Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted of murder at the Assizes in The County for strangling an 18-year-old woman on 22 December 1960. After the conviction, the Appellant’s appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal in The Region was dismissed on 18 July 1961. The Court nevertheless certified that two points of law of general public importance arose and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords under the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The present opinion resolves that further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, after the jury had rejected the Appellant’s plea of insanity, it remained open to him to rely on a separate defence of automatism.
2. If so, whether, on the evidence adduced at trial, the issue of automatism ought to have been left to the jury.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to leave manslaughter to the jury on the basis that the Appellant lacked the specific intent required for murder.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The ultimate burden lay on the Crown to prove that the killing was a conscious and voluntary act.
• Evidence of “blackouts,” prior odd behaviour, scratches, and removal of the victim’s clothing provided a “volume of evidence” capable of raising a reasonable doubt that the acts were voluntary.
• The jury should have been directed to analyse the evidence through a series of questions (labelled A–D) that distinguished: (a) involuntary action; (b) involuntariness caused by disease of the mind (insanity); and (c) involuntariness from any other cause (pure automatism), acquitting if reasonable doubt remained.
• Even if insanity failed, manslaughter should have been left to the jury on the basis of diminished capacity to form intent.

Respondent's Arguments

• All medical evidence tied the alleged blackout solely to psychomotor epilepsy, which falls within the M'Naghten definition of “disease of the mind.”
• Once the jury rejected insanity, there was no evidential foundation for any alternative, non-insane automatism defence.
• No evidence capable of supporting a manslaughter verdict was adduced; therefore the judge correctly withheld that issue.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The House held that automatism can be a stand-alone defence in rare circumstances, but only where there is positive evidence pointing to involuntary action unconnected with disease of the mind.

2. All medical testimony attributed any possible blackout solely to psychomotor epilepsy, a “disease of the mind” under the M'Naghten Rules. Once the jury rejected insanity, that evidence was necessarily rejected also; no alternative pathological or external cause was suggested.

3. Applying Hill v. Baxter and Mancini, a trial judge must first determine whether evidence exists on which a reasonable jury could find automatism. Here, after excluding the rejected insanity evidence, nothing remained that could rationally support automatism.

4. Because the Appellant failed to lay this “proper foundation,” the trial judge properly withheld any direction on automatism; instructing otherwise would have invited speculation contrary to the requirement that defences be grounded in evidence.

5. On manslaughter, the House adopted the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeal that no evidence demonstrated impairment sufficient to negate the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. Accordingly, the judge’s refusal to leave manslaughter was correct.

6. The House clarified dicta in overseas authorities (notably Cottle) by emphasising that automatism directions are obligatory only where evidence supports a non-insane cause of involuntariness. The ruling harmonises the doctrines of insanity, automatism, and the overarching Woolmington principle.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Immediate Effect: The conviction for murder stands; no new trial is ordered.

Broader Implications: The decision affirms that:

• A judge must withhold an automatism direction unless credible evidence supports involuntary action independent of disease of the mind.
• Where the only suggested cause of unconsciousness is itself a “disease of the mind,” the defence is one of insanity, carrying the evidential and legal burdens prescribed by M'Naghten.
• The ruling provides authoritative guidance on the evidential threshold for raising automatism, thereby narrowing the circumstances in which the defence may be left to a jury.