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Deeds v. Various Respondents
Factual and Procedural Background
On 11 December 2012, a General Civil Restraint Order ("GCRO") was made by Swift J in the High Court of Justice Birmingham District Registry against the Appellant. This order, effective until 10 December 2014, required the Appellant to seek court permission before initiating any civil proceedings. Paragraph 6 of the order allowed the Appellant to apply without prior permission to set aside, vary, or stay the order, or to seek permission to appeal.
The Appellant applied to set aside the GCRO pursuant to paragraph 6(1), but the application was considered on paper and refused by Males J, sitting in the Birmingham County Court, on 15 February 2013. The Appellant then applied to set aside Males J’s order, arguing denial of an oral hearing. Morgan J, sitting in the Birmingham District Registry, also refused this application on the papers, holding that Males J was entitled to decide the matter without a hearing under Practice Direction 3C paragraph 4.6.
Consequently, the Appellant has not had an oral hearing to explain why the GCRO should not have been made against him.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the refusal to grant an oral hearing to the Appellant in the application to set aside the GCRO constituted a serious procedural irregularity rendering the decision unjust.
- Whether the procedural rules and Practice Directions permit or require an oral hearing in applications to set aside a GCRO made on the court’s own initiative.
- The proper interpretation and application of CPR Part 3.3 and Practice Direction 3C regarding orders made without notice and applications to set them aside.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant contended he had a right to a fair hearing under common law and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- He argued that the right to a hearing, as stated in the GCRO, implied an oral hearing rather than a paper-based consideration.
- He claimed a legitimate expectation of an oral hearing which was denied.
Respondents' Arguments
- The Respondents accepted a procedural irregularity occurred but argued it caused no injustice.
- They referred to precedent establishing that an oral hearing is not required in every case, a proposition not disputed by the Appellant.
- They suggested that if the application had been treated under CPR 23.8(c), dealing with the matter on papers would have been appropriate.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
R (Ewing) v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWCA 504 (Admin) | Oral hearing not required in every case involving civil restraint orders. | Accepted as authority that an oral hearing is not invariably necessary but distinguished on facts. |
R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2007] 1 WLR 5511 | Power to make Civil Restraint Orders on court’s own initiative is exceptional and usually urgent interim measure. | Used to emphasize the exceptional nature of the GCRO and that an oral hearing should follow promptly. |
Connah v Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 1616 | Reinforces the exceptional and urgent nature of orders made on court’s own initiative. | Supported the view that affected parties should have opportunity for oral hearing subsequently. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the procedural history and the relevant Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and Practice Directions. It noted that the GCRO was made on the court’s own initiative under CPR 3.3, which entitles the affected party to apply to have the order set aside without prior permission. The court found that the applications made by the Appellant were incorrectly treated under Practice Direction 3C paragraph 4.6, which mandates determination without a hearing for applications for permission to amend or discharge a GCRO but does not apply to the initial application to set aside the order once permission is granted.
The court held that Males J and Morgan J erred in deciding the matter on the papers without an oral hearing, especially given the serious effect of the GCRO on the Appellant’s access to the courts and the language of the original order promising a hearing. The court stressed the presumption in favour of oral hearings when fundamental rights such as access to justice are at stake.
The court also considered the possibility that the application could have been dealt with under CPR 23.8(c), allowing paper determination if a hearing is inappropriate, but concluded that even if that were so, the order should have recorded the Appellant’s right to apply to set it aside, which it did not. Thus, the procedural safeguards were insufficient.
In distinguishing the precedent from R (Ewing), the court noted that in that case the litigants had already been declared vexatious after oral hearings, whereas here the Appellant had not had any oral opportunity to challenge the GCRO.
Ultimately, the court emphasized that fairness requires the Appellant be given an oral hearing to present reasons why the GCRO should not stand.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and set aside the order made by Males J. It directed that the Appellant's application to set aside the GCRO be considered at an oral hearing before a High Court Judge. The court specified that the oral hearing need not be lengthy and advised timely submission of written materials.
The direct effect is that the Appellant will now have an opportunity for an oral hearing to challenge the GCRO. No new legal precedent was established beyond clarifying the application and interpretation of CPR Part 3.3 and Practice Direction 3C in the context of GCROs made on the court’s own initiative.
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