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Collins v. Godefroy
Factual and Procedural Background
This case arose from an action brought by Plaintiff, an attorney subpoenaed as a witness in a civil suit between Party A and Party B. Plaintiff attended court for six days but was not called to give evidence. After Party A obtained a verdict later set aside, Plaintiff demanded six guineas as compensation for loss of time due to attendance on subpoena. Party A denied owing the sum, believing it had been paid by their attorney. Plaintiff commenced an action to recover the fee. Party A applied to the Court of King's Bench to stay the proceedings upon payment of the six guineas without costs; the Court granted this rule absolute. Party A did not pay costs and pleaded the general issue. At trial before Lord Tenterden C.J., it was held that Plaintiff was not entitled to recover because attendance on subpoena is a legal duty, and Plaintiff was nonsuited with liberty to move to enter a verdict for six guineas.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an attorney subpoenaed as a witness in a civil suit can maintain an action against the party who subpoenaed him for compensation for loss of time incurred by attendance.
- Whether the statute 5 Eliz. c. 9, s. 12 affects the right to claim compensation for loss of time as a witness.
- Whether an express or implied promise to pay compensation to a witness for loss of time is enforceable at law.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- Attendance on subpoena to give evidence is a duty imposed by law on all persons; therefore, no action for compensation for loss of time can be maintained.
- The law does not imply a promise by the party on whose behalf the duty is performed to pay remuneration, and an express promise would be void for lack of consideration.
- Precedents show that officials performing duties imposed by law cannot recover compensation for costs or loss of time from parties benefiting from those duties.
- The statute 5 Eliz. c. 9, s. 12 mandates only reasonable costs and charges for attendance, not compensation for loss of time, indicating no common law right exists.
- Practice in taxation of costs does not alter the law.
- Even if there was an express promise, no consideration existed to support it.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The action is maintainable at common law, independently of the statute.
- The statute does not bar the action but provides an additional remedy to secure witness attendance.
- There was evidence of an express promise to pay compensation for loss of time.
- A professional witness attending for the benefit of a party, rather than the public, should be compensated for loss of time.
- Usage in the Master's office allowing compensation for professional witnesses supports an implied contract to pay.
- Leaving compensation to the discretion of parties would risk corruption.
- Precedents allow compensation for medical men and attorneys, and the case law cited does not preclude attorneys from recovering.
- The defendant’s offer to pay six guineas without costs evidences an express promise and moral obligation to compensate Plaintiff.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bridge v. Cage (Cro. Jac. 103) | A promise to pay for performing a duty imposed by law without consideration is void. | Supported the principle that attendance on subpoena is a legal duty not giving rise to a right to compensation. |
| Morris v. Burdett (1 Campb. 218) | Officers performing statutory duties cannot recover expenses from parties benefiting. | Reinforced that duties imposed by law do not create a right to compensation. |
| Dew v. Parsons | Practice in taxation of costs does not create a legal right to compensation. | Used to distinguish between legal rights and procedural cost allowances. |
| Willis v. Peckham (Brod. & B. 515) | A witness cannot recover compensation for loss of time even with express promise. | Confirmed that compensation claims for loss of time are generally not enforceable. |
| Moor v. Adam (5 M. & S. 156) | No compensation allowed for loss of time to certain witnesses (e.g., merchants from abroad). | Supported refusal to allow compensation for loss of time to witnesses generally. |
| Severn v. Olive (3 B. & B. 72) | Compensation for loss of time allowed only to medical men and attorneys. | Discussed the scope of compensation for professional witnesses, relevant to Plaintiff's status. |
| Lopez v. De Tastet (3 B. & B. 292) | No allowance for loss of time for brokers as witnesses. | Distinguished professional categories eligible for compensation. |
| Schimmel v. Lousada (4 Taunt. 695) | Costs allowed for detaining a foreign witness necessary to the cause, but not for bringing him over before action. | Noted exceptions for foreign witnesses not accessible by subpoena. |
| Thellusson v. Staples (Doug. 438) | Referenced in notes regarding witness attendance and compensation. | Provided contextual precedent related to witness attendance. |
| Lonergan v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company (7 Bingh. 729) | Allowance of compensation for professional men for loss of time. | Supported discussion on compensation to professional witnesses. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined whether attendance on subpoena as a witness creates a legal duty that precludes recovery for loss of time. It found that such attendance is indeed a legal obligation imposed by law, and therefore no implied promise to pay compensation arises. The statute 5 Eliz. c. 9, s. 12 was interpreted as requiring only reasonable costs and charges related to attendance, not compensation for loss of time. The court acknowledged the existence of a practice to allow compensation between parties but held that this practice does not alter the legal principle. Even assuming an express promise to pay existed, the court held that without a legal duty to pay, such a promise lacks consideration and is unenforceable. The court considered relevant precedents and statutory provisions and concluded that no action lies for compensation for loss of time in attendance as a witness under subpoena. The court also noted that the defendant's offer to pay without costs did not constitute acceptance and thus did not affect the legal position.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court held that an attorney attending court as a witness pursuant to subpoena cannot maintain an action against the party who subpoenaed him for compensation for loss of time. The legal duty to attend does not give rise to an enforceable promise to pay remuneration. The statute and case law support this conclusion, and the practice of allowing costs between parties does not alter the law. The direct effect is that Plaintiff's claim was dismissed with costs. The court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed existing principles limiting compensation claims by witnesses for loss of time.
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