Regina v Benguit

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted of murder at a Crown Court trial in The City and sentenced to life imprisonment. This conviction followed two previous trials which failed to reach a verdict on the murder charge. The first trial included a co-defendant who faced charges of rape and assisting the appellant, resulting in acquittals on the rape charges but no verdict on assisting. The appellant faced charges of murder and rape; the jury failed to reach a verdict on both counts. A retrial was ordered, at which the appellant was acquitted of rape, and the co-defendant was acquitted of assisting an offender, but again no verdict was reached on the murder charge. A second retrial was then authorized by the Director of Public Prosecutions after reasoned submissions from both prosecution and defence. The trial judge rejected the appellant's submission that the second retrial would be an abuse of process. During the second retrial, evidence from two witnesses was admitted over the appellant's objection. The prosecution case was that the appellant stabbed to death a female student in the early hours of 12th July 2002. The victim was attacked from behind with a knife, which was never recovered. The main evidence against the appellant came from a witness who was an admitted drug addict and part-time prostitute, who gave inconsistent statements but implicated the appellant in the murder and related offences. Additional supporting evidence came from residents of a drug house and the appellant's partner, who recalled a blood-stained top. No forensic evidence linked the appellant to the murder. The appellant denied the murder and any association with carrying a knife. Ultimately, the jury convicted the appellant of murder.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in allowing a second retrial after two previous juries had failed to agree on a verdict for the murder charge.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of two witnesses regarding the appellant allegedly carrying a knife, particularly in light of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provisions on bad character evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The second retrial was unjust, oppressive, and vexatious, particularly given the unreliable nature of the main witness's evidence, who was an admitted drug addict with inconsistent statements.
• It is a longstanding convention that after two failed trials due to jury disagreement, the prosecution should offer no further evidence, and thus the second retrial was inappropriate despite no absolute legal bar.
• The evidence of the two witnesses concerning the appellant carrying a knife was inadmissible bad character evidence and should have been excluded under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which was not properly applied.
• The evidence was prejudicial, was not sufficiently connected to the date of the murder, and was only introduced as a last resort after previous trials.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The decision to proceed with a second retrial was within the judge’s discretion and was justified by the seriousness of the offence and the public interest in prosecuting the guilty.
• The prosecution had behaved properly by submitting reasoned arguments to the Director of Public Prosecutions and allowing the appellant's legal team to make representations.
• The evidence of the two witnesses was relevant and probative, showing the appellant was a knife carrier, which was significant given the nature of the murder weapon.
• Although the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was in force, the prosecution relied on common law rules for admissibility, which were considered more stringent and appropriate for a retrial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered the propriety of a second retrial after two previous hung juries. It acknowledged there is no legal rule barring a second retrial but recognized a convention against it. The court applied the principles from Bowe v R, emphasizing a discretionary, fact-sensitive approach balancing the interests of justice, defendant's rights, and public interest. The judge had properly considered all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the procedural history, and the appellant’s arguments. The judge also noted the prosecution's careful approach in seeking the retrial and the opportunity afforded to the defence to make representations. Consequently, the court found the judge’s decision within the scope of her discretion and not unjust or oppressive.

Regarding the admission of evidence from the two witnesses about the appellant carrying a knife, the court acknowledged the Criminal Justice Act 2003 governed bad character evidence at the time of the retrial. The judge applied the common law test, which was arguably more stringent. The evidence was deemed relevant and probative, outweighing prejudicial effect, as it supported the prosecution’s case that the appellant was a knife carrier, significant given the murder weapon was never recovered. The appellant's counsel argued the evidence should have been excluded under the Act’s structured tests, particularly section 101, but the court concluded that even if the Act had been properly applied, the evidence would still have been admitted. The court rejected the argument that the failure to apply the Act undermined the conviction’s safety, holding that the admission of the evidence was proper and did not prejudice the appellant.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appellant's appeal against conviction.

The decision confirms that a second retrial after two hung juries is permissible within judicial discretion, provided the interests of justice are served and the retrial is not oppressive or unjust. It also clarifies that the admission of bad character evidence must comply with the Criminal Justice Act 2003, but where common law tests were applied and the evidence was clearly relevant and probative, the failure to strictly apply the Act does not necessarily render a conviction unsafe. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling affirms established principles regarding retrials and evidential admissibility in serious criminal cases.