Robinson v West Yorkshire Police

Factual and Procedural Background

On 29 July 2008, the Plaintiff was walking along a busy street in The City when she became inadvertently involved in the arrest of a suspected drug dealer by police officers. During the arrest, the suspect struggled violently, causing the Plaintiff to be knocked to the ground and injured. The Plaintiff subsequently initiated a claim against the local Chief Constable for damages for personal injury, alleging negligence. The trial judge found negligence on the part of the arresting officer but dismissed the claim on the basis of police immunity in the context of crime suppression. The Plaintiff was granted permission to appeal the issue of immunity, while the Defendant sought to appeal findings of duty and negligence but supported the ultimate dismissal. This appeal concerns the extent of the Chief Constable’s liability in negligence for the incident.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the three-stage Caparo test for duty of care applies to claims of direct physical harm caused by police officers during the investigation and suppression of crime.
2. Whether the police owe a duty of care to individual members of the public injured as a direct result of police actions in arresting suspects.
3. Whether the principle of police immunity (the Hill principle) applies to bar negligence claims arising from police conduct in the course of investigating and suppressing crime.
4. Whether the trial judge erred in applying a blanket immunity to the police.
5. Whether the requirement of "outrageous negligence" is necessary to overcome the Hill principle.
6. The extent to which proximity and assumption of responsibility affect the imposition of a duty of care on the police in operational decisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Caparo three-stage test should not apply to claims of direct physical harm caused by police officers; only foreseeability and proximity are relevant, excluding public policy considerations.
• There is a general duty on police officers not to cause direct physical harm to members of the public, even when engaged in crime suppression.
• Distinction should be drawn between direct physical harm and indirect harm (e.g., failure to prevent harm by third parties), with the former not subject to the full Caparo test.
• There is a higher moral culpability for officers who directly cause physical harm, justifying enforcement of duty of care.
• Relied on authorities such as Hill v Chief Constable West Yorkshire Police, Knightley v Johns, and Rigby v Chief Constable to support liability for direct negligence.
• Suggested that police immunity should be limited and does not provide blanket protection, especially in cases of direct harm.

Respondent's Arguments

• The three-stage Caparo test applies fully, including the requirement that it be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty.
• The police do not owe a duty of care to individual members of the public in the investigation and suppression of crime, consistent with the Hill principle.
• The harm suffered by the Plaintiff was indirect, caused by the suspect’s actions, and thus the claim fails at the duty stage.
• The trial judge’s findings of duty and negligence were unsustainable on the evidence.
• Police immunity is not a blanket protection but applies broadly to operational decisions to avoid defensive policing.
• Cases of assumed responsibility or non-core functions (e.g., negligent traffic management) are exceptions to the immunity principle.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by affirming the foundational principle from Donoghue v Stevenson that a duty of care arises when harm is reasonably foreseeable and there is sufficient proximity between the parties. It rejected the Appellant’s argument that the Caparo test’s third limb—whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty—does not apply to claims of direct physical harm by police officers. The court held that the full Caparo test applies to all negligence claims, including those involving direct physical damage.

The court carefully analysed the principle of police immunity, primarily derived from Hill v Chief Constable West Yorkshire Police, which provides that police officers do not owe a duty of care to individual members of the public in the investigation and suppression of crime, to avoid defensive policing. This immunity is not absolute but applies broadly to operational decisions. Exceptions exist where police assume responsibility or in cases of "outrageous negligence," but these are narrowly construed.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the harm to the Plaintiff was indirect, caused by the suspect’s violent resistance, not a direct result of police negligence. Therefore, imposing a duty of care would fail the third stage of the Caparo test as it would not be fair, just and reasonable. The trial judge’s findings of duty and breach were unsustainable, partly due to conflating physical proximity with legal proximity, which requires a special relationship beyond mere presence.

The court also emphasised the difficulty of judging police operational decisions with hindsight and noted that the arresting officers acted with reasonable care given the circumstances. The brief delay of backup officers was justified by tactical considerations and did not amount to negligence.

Finally, the court rejected the Appellant’s contention that the immunity principle requires a finding of "outrageous negligence" to be defeated, noting the trial judge did not apply such a restrictive test and that the principle remains subject to exceptions but not defined by this threshold.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL.

The decision confirms the continued application of the Hill principle, maintaining police immunity from negligence claims arising from their operational duties in investigating and suppressing crime, including arrests. The court clarified that the full Caparo test applies universally, including to claims of direct physical harm, and that the third limb—fairness, justice and reasonableness—often precludes imposing duties on police in these contexts to avoid defensive policing. The ruling reinforces that mere physical proximity to police operations does not establish legal proximity sufficient to impose a duty of care. No new precedent was set; rather, existing principles were reaffirmed and applied to the facts. The direct consequence is that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Chief Constable fails, and the police remain broadly shielded from negligence claims in core operational functions.