Gray v Thames Trains & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

Company A and Company B negligently caused a major rail accident on 5 October 1999. The Plaintiff, a passenger, suffered minor physical injuries and developed post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

While suffering from PTSD the Plaintiff fatally stabbed a pedestrian (“the Victim”) on 19 August 2001. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility and, on 3 March 2003, Judge Rafferty imposed a hospital order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 with an indefinite restriction order under section 41. Since then the Plaintiff has remained in The Hospital.

In August 2005 the Plaintiff sued Company A and Company B for negligence, claiming (i) pre- and post-killing loss of earnings, (ii) general damages flowing from his detention, conviction, guilt and reputational harm, and (iii) an indemnity against potential civil claims by the Victim’s dependants.

Judge Flaux held that public-policy principles (ex turpi causa) barred recovery for all losses flowing from the killing. The Court of Appeal partially reversed that decision, allowing recovery of post-killing loss of earnings but not the other heads of damage. The Appellants appealed and the Plaintiff cross-appealed to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does the public-policy defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio prevent the Plaintiff from recovering damages that are a consequence of his own criminal act?
2. More specifically, is recovery barred for loss of liberty, earnings and reputation flowing from a lawful sentence imposed for that act (the “narrower rule”), and/or for any damage causally linked to the criminal act (the “wider rule”)?
3. Does an unbroken chain of causation—from the negligent rail crash through PTSD to the hospital order—negate the application of the public-policy defence?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The public-policy maxim ex turpi causa bars compensation for consequences of a claimant’s own criminal conduct, especially when the loss arises from a lawful sentence (Clunis; Worrall).
• Both loss of earnings during detention and general damages are “inextricably linked” to the manslaughter and therefore irrecoverable.
• Under Jobling, supervening events (here, lawful detention) must be treated as real-world vicissitudes that limit recoverable loss.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Appellants destroyed the Plaintiff’s earning capacity before the killing; therefore their negligence, not the manslaughter, caused the post-2001 loss of earnings.
• The hospital order was imposed primarily for treatment, not punishment, so the “narrower rule” concerning sentences of punishment should not apply.
• Alternatively, events from the crash to detention formed a single causal chain for which public-policy defences should not operate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Hoffmann, delivering the principal opinion, identified two public-policy rules:

• Narrower rule: A claimant cannot recover for damage that flows from a lawful sentence imposed for his own crime because such recovery would be inconsistent with the criminal court’s determination of personal responsibility.
• Wider rule: More generally, a claimant cannot recover for damage which is an “inextricable” consequence of his criminal act.

Applying the narrower rule, the House held that all post-killing loss of earnings and general damages (detention, conviction, reputation) directly resulted from the hospital order and restriction, i.e., from lawful punishment. Compensating the Plaintiff would require civil courts to “give with one hand what the criminal court has taken with the other,” undermining consistency between criminal and civil law.

Even if the narrower rule did not apply to certain heads (e.g., guilt, indemnity), the wider rule captured them: those losses were the immediate result of the manslaughter and thus causally and morally inseparable from it.

The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s “single causal chain” argument, holding that the voluntary, deliberate killing—despite diminished responsibility—broke any chain that could shift ultimate responsibility back to the Appellants.

On causation, the House endorsed Judge Flaux’s unchallenged finding that, on the balance of probabilities, the Plaintiff would not have been detained in The Hospital but for the killing; therefore detention was not a foreseeable medical consequence of the PTSD alone.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed; cross-appeal dismissed. The order of Judge Flaux was restored, eliminating all claims for loss of earnings and general damages arising after the manslaughter and denying the requested indemnity.

Implications: The decision re-affirms and clarifies the public-policy defence of ex turpi causa. Civil courts must not compensate for the consequences of a claimant’s own crime when those consequences include lawful punishment or are otherwise inseparable from the criminal act. The ruling distinguishes therapeutic detention from purely medical confinement, and it limits recovery even where the defendant’s negligence contributed to the claimant’s diminished responsibility. No new precedent was set, but existing authority was consolidated and applied.