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Sutradhar v. Natural Environment Research Council
Factual and Procedural Background
The Claimant, a resident of The State, alleges that he contracted arsenic poisoning from local drinking water. He attributes his injury to a 1992 geological report prepared by Company A (a subsidiary of Company B). The report, commissioned and funded by Company C, analysed 31 elements in groundwater samples but did not test for arsenic. The Claimant contends that the report’s omission caused public‐health authorities to believe the water was safe, delaying mitigation measures that would otherwise have protected him.
At first instance, Judge [Last Name] refused to grant summary judgment to Company B. A majority of the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and struck out the claim, holding that no duty of care was arguable. The Claimant appealed to the House of Lords. The present opinion dismisses that appeal and affirms summary judgment in favour of Company B.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Claimant has any real prospect of establishing that Company B owed him a duty of care in negligence for statements (express or implied) contained in the 1992 geological report.
- Whether, in the context of negligent misstatement jurisprudence, the relationship between Company B and residents of The State possessed the requisite proximity to impose such a duty.
- Whether summary judgment was properly granted under CPR r 24.2 on the ground that the claim disclosed no real prospect of success and no compelling reason for a trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimant’s Arguments
- Implied Misrepresentation: By omitting arsenic from the list of tested elements, the report implicitly represented that arsenic testing was unnecessary, thereby inducing public authorities not to investigate further.
- Reasonable Reliance: The report was distributed to governmental and non-governmental bodies responsible for water safety, and it was foreseeable that they would rely on it when deciding whether further tests were needed.
- Foreseeability of Harm: Injury from contaminated water was a foreseeable consequence of failing to alert authorities to potential toxins.
- Development of the Law: Modern authorities recognise duties of care arising from negligent statements that create physical harm, even absent contractual or statutory relationships.
Defendant’s Arguments
- No Proximity: Company B had neither control over nor responsibility for the public water supply; its sole role was the production of a limited scientific report.
- No Positive Duty to Test: No entity asked Company A to certify potability; therefore, it owed no duty to test for arsenic or any other unrequested element.
- Absence of Misrepresentation: The report clearly listed the elements analysed and made no express or implied statement about arsenic.
- Policy and Cost: Allowing the claim to proceed would expose scientific bodies to indeterminate liability and impose disproportionate litigation costs where prospects of success are minimal.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 | Scope of summary judgment under CPR r 24.2 | Cited to emphasise that courts should terminate cases with no real prospect of success. |
Three Rivers (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 | Confirmation of Swain v Hillman principles and the need for justice to both sides | Reinforced the appropriateness of striking out hopeless claims. |
Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 | Tripartite test: foreseeability, proximity, and fairness | Utilised to show lack of proximity between Company B and the Claimant. |
Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465 | Liability for negligent misstatements in the absence of contract | Distinguished; court held the present facts fell outside the narrow class envisaged. |
Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491 | Historic position excluding liability for negligent statements | Referenced to illustrate the evolution of the law since. |
Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164 | Denning LJ’s dissent foreshadowing Hedley Byrne | Used to highlight the limited circumstances where duty for statements arises. |
Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s LR 255 | Duty arising where defendant controls whether a dangerous activity occurs | Distinguished; unlike the aircraft inspector in Perrett, Company B had no control over drinking water. |
Clay v AJ Crump & Sons Ltd [1964] 1 QB 533 | Liability where a professional controls a physical hazard | Distinguished on same basis. |
Watson v British Boxing Board of Control Ltd [2001] QB 1134 | Duty where defendant assumes responsibility for safety arrangements | Court found no comparable assumption of responsibility here. |
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 | Neighbour principle for physical injury | Referred to show that negligent statement cases require closer proximity than Donoghue entails. |
Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 | Limits on imposing duty due to policy considerations | Cited as an example of circumstances where policy negates duty. |
Parkinson v St James’s Hospital [2002] QB 266 | Policy limits in “wrongful birth” claims | Another illustration of fairness considerations. |
Brooks v Commissioner of Police [2005] 1 WLR 1495 | Policy constraints on duties owed by public bodies | Referenced to underline caution in extending duties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The House of Lords accepted the Claimant’s factual allegations for the purpose of the summary-judgment test but concluded that, even on those assumptions, the claim was “hopeless.” Applying the Caparo framework, the Court found:
- Foreseeability: Physical injury from contaminated water was arguably foreseeable.
- Proximity: No sufficient proximity existed. Company B had neither statutory authority nor practical control over The State’s drinking-water programme. Its involvement was limited to producing an academic report.
- Fair, Just and Reasonable: Imposing liability would expose scientific researchers to indeterminate claims by vast, undefined classes of persons and would be unjust given the absence of control or responsibility.
Turning to negligent misstatement principles (Hedley Byrne), the Court held that liability arises only when a professional knows that a statement will be relied upon in a specific transaction or by an identifiable class. Here, the report was a reconnaissance study, openly stating which elements were and were not tested. Any implied reassurance about arsenic was, at most, a reflection of then-prevailing orthodoxy shared by all relevant agencies. Accordingly, no duty to the Claimant arose.
Finally, the Court emphasised that CPR r 24.2 empowers courts to avoid costly, complex trials where claims lack a realistic prospect of success. Given the enormous public expense already incurred and the speculative chain of causation alleged, justice to both parties required dismissal at this stage.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The order granting summary judgment to Company B stands, and the Claimant’s action is struck out.
Implications: The decision reinforces the stringent proximity requirements governing negligent misstatement claims, particularly where scientific publications are concerned. It affirms the utility of summary judgment under the Civil Procedure Rules to curtail litigation that lacks a realistic prospect of success. No new legal principles were created; rather, existing doctrine was clarified and applied to a novel factual scenario.
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