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Hegarty v. Department of Justice and Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant, currently incarcerated, initiated a judicial review challenging two decisions dated 06 December 2017: (i) a recommendation by a single Commissioner of the Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland to revoke the licence upon which the Applicant had been released from sentenced custody the previous day, and (ii) the Department of Justice's decision to revoke the Applicant's licence on the same date. The Applicant had been sentenced to five years imprisonment and five years licence, released on 05 December 2017, with electronic monitoring as a licence condition. On 05 December 2017, G4S personnel attempted to install electronic monitoring equipment at the Applicant's residence but were refused entry. The police reported this incident, leading the Commissioner to recommend licence revocation, which the Department accepted, resulting in the Applicant’s recall to custody.
The judicial review proceedings were initiated on 15 December 2017, with a case management order issued on 20 December 2017 setting a hearing initially for 08 January 2018, later rescheduled to 22 January 2018, and eventually to 09 February 2018 due to procedural irregularities including late affidavits and amendments. The court emphasized expedition due to the liberty interests at stake.
The Applicant filed three lengthy affidavits supplemented by affidavits from his solicitors, but these were criticized for prolixity, containing comment, conjecture, and double hearsay, obscuring the core factual and legal issues. Procedural compliance was highlighted as a concern, with the court urging adherence to affidavit and pleading requirements to avoid unnecessary delay and costs.
The statutory framework governing the licence recall is the Criminal Justice (NI) Order 2008, particularly Article 28, which provides that the Department of Justice may revoke a prisoner’s licence on the recommendation of the Parole Commissioners or in the public interest without such recommendation. The Parole Commissioners have an advisory role, and the Department is the ultimate decision maker. The Applicant was informed of his recall reasons and his right to make written representations.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decision of the Department of Justice to revoke the Applicant’s licence was irrational under the Wednesbury principle.
- Whether there was a failure to conduct adequate enquiries as required by public law principles, including the duty to take into account all material facts and considerations.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Re Mullan's Application [2007] NICA 47 | Sets the standard for the threshold of judicial intervention in licence recall decisions; emphasises the need for high-quality decision making with a recognition of the liberty interest. | Used to support the high threshold for intervention and the nature of the recall decision as less adjudicative than later reviews. |
R v Department for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 | Describes reasonableness as a spectrum and the Wednesbury principle as a sliding scale of review, dependent on the gravity of what is at stake. | Supported the court’s approach to applying a calibrated intensity of review in a liberty-depriving context. |
Sheffield City Council v Smart [2002] EWCA Civ 4 | Judicial review intensity varies with subject matter. | Reinforced the principle that the intensity of review is context-dependent. |
Re S-C [1996] 1 All ER 532 | Fundamental constitutional principle protecting liberty, tracing back to Magna Carta. | Underpinned the court’s emphasis on the protection of liberty in reviewing recall decisions. |
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 | Every person’s body is inviolate; fundamental principle protecting personal liberty. | Supported the court’s recognition of the importance of liberty interests. |
Eleko v Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662 | Executive interference with liberty/property must be legally justified before a court. | Emphasized judicial scrutiny of executive decisions affecting liberty. |
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 104 | Decision makers must ask the right questions and take reasonable steps to acquaint themselves with relevant information. | Referenced in discussion of the duty to inquire and take into account material facts. |
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407 | Decision maker must be fully informed of all material facts and circumstances. | Supported the principle that failure to adequately inform oneself can vitiate a decision. |
Naraynsingh v Commissioner of Police [2004] UKPC 20 | More investigation may be required where further information is obviously available. | Used to illustrate the duty of inquiry in public law decisions. |
R (Khatun) v Newham LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 55 | Decision maker decides manner and intensity of inquiry subject to Wednesbury review. | Supported the view that courts give deference to decision makers on procedural matters. |
R (Plantagenet Alliance) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin) | High threshold for establishing failure to undertake necessary inquiries in public law decisions. | Supported a restrictive approach to challenging decision makers on inquiry duties. |
Hirst v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Parole Board [2006] EWCA Civ 945 | Assumption of good faith in reports submitted to decision makers. | Referenced to reject the idea that bad faith is the only ground to challenge initial reports. |
R (Gulliver) v Parole Board [2008] 1 WLR 1116 | Legality of recall does not require proof of breach, only reasonable belief of breach. | Supported the standard applied by the Department and Commissioner in assessing the Applicant’s conduct. |
R (West) v Parole Board [2005] 1 WLR 350 | Decision maker need only be satisfied that the prisoner appears not to comply with licence conditions. | Reinforced the reasonableness standard in recall decisions. |
Re Raineys Application [2017] NIQB 98 | Department’s discretion in licence revocation is broad; challenges only on irrationality grounds. | Affirmed the broad discretion and high threshold for challenge in this case. |
Re Edgar's Application [2017] NIQB 85 | Single Commissioner’s recommendation is an intermediate, non-binding step. | Supported the view that the Department’s decision is the final legally effective decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed review of the procedural history, evidential material, and legal framework governing licence revocation. It emphasized the high threshold for judicial intervention in decisions involving deprivation of liberty, applying the Wednesbury principle with an intensity calibrated to the liberty interest involved. The court identified two core grounds of challenge: irrationality and failure to make adequate enquiries.
Regarding irrationality, the court found that the Department’s decision to revoke the licence was within the range of reasonable decisions, applying the dual test: (i) whether the risk of harm to the public had increased more than minimally since release, and (ii) whether the increased risk could be safely managed in the community. Both questions were answered affirmatively in the negative, justifying revocation.
On the duty of inquiry, the court acknowledged that the single Commissioner relied on a police report which contained an opaque and unparticularised statement about the Applicant’s "wilful disengagement" and refusal to consent to electronic monitoring before release. The court criticized the Commissioner for not seeking clarification from the police officer, especially given the liberty implications and the availability of direct contact information. However, as the Department’s final decision maker expressly disavowed reliance on this particular statement and no cross-examination challenged the Departmental official’s affidavit, the court concluded no legal defect arose from this issue in the final decision.
The court also highlighted the importance of procedural compliance, including proper affidavit preparation and case management, and urged practitioners to adhere strictly to established rules. It recognized the need for expeditious decision-making in licence recall cases to protect the public and acknowledged the advisory role of the Parole Commissioners vis-à-vis the Department’s final decision.
In assessing the evidence, the court accepted the Department’s position that the Applicant was aware of and subject to electronic monitoring conditions and that his refusal to allow installation of monitoring equipment constituted a material breach increasing the risk to public safety. The court found no irrationality or procedural impropriety sufficient to overturn the Department’s decision.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the Applicant's judicial review challenge.
The direct effect of this decision is the affirmation of the Department of Justice’s licence revocation and the Applicant’s continued detention. No new legal precedent was established. The court emphasized the broad discretion afforded to the Department in licence revocation decisions, subject only to a high threshold of irrationality and procedural fairness. The judgment underscores the importance of rigorous adherence to procedural requirements and the necessity for clarity and accuracy in reports underpinning recall decisions, given the significant liberty interests involved.
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