Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Barrett v. London Borough of Enfield
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant was taken into care at the age of ten months pursuant to successive care orders obtained by the Respondent local authority. Between 1973 and 1990 the Appellant experienced numerous foster placements, residential home moves and brief, supervised contact with his mother. He alleges that the Respondent’s cumulative failures in managing his upbringing left him, on leaving care at 18, without family attachments and suffering from psychiatric illness, alcohol misuse and self-harm.
In 1993 the Appellant issued proceedings in negligence. A district judge rejected the Respondent’s application to strike out the claim, but a county court judge reversed that decision. The Court of Appeal affirmed the strike-out, holding that no actionable duty of care arose. The present judgment concerns the Appellant’s further appeal to the House of Lords, which ultimately allowed the appeal and reinstated the claim for trial.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a local authority owing statutory duties under the children’s legislation also owes a common-law duty of care to a child in its care for the manner in which those duties are performed.
- Whether alleged negligence that involves the exercise of statutory discretion is justiciable, or barred as a matter of public policy.
- Whether, on the pleadings, the Appellant has any realistic prospect of proving causation between the alleged negligent acts/omissions and his psychiatric injury.
- Whether striking out the claim would conflict with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to court).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The statutory relationship placed the Respondent in loco parentis, creating proximity sufficient for a duty of care analogous to that owed by hospitals or schools.
- The pleaded breaches (e.g., repeated moves, failure to consider adoption, inadequate psychiatric input) are operational acts that can be assessed by ordinary negligence standards and do not require the court to second-guess high-level social policy.
- Questions of causation are fact-sensitive and should be resolved at trial with expert evidence, not on a strike-out.
- A blanket denial of liability risks infringing Article 6 ECHR as interpreted in Osman v. United Kingdom.
Respondent's Arguments
- The claim challenges discretionary child-care decisions; under authorities such as X v. Bedfordshire County Council and Stovin v. Wise it is not fair, just or reasonable to impose a duty of care.
- Public-policy concerns (defensive social work, diversion of resources) justify striking out.
- Even if some operational negligence could be alleged, the pleaded psychiatric injury is too remote and cannot be causally linked to any actionable breach.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| X v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 | Policy reasons may preclude a duty of care where social-service discretions are involved. | Distinguished; similarities acknowledged but held not to mandate strike-out in present facts. |
| Stovin v. Wise [1996] AC 923 | No liability for omissions involving statutory discretion without clear duty. | Relied on by Respondent; Lords held case concerned omissions, not applicable to present operational acts. |
| Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 | Three-stage test: foreseeability, proximity, fairness. | Foreseeability and proximity accepted; dispute centred on whether duty is “fair, just and reasonable.” |
| Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd v. Home Office [1970] AC 1004 | Liability may arise where statutory powers are exercised carelessly outside reasonable discretion. | Cited to show that excessive or unreasonable use of discretion can found liability. |
| Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 | Public-policy immunity for policing functions. | Compared but distinguished; House rejected blanket immunity approach. |
| Osman v. United Kingdom (ECtHR, 1998) | Article 6 requires practical access to court; blanket immunities may breach Convention rights. | Influenced Lords’ caution against striking out at interlocutory stage. |
| Phelps v. Hillingdon LBC [1999] 1 WLR 500 | Necessity of deciding negligence cases on found facts, not assumptions. | Illustrated dangers of premature strike-out and informed final decision. |
| Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 | Professional negligence standard for skilled persons. | Applied to social-work professionals; standard to be assessed at trial. |
| Anns v. Merton LBC [1978] AC 728 | Policy/operational distinction guidance. | Discussed; Lords emphasised inadequacy of rigid policy/operational dichotomy. |
| Page v. Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 | No distinction between physical and psychiatric injury for foreseeability. | Cited to support pleading of psychiatric damage. |
| Capital Counties plc v. Hampshire CC [1997] QB 1004 | No general immunity for emergency-service professionals. | Used by Appellant to rebut argument for blanket immunity for social workers. |
| H. v. Norfolk County Council [1997] 1 FLR 384 | Applied X v. Bedfordshire to foster-care abuse; no duty owed. | Relied on by Court of Appeal; House noted factual differences. |
| A. v. Liverpool City Council [1982] AC 363 | Wardship court will not override local-authority care decisions. | Considered but distinguished: present case concerns damages, not supervisory jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Strike-out principles. The House reaffirmed that a strike-out is appropriate only where success is impossible. Negligence claims involving developing areas of law should normally proceed to trial so that findings can be made on actual, not hypothetical, facts.
Duty of care. Using the Caparo framework, the Lords found foreseeability and proximity “plainly satisfied.” On the third limb, they rejected a blanket policy immunity. Decisions such as placement changes, adoption planning and psychiatric referral are capable of being judged by ordinary negligence standards and do not necessarily require evaluation of high-level resource allocation.
Policy versus operational acts. The traditional policy/operational distinction was considered “uncertain and developing.” Even if some impugned decisions were discretionary, others – e.g., monitoring foster placements or obtaining expert assessments – were operational and potentially actionable.
European Convention considerations. The Lords gave weight to Osman v. United Kingdom, noting the risk that a blanket strike-out could breach Article 6 by denying the claimant a substantive hearing.
Causation. Causation was treated as a factual matter for trial. Expert reports suggested that negligent management of care could be a “significant causal determinant” of the Appellant’s psychiatric condition. It was therefore inappropriate to dismiss the claim summarily.
Standard of care. While emphasising the difficult tasks faced by social-services staff, the Court held that professional social workers are subject to the Bolam standard; whether that standard was breached requires evidence.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: the appeal was ALLOWED; the strike-out order was set aside and the claim was reinstated for trial.
Implications: The judgment confirms that local authorities can, in principle, owe a common-law duty of care to children in their care and that courts should be slow to strike out such claims without factual exploration. It does not establish liability but signals that policy concerns do not automatically immunise social-service decisions from negligence scrutiny, especially post-Osman. The decision encourages full trials where the boundary between policy and operational fault is uncertain.
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