Chargot Limited (t/a Contract Services) and others, R v

Factual and Procedural Background

On 10 January 2003, Employee A was fatally injured while operating a dumper truck during construction works at The Farm in The City. The works were being carried out by three defendants:

• Company A – the direct employer of Employee A;
• Company B – the principal contractor on site; and
• Director A – a director of Company A and managing director of Company B.

An investigation highlighted shortcomings in health-and-safety management, although the precise cause of the accident was never established. All three defendants were prosecuted under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (the 1974 Act):

• Company A – for breach of s.2(1) (employee safety);
• Company B – for breach of s.3(1) (safety of non-employees);
• Director A – for consent, connivance or neglect under s.37(1).

On 10 November 2006 the jury convicted all defendants and substantial fines were imposed. The Court of Appeal dismissed appeals against conviction and sentence but certified three points of law of general public importance. The present judgment of the House of Lords resolves those certified questions and the defendants’ further appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in prosecutions under s. 2(1) of the 1974 Act, the Crown need only prove the existence of a risk arising from a state of affairs at work, or must identify and prove specific breaches of duty.
2. Whether the same applies to prosecutions under s. 3(1) of the 1974 Act concerning risks to non-employees.
3. Whether, for liability of an officer under s. 37(1), the Crown must go beyond proving a mere risk and establish particular acts or omissions amounting to consent, connivance or neglect.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The Crown was required to specify and prove the particular acts or omissions that constituted breaches; merely pointing to a “state of affairs” was insufficient.
• Given the reverse burden in s. 40, Article 6(2) ECHR demanded that the prosecution bear the overall burden of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
• As regards Director A, the jury received no adequate guidance on the meaning of “consent, connivance or neglect.”
• Lack of detailed particulars prejudiced the defence’s ability to meet the case.

Respondent's Arguments

• Sections 2(1) and 3(1) impose result-based duties; proof that the protected result was not achieved (or that a material risk existed) suffices to establish a prima facie breach.
• The statutory scheme (including s. 40) lawfully shifts the burden to defendants to show that further precautions were not reasonably practicable.
• The particulars referring to risks “in relation to the driving or use of dumper trucks” afforded fair notice; additional detail was unnecessary.
• Director A’s own statement demonstrated his operational control, from which the jury could infer consent, connivance or neglect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House of Lords, led by Judge Hope, analysed the statutory framework, relevant case law, and proportionality considerations:

1. Nature of the Duties – Sections 2(1) and 3(1) impose result-oriented duties to ensure safety; they do not prescribe specific methods. Failure to achieve the result (or exposure to a material risk) establishes a prima facie breach.
2. Burden of Proof – By virtue of s. 40, once the Crown proves the existence of a material risk, the onus shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that further precautions were not reasonably practicable. This reverse burden is proportionate and consistent with Article 6(2) ECHR.
3. Particulars and Fair Notice – The indictment’s reference to risks “in relation to the driving or use of dumper trucks” satisfied the fair-notice requirement; the Crown was not obliged to plead or prove specific acts or omissions.
4. No Requirement for a Brown Direction – Because specific breaches are not ingredients of offences under ss. 2(1)/3(1), unanimity on individual alleged failures is unnecessary.
5. Officer Liability (s. 37) – The Crown needed to prove that the corporate offence occurred and that Director A’s consent, connivance or neglect contributed. His own statement of direct involvement justified the inference of neglect at minimum.
6. Proportionality and Policy – The statutory scheme balances public protection with reasonable employer obligations; it addresses significant, not trivial, risks and encourages proactive safety management.
7. Application to the Facts – The undisputed fatal accident demonstrated that a material risk had manifested. Defendants failed to prove that further precautions were not reasonably practicable. The jury had adequate legal directions, and no procedural unfairness occurred.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEALS DISMISSED.

The convictions and sentences of Company A, Company B and Director A stand. The House of Lords confirms that, in prosecutions under ss. 2(1), 3(1) and 37(1) of the 1974 Act, the Crown may establish its case by proving the existence of a material risk arising from workplace activities; it need not identify specific acts or omissions. The decision reinforces employers’ proactive duty to manage safety and clarifies that the statutory reverse burden under s. 40 is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. No new cause of action is created, but the judgment provides authoritative guidance on prosecution practice and officer liability in health-and-safety cases.