Andrews v DPP

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, a 37-year-old employee of Company A Transport Department at The Garage in The City, was instructed late on the evening of 27 June 1936 to drive a van to assist a broken-down bus several miles away. At approximately 10:45 p.m. on The Road, Witness [Binks] was travelling at about 10 miles per hour when he saw the Deceased crossing from the near side of the 29-foot-wide carriageway.

The Appellant approached from behind at a speed exceeding 30 miles per hour, overtook the witness’s vehicle well over on the off side, and struck the Deceased when he was only a few paces from the opposite kerb. The Deceased was first carried on the bonnet, then thrown forward and run over. Immediately afterwards the van almost collided with a cyclist. The Appellant failed to stop, returned to The Garage, and falsely reported that he had not found the bus. When challenged later he denied travelling on The Road; at trial he professed no recollection of the journey. The fact that he was the driver was unquestioned.

He was tried before Judge [Du Parcq] at the December 1936 Assizes in The City, convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, and disqualified for life from holding a driving licence. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal. Pursuant to a certificate of the Attorney-General, a further appeal was brought before the House of Lords, confined to an allegation that the trial judge had misdirected the jury.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury by equating the statutory offence of dangerous driving under the Road Traffic Acts with the common-law felony of manslaughter.
2. What degree of negligence is required to convert a fatal road-traffic accident into the crime of manslaughter.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House acknowledged the difficulty of defining manslaughter, stressing that simple negligence adequate for civil damages is insufficient for criminal responsibility. Drawing heavily on Rex v. Bateman, their Lordships reaffirmed that only a “very high degree of negligence”—most conveniently described as “reckless,” though not limited to indifference to risk—will sustain a conviction.

The statutory offences in the Road Traffic Acts—particularly driving “without due care and attention” and “dangerous driving” (ss. 12 and 11)—regulate road behaviour but are not coterminous with manslaughter. A person may commit statutory dangerous driving without reaching the criminal threshold for manslaughter, and Section 34 of the Road Traffic Act 1934 expressly allows conviction for dangerous driving on an indictment for manslaughter. Hence, equating the two is wrong in principle.

Turning to the summing-up, the trial judge initially suggested that killing during the commission of an “unlawful act” (dangerous driving) automatically constituted manslaughter. Standing alone, that would have been erroneous. However, later passages redirected the jury to consider whether the Appellant’s conduct exhibited the high degree of negligence or recklessness required by Bateman. Re-reading the charge as a whole, the House concluded that the jury had ultimately been instructed on the correct test, and given the overwhelming evidence of the Appellant’s reckless driving, the verdict was inevitable.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence affirmed.

The decision reiterates that manslaughter by negligence demands proof of a very high degree of negligence and clarifies that statutory dangerous driving and common-law manslaughter are distinct offences with different thresholds. While the judgment restates existing principles rather than creating new precedent, it provides authoritative guidance on jury directions in cases where fatal road accidents are prosecuted as manslaughter.