admitted to be inordinate and inexcusable, caused no serious prejudice to the Respondents; therefore limb (2) of Birkett v. James was not satisfied.
• The conduct complained of did not amount to the intentional, contumelious behaviour required by limb (1); hence an abuse-of-process finding was unavailable.
• The courts below erred in fusing partial elements of limbs (1) and (2) to create a new ground for dismissal.

The Respondents filed no submissions and were not represented.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House accepted the findings of both lower courts that (a) the delay exceeded two years after September 1990, (b) it was inexcusable, and (c) the Appellant had “no interest in actively pursuing” the libel claim. Maintaining proceedings in those circumstances was characterised as an abuse of process because litigation is intended to resolve disputes, not to leave them “hanging like the sword of Damocles” over defendants.

Once abuse of process was established, the House held it unnecessary to satisfy limb (2) of Birkett by proving concrete prejudice or risk of an unfair trial. The same facts supporting abuse (lack of intent to prosecute) inevitably demonstrated want of prosecution. The Lords noted that although some judges have suggested blending elements of both limbs, the instant case did not require settling that question; pure abuse of process was sufficient.

The House also observed that broader procedural reform and active case management—rather than doctrinal change—are better vehicles for tackling systemic delay, echoing comments in Chris Smaller.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed. The order striking out the action and dismissing the claim for want of prosecution remains in force; costs were awarded against the Appellant.

Implications: The decision confirms that where a plaintiff has no genuine intention of prosecuting an action, the court may strike it out as an abuse of process without requiring proof of specific prejudice to defendants. The ruling leaves intact, but does not expand, the established Birkett framework, signalling that any wholesale change to delay doctrine should await procedural reform rather than piecemeal judicial innovation.