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Vacher & Sons Ltd v. London Society of Compositors
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellants, a firm engaged in printing, issued proceedings for conspiracy and libel against the Respondents, a registered trade union. The gravamen of the claim was that the Respondents had falsely portrayed the Appellants as unfair employers. Before any defence was filed, the Respondents applied to have the union struck out as a defendant on the footing that section 4(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 forbade tort actions against a trade union.
A Master granted the strike-out order. A single judge (Judge A) set that order aside, directing that the issue stand over to trial. The Court of Appeal (by majority) reinstated the strike-out. The present appeal was brought to the House of Lords, which dismissed it and thereby confirmed that the action could not proceed against the union.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 4(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 prohibits all tort actions against a trade union, irrespective of whether the alleged tort was committed “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.”
- Whether section 4(2) of the Act operates as a proviso limiting the breadth of section 4(1) by implication.
- Whether, on the face of the pleadings, the alleged libel was an act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute so as to affect the court’s jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Section 4(1) must be read in the context of sections 1–3, each of which expressly confines immunity to acts done “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”; the same limitation should be implied into section 4(1).
- The long and short titles of the Act show that Parliament’s focus was trade disputes; a construction giving unions blanket immunity would raise them above the law and could not have been intended.
- The presence of the limiting words in section 4(2) demonstrates that Parliament meant the same limitation to qualify section 4(1).
- A literal reading would lead to absurd or unjust consequences, which the court should avoid.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The wording of section 4(1) is clear, precise, and unambiguous; courts must not insert language that Parliament omitted.
- Sections 1–3 deal with individuals and combinations generally; section 4 is a distinct provision directed exclusively to trade unions, implementing a different legislative objective.
- Section 4(2) concerns only the continuing liability of trustees under the Trade Union Act 1871 and cannot be read as a proviso to section 4(1).
- Even if a limitation were relevant, the pleading itself suggests the impugned statements were made in the context of an industrial dispute.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent (Anonymized) | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Precedent A (Statutory Construction Case 1) | Courts adhere to the ordinary grammatical meaning of statutory words unless that would produce absurdity. | Cited to justify giving section 4(1) its plain meaning. |
Precedent B (Statutory Construction Case 2) | If statutory language is precise and unambiguous, it alone expresses legislative intent. | Relied on to reject speculation about parliamentary motives. |
Precedent C (Tort Liability of Trade Unions Case) | Before 1906, trade unions could be sued in their own or a representative name and their funds reached. | Provided historical context that Parliament was legislating against. |
Precedent D (Representative Action Case) | Confirmed the availability of representative proceedings against associations. | Used to describe pre-Act procedure now displaced by section 4(1). |
Precedent E (Inducement of Breach of Contract Case) | Established liability for inducing breach of contract. | Noted as the doctrine qualified by section 3 of the 1906 Act, differentiating it from section 4. |
Precedent F (Statutory Construction Case 3) | Court follows clear statutory words even if they appear unreasonable. | Bolstered rejection of the argument ab inconvenienti. |
Precedent G (Statutory Construction Case 4) | Judicial review of legislative policy is impermissible where language is clear. | Supported the view that policy considerations could not override section 4(1). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The House held, unanimously, that section 4(1) is drafted in absolute terms and contains no internal or contextual limitation to torts associated with trade disputes. Judges emphasised orthodox canons of construction: (i) words must be given their ordinary meaning; (ii) courts may not read into a statute language that Parliament omitted; and (iii) perceived policy “inconvenience” cannot control clear text.
Section 4(1) differs fundamentally from sections 1–3: those provisions regulate individual conduct in the context of industrial action, whereas section 4 addresses the corporate liability of trade unions. The first subsection expressly bars any court from “entertaining” an action of tort against a trade union, whether the claim proceeds directly against the union or via representative defendants. Nothing in the Act's structure, title, or history justifies implying the words “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.”
Section 4(2) preserves (with a new limitation) the existing personal liability of trustees under section 9 of the Trade Union Act 1871. Its different wording reinforces, rather than qualifies, the breadth of subsection (1). Consequently, the application to strike out the union was properly granted; to allow the action to proceed would contravene the statutory prohibition.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed; the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain the tort action against the trade union.
Implications: The decision affirms that, by virtue of section 4(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1906, trade unions enjoy complete immunity from tort liability in court proceedings, regardless of whether the impugned act is related to an industrial dispute. While trustees may remain liable under section 9 of the 1871 Act (subject to the statutory qualification in section 4(2)), unions themselves cannot be sued in tort. The ruling consolidates the legislative reversal of earlier authority that had exposed union funds to litigation, but it does not establish any new principle beyond statutory interpretation.
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