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Ministry of Defence v. AB & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
A group of former service personnel (the “Appellants”) alleged that injuries such as various cancers, infertility and other illnesses were caused by exposure to ionising radiation during atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by a government department (“Defendant Government Department”) between 1952 and 1958. A Group Litigation Order was made, and nine lead claims were selected for determination of preliminary issues on limitation.
The Appellants issued their writs between 2004 and 2008—well over three decades after the alleged exposure. The Defendant pleaded that every lead action was time-barred under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. A ten-day hearing took place before Judge [Last Name] who, applying then-prevailing Court of Appeal authority, equated “knowledge” with strong subjective belief. He found five claims out of time but exercised discretion under section 33 to let them proceed; he found the other four were within time.
The Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal ruled that each Appellant had acquired “knowledge” more than three years before issuing proceedings and refused to disapply limitation, principally because the claims had no real prospect of proving causation. The nine Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- What constitutes “knowledge” of attributability under sections 11(4)(b) and 14(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980: subjective belief, or knowledge of objectively verifiable facts?
- Whether an action issued before the claimant has such “knowledge” is nonetheless time-barred.
- The correct approach to striking out or granting summary judgment where claims are commenced on a speculative basis.
- If the claims were time-barred, whether the court should exercise discretion under section 33 to disapply the limitation period.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- “Knowledge” requires objectively supportable facts; mere belief is insufficient. They only obtained such knowledge on seeing a 2007/2008 scientific study (“Rowland Report”) suggesting possible chromosomal damage from fallout.
- Even if out of time, the court should disapply limitation under section 33 because the Defendant always controlled the exposure data and a fair trial remained possible.
Defendant Government Department’s Arguments
- Long-standing Court of Appeal authority equates firm subjective belief with knowledge. Each Appellant believed in causation many years before action and is statute-barred.
- The Rowland Report is scientifically contentious and, in any event, falls far short of establishing causation.
- Section 33 should not be invoked: the claims are speculative and have no real prospect of success; extensive documentary and witness evidence has been lost.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cartledge v Jopling (1963) | Limitation where injury undiscovered at accrual | Explained historical move to “date of knowledge” provisions |
| Davis v Ministry of Defence (1985) | Distinction between belief and knowledge | Majority approved; held belief alone insufficient |
| Halford v Brookes (1991) | “Reasonable belief” can satisfy knowledge | Re-examined; majority said later case-law wrongly extended this |
| Nash v Eli Lilly (1993) | Firm belief may start time running | Overruled so far as it equated belief with knowledge |
| Broadley v Guy Clapham (1994) | Moment claimant knows enough to investigate | Endorsed only where based on objectively verifiable facts |
| Spargo v North Essex DHA (1997) | Summary of “knowledge” principles | Partially disapproved; summary treated as misconceived |
| Haward v Fawcetts (2006) | Need to know real possibility of causation | Majority followed Lord Nicholls’s formulation |
| Whitfield v North Durham HA (1995) | Issue of writ not conclusive of knowledge | Cited to reject automatic link between issuing claim and knowledge |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Majority (Judges [Wilson], [Walker], [Brown], [Mance])
- Section 14 speaks of “knowledge of facts”; Parliament did not intend subjective belief, however genuine, to trigger the limitation period.
- Knowledge requires objectively verifiable information showing a real possibility that the injury was caused by the defendant’s act or omission.
- Before publication of the Rowland Report no scientific data supported the veterans’ belief; hence they lacked “knowledge”.
- Because limitation had not begun to run, the section 33 discretion did not arise. However, even if it had, the claims lacked any realistic prospect of proving causation, so disapplication would be futile.
Dissent (Judges [Phillips], [Hale], [Kerr])
- Belief sufficiently strong to prompt a reasonable person to consult solicitors constitutes knowledge; the Appellants formed such beliefs years earlier, so claims are out of time.
- Rowland Report adds little; causation remains speculative and section 33 should not rescue hopeless claims.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEALS DISMISSED. The claims remain statute-barred; no discretion under section 33 is exercised.
Implications: The Supreme Court restored an objective standard to “knowledge” under the Limitation Act 1980. Claimants must possess—or be fixed with—facts objectively indicating a real possibility of causation before the three-year clock starts. Mere personal conviction will not suffice. The judgment narrows reliance on older Court of Appeal authority and is likely to govern future latent-injury litigation. No new precedent on causation was set; the practical effect is to terminate the nine lead claims and signal high hurdles for the remaining group actions.
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