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Rhesa Shipping CO SA v. Edmunds
Factual and Procedural Background
Company A (“the shipowners”) owned the vessel Popi M, an elderly ship built in 1952 and, by 1978, in a generally deteriorated condition. While carrying a cargo of sugar from The City of Rouen to The City of Hodeidah, the vessel experienced limited bad weather in the Bay of Biscay but otherwise sailed in calm seas.
On 5 August 1978, while in the Mediterranean, a large aperture appeared in the port-side shell plating adjacent to the engine room. Sea water flooded the engine room and, due to a partially open watertight door and missing non-return valves on bilge lines, also reached the two after holds. The crew abandoned ship and the vessel ultimately sank stern first the same evening.
The shipowners claimed a total loss under their hull policies, asserting that the vessel was lost by “perils of the sea.” Company B (the hull underwriters) resisted payment, alleging that the loss was the result of un-insured wear and tear. At first instance, Judge [Bingham] accepted the shipowners’ contention that the aperture had probably been caused by a collision with a submerged submarine and entered judgment for the shipowners. The Court of Appeal (Judges [Donaldson], [O’Connor] and [May]) affirmed. Company B appealed to the House of Lords.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the shipowners discharged the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the vessel was lost by an insured peril (perils of the sea).
- Whether a trial judge faced with competing improbable explanations is entitled, or obliged, to choose the “least improbable” explanation instead of holding that the true cause remains in doubt and that the claimant has therefore failed to prove the case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ (Company B’s) Arguments
- The shipowners bore the burden of proving an insured peril; they failed to show that a collision with a submarine or any other peril of the sea probably occurred.
- The more likely explanation was progressive wear and tear in the wasted hull plating, a cause excluded from cover.
- Judge [Bingham] erred by feeling compelled to choose between two improbable theories rather than concluding that causation was unproven.
Respondents’ (Company A’s) Arguments
- The proximity and characteristics of the damage indicated an external blow; collision with a submerged object (most plausibly a submarine) was therefore the most probable cause.
- Underwriters’ “wear and tear” theory was unsupported by expert evidence concerning a plausible mechanism for sudden shell-plating failure.
- The court was not confined to identifying a specific peril; proof that the loss arose from perils of the sea in general sufficed.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
La Compania Martiartu v. The Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance [1923] K.B. 650 | If, after hearing all the evidence, the court remains in doubt as to the proximate cause of loss, the assured fails because the burden of proof rests on them. | The House of Lords relied on Judge [Scrutton]’s dictum to hold that the trial judge should have concluded that causation remained in doubt and that the shipowners therefore failed to discharge the burden of proof. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge [Bingham] treated the case as a binary choice between (a) collision with a submarine and (b) wear and tear. He considered the submarine theory “extremely improbable” for seven identified reasons, yet felt driven to adopt it because he regarded the wear-and-tear theory as effectively ruled out.
The House of Lords held that this approach was erroneous for three principal reasons:
- The trial judge overlooked the third permissible result identified in La Compania Martiartu: a finding that the true cause was doubtful, leaving the burden of proof unmet.
- Holistic fact-finding requires recognition that all relevant facts were not known; in particular, the wreck lay too deep for examination, so some potential explanations could not be tested or excluded.
- The balance-of-probabilities test must be applied with common sense; it is illogical to pronounce an event “more likely than not” when one has already found it “extremely improbable.”
The Court of Appeal had assumed that Judge [Bingham] must have considered the third option because he cited the correct legal principle earlier in his judgment. The House rejected that inference: the judge’s reasoning at the decisive stage showed no engagement with the “don’t know” alternative.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The orders of Judge [Bingham] and the Court of Appeal were set aside, and judgment was entered for Company B (the underwriters) with costs in all courts. The matter was remitted to the High Court for any consequential steps.
Implications: The decision re-emphasises that, in marine insurance and more broadly, a claimant must prove causation on the balance of probabilities. Where competing hypotheses are all improbable or unproven, a court is not obliged to select the least improbable; it may, and sometimes must, find that the claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proof. The judgment clarifies the proper use of the burden-of-proof doctrine and rejects the “Sherlock Holmes” approach of accepting any remaining hypothesis once others are excluded.
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