Sharp & Anor v Adam & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

Mr Adam, who suffered from secondary progressive multiple sclerosis diagnosed in 1980, executed a will on 1st June 2001. The central question before the Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division was whether Mr Adam had testamentary capacity at that time. The Deputy Judge decided that Mr Adam lacked testamentary capacity when making the 2001 will, and that the previous will dated 6th February 1997 was his last valid will. The claimants, who stood to benefit principally under the 2001 will, appealed this decision with permission. The defendants included Mr Adam's daughters, who were principal beneficiaries under the 1997 will, and the executors of the estate.

Mr Adam's physical condition had severely deteriorated by 2001, but there was conflicting evidence regarding his mental capacity. Several close associates, including solicitors and a general practitioner, believed he had sufficient understanding to make a valid will, while expert neuropsychiatric and neurological opinions diverged. The Deputy Judge preferred the neuropsychiatric expert's opinion that Mr Adam lacked testamentary capacity.

The estate mainly comprised a stud farm and related assets, with an estimated value exceeding £1 million. The 2001 will notably excluded Mr Adam's daughters as beneficiaries, a decision that was unexplained and unexpected given the prior affectionate relationship.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Mr Adam had testamentary capacity at the time of executing the 1st June 2001 will.
2. The application and interpretation of the legal test for testamentary capacity as established in Banks v Goodfellow.
3. The relevance of the testator's mental condition, including cognitive impairment and possible "poisoning" of affections, in assessing testamentary capacity.
4. The evidential weight to be given to expert opinions versus contemporaneous observations of the testator's mental state.
5. Whether the absence of a rational explanation for the exclusion of the daughters from the will indicates lack of testamentary capacity.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The Deputy Judge misapplied the Banks v Goodfellow test by effectively changing the law.
• He gave undue weight to unreliable expert evidence and insufficient weight to direct evidence showing Mr Adam’s cognitive faculties were unimpaired.
• The Deputy Judge wrongly sought a "King Lear" moment to explain the disinheritance of the daughters.
• The will’s terms should be viewed as a reward to the principal beneficiaries rather than a retributive act against the daughters.
• Errors of fact were made, including misunderstandings of key witness evidence.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Deputy Judge’s conclusion that Mr Adam lacked testamentary capacity is sustainable on the evidence.
• The MRI scan and expert evidence support the likelihood of cognitive impairment affecting testamentary capacity by 2001.
• The Deputy Judge properly applied the law and carefully weighed conflicting expert and lay evidence.
• The absence of a rational explanation for excluding the daughters raises a legitimate question about capacity.
• The decision does not represent a revision of the law but is a fact-specific determination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed review of the factual findings and expert evidence concerning Mr Adam's testamentary capacity. The Deputy Judge found that Mr Adam understood the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of his property, and the claims of those involved, satisfying the first three elements of the Banks v Goodfellow test. However, the Deputy Judge concluded that Mr Adam lacked the capacity to make a rational judgment due to a "poisoning" of his natural affections or a perversion of his moral sense, which was unexplained but likely caused by mental disorder associated with his multiple sclerosis.

The court carefully considered conflicting expert opinions. Professor Ron, a neuropsychiatrist, opined that the severity of Mr Adam's brain damage and cognitive impairment likely deprived him of testamentary capacity, focusing on cognitive deficits without addressing the fourth element of the test related to affections and moral sense. Dr Hawkes, a neurologist, concluded that Mr Adam had capacity, influenced by contemporaneous observations from those close to Mr Adam, though he acknowledged concerns about the unexplained exclusion of the daughters.

The Deputy Judge gave significant weight to Professor Ron's expertise but rejected much of her factual analysis, preferring contemporaneous evidence that Mr Adam was mentally capable when executing the will. Nonetheless, the Deputy Judge found the disinheritance of the daughters irrational and inconsistent with the evidence of affection, concluding this indicated impairment of the fourth element of the Banks v Goodfellow test.

The appellate court acknowledged the finely balanced nature of the case and the difficulty in assessing borderline capacity. It emphasized the need for caution in overturning trial findings, particularly in matters involving evaluation of evidence and expert opinion. The court found no error in law or principle in the Deputy Judge's approach or conclusions and recognized that the case turned on its specific facts.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL, upholding the Deputy Judge's decision that Mr Adam did not have testamentary capacity when executing the 1st June 2001 will.

This decision means that the 2001 will is invalid and that the 1997 will remains the last valid testamentary disposition. The ruling does not establish new legal precedent but confirms the enduring applicability of the Banks v Goodfellow test for testamentary capacity and the importance of considering both cognitive capacity and the presence of any mental disorder affecting affections or moral sense.