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R v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales ex p. Caswell
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellants are dairy farmers who operate two farms in The County. Because no milk was produced at one of the farms during the statutory reference year, the only potential basis for receiving a “wholesale quota” for that holding was an exceptional hardship application under the Dairy Produce Quotas Regulations 1984. In February 1985 the Respondent tribunal awarded quota for only 70 cows (318,500 litres per annum), having limited its assessment to stock expected to be milked by the end of March 1985.
The Appellants did not learn of the possibility of judicial review until May 1987, after which they promptly sought legal aid. Leave to apply for judicial review was granted on 21 October 1987, but Judge Popplewell (High Court, 25 November 1988) refused substantive relief because of the delay, limiting the remedy to a declaratory judgment that the tribunal had erred in law. The Court of Appeal (26 May 1989) affirmed, and the present appeal to the House of Lords followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- How Order 53 rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 interact in defining and addressing “undue delay” in applications for judicial review.
- Whether, notwithstanding leave having been granted, the substantial lapse of time before seeking relief warranted refusal of substantive remedies because such relief would be “detrimental to good administration.”
- Whether the lower courts erred in exercising their discretion to refuse certiorari or mandamus in favour of the Appellants.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Contended that the interpretation adopted in Reg. v. Stratford-on-Avon District Council, Ex parte Jackson was incorrect and that an extension of time under Order 53 rule 4 necessarily negated “undue delay” for the purposes of section 31(6).
- Maintained that granting relief would not in fact harm good administration because other producers were unlikely to bring similar claims so long after the event.
- Highlighted personal financial hardship caused by super-levies imposed for the 1986-87 and 1987-88 years.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Relied on affidavits (including one from the tribunal’s former secretary) to show that reopening quota allocations years later would require re-examination of thousands of decisions and reduce other producers’ quotas, thereby harming the integrity of the finite quota system.
- Argued that even if delay were excusable, the inevitable administrative upheaval satisfied the statutory test of detriment to good administration.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Reg. v. Stratford-on-Avon District Council, Ex parte Jackson [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1319 | “Undue delay” exists whenever an application is not made promptly or within three months; extension of time does not eliminate the delay for section 31(6). | Adopted as binding authority; used to confirm that the House could still refuse substantive relief despite the earlier grant of leave. |
| O’Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237 | Public interest in finality and certainty of administrative decisions. | Quoted to support the view that reopening long-settled quota decisions would contravene good administration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The leading speech, delivered by Judge Goff, reconciled Order 53 rule 4 with section 31(6) as follows:
- Failure to act within three months constitutes “undue delay,” even where the court subsequently extends time under the rule.
- Section 31(6) empowers the court, at either the leave stage or the substantive hearing, to refuse relief if delay would cause hardship, prejudice, or detriment to good administration.
- Because leave was granted ex parte, questions of administrative detriment were properly considered at the substantive stage.
Applying those principles, the House accepted the High Court’s factual findings—based on affidavit evidence—that granting substantive remedies would likely trigger similar late claims, compel reallocation of a finite national quota, and require the reopening of decisions dating back to 1984. Such consequences were judged to be precisely the kind of “detriment to good administration” Parliament intended to prevent.
The House further held that the first-instance judge had properly weighed the Appellants’ financial hardship against the systemic disruption and had exercised his discretion lawfully. No error of principle justified appellate intervention.
Holding and Implications
Appeal DISMISSED; the Court of Appeal’s order is AFFIRMED.
Direct Consequences: The Appellants receive only declaratory relief; no additional quota is awarded. Costs are to be taxed under the Legal Aid Act 1988.
Broader Implications: The decision reaffirms that (1) extensions of time under Order 53 do not erase “undue delay” for section 31(6) purposes, and (2) courts may refuse substantive relief where granting it would destabilise settled administrative schemes. No new legal test was created, but existing principles concerning delay and good administration were clarified and endorsed at the highest level.
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