Perrins v Holland & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the estate of the late Robert, who died on 31 January 2003. Robert made a will on 26 September 2001, with probate granted on 24 June 2003. The estate's principal asset was a bungalow held under a long lease, valued at £195,000. Robert's will left his entire estate to Anne, described as his carer, with a contingency that if she did not survive him by 28 days, the estate would be divided equally between his son David and his brother John. David challenged Robert’s testamentary capacity at the time of both instructing and executing the will, without alleging undue influence. David also claimed provision under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, but this claim was deferred and the trial focused solely on testamentary capacity.

Robert suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes and multiple sclerosis (MS). He separated from his former spouse, Mrs Edge, with whom he had a son, David. Robert developed severe disabilities over time, including becoming wheelchair-bound. Anne became Robert’s close companion and carer from 1994 onward. Robert made previous wills, including one in 1994 leaving his estate to David, but later changed his testamentary intentions to provide for Anne.

Robert gave instructions for the contested will on 5 April 2000 to a solicitor, Mr Ferguson, and executed the will on 26 September 2001 using a rubber stamp due to his disabilities. The execution took place in the car park of the solicitor’s office with Anne present but at a distance. The trial examined Robert’s mental capacity at both the instruction and execution dates, considering medical evidence, witness testimony, and the circumstances surrounding the will’s preparation and execution.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Robert had testamentary capacity when he gave instructions for the will on 5 April 2000.
2. Whether Robert had testamentary capacity when he executed the will on 26 September 2001.
3. Whether the executed will accurately embodied Robert’s testamentary instructions.
4. Whether Robert knew and approved the contents of the will at the time of its execution.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by applying the classic Banks v Goodfellow test for testamentary capacity, recognizing its continued relevance despite the subsequent Mental Capacity Act 2005, since the events predated that legislation. It acknowledged modern principles that capacity is task-specific and that adults with impaired capacity may make decisions with assistance.

The court examined two critical dates: 5 April 2000 (when Robert gave instructions for his will) and 26 September 2001 (when he executed it). It found that on 5 April 2000 Robert demonstrated sufficient capacity to understand the nature and effects of making a will, the extent of his estate, and the claims of potential beneficiaries. This conclusion was supported by evidence from the solicitor Mr Ferguson, carers, and lack of contemporaneous concerns about capacity.

Regarding the execution on 26 September 2001, the court found Robert lacked full testamentary capacity as traditionally defined, but was in the mental state described in Parker v Felgate: capable of understanding that he was executing a will based on prior instructions, even if he could not recall all details. The court accepted that Mr Ferguson briefly summarized the will’s contents, and Robert indicated his approval. The court rejected suggestions that Robert’s limited communication or use of a rubber stamp invalidated his capacity or knowledge and approval.

The court carefully considered medical and social service records, expert neurological opinion, and lay witness testimony. It found evidence of cognitive impairment but also evidence of Robert’s ability to make decisions and understand his affairs at the relevant times. The court was critical of the expert’s dismissal of lay evidence and accepted that Robert’s capacity fluctuated but was sufficient at the instruction date and adequate at execution under the relevant legal standard.

The court also addressed the issue of whether the will accurately embodied Robert’s instructions, concluding that it did, and that Robert’s testamentary wishes had not changed between instruction and execution despite some doubts raised by Anne’s lack of involvement in reading or discussing the will with Robert.

Finally, the court found that Robert knew and approved the contents of the will at execution, inferring this from his understanding of the process and the solicitor’s explanation, consistent with established legal principles.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to pronounce in favour of the will dated 26 September 2001. It held that Robert had testamentary capacity when he gave instructions, that the will accurately reflected those instructions, and that at execution he knew and approved the will’s contents despite his physical and cognitive impairments.

The direct effect of this decision is that the will stands valid and the estate passes according to its terms. The court did not set any new precedent but reaffirmed established principles, particularly the application of Parker v Felgate in cases involving diminished capacity at execution. The court also emphasized the importance of assessing capacity contextually and recognizing the role of lay evidence alongside medical opinion.