R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p. Dyer

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Plaintiff for judicial review of a decision by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ("PCA") dated 20th December 1991. The PCA declined to re-open his investigation into the Plaintiff's complaints against the Department of Social Security regarding the mishandling of her claims for invalidity benefit, supplementary benefit, and income support during the late 1980s. The PCA had previously completed an investigation, issuing an 18-page report on 18th September 1991 to the referring Member of Parliament and the Department, which found the Plaintiff's complaints justified and included apologies from the Department's Permanent Secretary along with a reimbursement payment. The Plaintiff challenged both the refusal to re-open the investigation and the manner in which the PCA conducted the original investigation.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court has supervisory jurisdiction to review the PCA's exercise of discretion under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967.
2. Whether the PCA acted within the proper ambit of his discretion in selecting which complaints to investigate.
3. Whether natural justice required the PCA to provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity to comment on the draft report.
4. Whether the PCA had the power to re-open an investigation after submitting his final report.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The PCA investigated only some of the Plaintiff's original complaints, omitting others of importance.
• The PCA gave the Department an opportunity to comment on the draft report but did not provide the Plaintiff with the same opportunity.
• The PCA wrongly refused to re-open the investigation after the Plaintiff pointed out unconsidered complaints and believed himself precluded from doing so.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Court has no jurisdiction to review the PCA's exercise of discretion, as the PCA is accountable solely to Parliament.
• The PCA's discretion is wide and the Court should only intervene in exceptional cases of abuse of discretion, by analogy with restricted judicial review in national economic policy decisions.
• The long-standing practice of sending draft reports only to the Department is appropriate and justified by legislative provisions and practical considerations.
• The PCA is functus officio after submitting his final report and cannot re-open the investigation without a new referral.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to review the PCA's discretionary decisions under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. It rejected the respondent's submission that the PCA was solely accountable to Parliament and immune from judicial review. The Court emphasized that although the PCA's discretion is broad and subjective, it remains subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts, albeit with a high threshold for intervention similar to Wednesbury unreasonableness.

Next, the Court considered the PCA's discretion to limit the scope of investigation. It found the PCA was entitled to select and investigate only six main aspects of the Plaintiff's numerous complaints, as this was a proper exercise of discretion and not unreasonable.

Regarding the procedural complaint about the draft report, the Court noted the long-standing practice of sending drafts only to the Department was consistent with the statutory framework and justified by practical considerations, including the Department's role in parliamentary accountability and the protection of sensitive information. The Court held that natural justice did not require the PCA to provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Finally, the Court held that the PCA was functus officio after submitting his final report and thus lacked power to re-open the investigation without a new referral. Even if the power existed, the PCA was entitled to refuse re-opening the investigation based on his prior discretionary decision.

Accordingly, none of the Plaintiff's grounds for judicial review succeeded.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision is DISMISSED. The application for judicial review was refused.

The direct effect of this decision is that the PCA's refusal to re-open the investigation and his conduct of the original investigation were lawful and within his statutory discretion. No new precedent was established beyond confirming the supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts over the PCA's discretionary decisions, albeit limited by the nature of the office and the statutory scheme. There is no order as to costs.