Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Denton, R v
Factual and Procedural Background
On 19th July 1996, after a two-week trial at the Inner London Crown Court, the Defendant was convicted of the murder of the victim. The Defendant claimed prejudice in mounting his defence due to the Crown's failure to disclose that he was a police informer who had supplied information about the uncle of a prosecution witness. The Defendant was aware of his informer status but asserted that his lawyers should have been informed. Additionally, he relied on the fact that his status as an informer had become public knowledge without his knowledge.
The Defendant, an illegal immigrant from Jamaica who entered the United Kingdom using a false passport, had a criminal history unknown to immigration authorities. After initial arrests and charges related to drugs and weapons, he agreed to become a police informer, providing information about Jamaican gangs. He was involved in supplying information that led to the arrest and conviction of an individual connected to a prosecution witness.
The victim was murdered sometime between 19th and 21st April 1995. The investigation involved multiple witness statements, forensic evidence linking the Defendant to the victim through seminal stains, and conflicting accounts regarding times and locations. The Defendant was initially charged with murder, released when proceedings were discontinued, then re-arrested and re-charged later in 1995. The trial included evidence about the Defendant's informant status, though this was not disclosed to his legal team.
During the trial, a private hearing addressed the Defendant's informer status, but no order was made to disclose this to the Defendant’s counsel. The jury convicted the Defendant by a majority verdict. After conviction, the Defendant’s status as an informer became widely known through media coverage, raising concerns about disclosure obligations and the impact on the fairness of the trial.
The Defendant appealed on grounds including non-disclosure of his informer status to his lawyers, failure to inform the judge fully about the implications of this status, improper granting of public interest immunity, instructions from handlers not to disclose the status to lawyers, and failure to disclose that prosecution witnesses knew about his informer status and its public exposure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Crown had a duty to disclose the Defendant’s status as a registered police informer to his legal representatives.
- Whether the judge should have been informed not only of the Defendant’s informer status but also of its potential impact on the defence strategy.
- Whether the granting of public interest immunity regarding the Defendant’s informer status was appropriate.
- Whether the Defendant was improperly instructed by his handlers not to disclose his informer status to his lawyers.
- Whether the Crown should have disclosed that certain prosecution witnesses were aware of the Defendant’s informer status.
- Whether the Crown had a duty to disclose the public knowledge of the Defendant’s informer status to the judge, Defendant, or his lawyers during trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Crown should have informed the Defendant’s lawyers of his informer status to enable them to use this information in cross-examination, particularly regarding the credibility and motive of prosecution witnesses.
- The judge should have been informed about the Defendant’s informer status and its potential impact on the defence case.
- The public interest immunity order concerning the Defendant’s informer status was improperly granted.
- The Defendant was instructed by his handlers not to disclose his informer status to his lawyers, which prejudiced his defence.
- The Crown failed to disclose that prosecution witnesses knew about the Defendant’s informer status and that this had become public knowledge, information which could have influenced the defence strategy.
Respondent's Arguments
- There is no duty to disclose to an accused information already known to him, and no separate duty to inform his lawyers without the accused’s express authority.
- Disclosure of informer status without the accused’s permission would breach confidence and damage public interest by deterring informers.
- The Crown had no obligation to inform the judge or the defence lawyers beyond acknowledging the Defendant’s status as an informer.
- The Defendant’s handlers denied instructing him not to disclose his status to his lawyers; the court accepted their evidence over the Defendant’s contradictory claims.
- The Crown faced a dilemma as counsel were unaware of the relevance of the informer status to the defence; however, the public exposure of that status during trial was not disclosed to the defence.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
R v. Keane (1999) 99 Crim CR A.P.P.R. 1 CA | Test for materiality in disclosure: relevance, raising new issues, and leading to evidence. | The court applied the test to determine whether the informer status was material and concluded that there was no duty to disclose information already known to the Defendant. |
R v. Brown (Winston) (1995) 1 CAR 191 CA | Limits on the scope of disclosure and the practical considerations of what the Crown must disclose. | Supported the principle that there is no duty to disclose information known to the accused himself. |
R v. Langley (2001) EWCA Crim 732 | Non-disclosure of material affecting reliability of confession deprived defence of an informed opportunity to challenge evidence. | The court distinguished this case on its facts, emphasizing that the failure to disclose in Langley was deliberate and tactical, unlike the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the duty of disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and prior case law, concluding that the Crown owed no duty to disclose to the Defendant information already known to him, including his informer status. The court acknowledged that while the informer status was relevant to the defence, particularly in cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the Defendant himself was aware of this status and had not instructed his lawyers accordingly.
The court found no evidence that the Defendant's handlers instructed him not to disclose his status to his lawyers, accepting the handlers' testimony over the Defendant's contradictory claims. The court recognized the Crown's dilemma regarding disclosure but noted that the public revelation of the Defendant’s informer status during trial was not communicated to the defence, which could have affected defence strategy.
Despite identifying a disadvantage to the Defendant—the lost opportunity to cross-examine a key witness on motive—the court concluded that the overall evidence against the Defendant was overwhelming. The risk of undermining a valuable witness and introducing character issues weighed against the use of the informer status in cross-examination. The court distinguished the present case from precedent involving deliberate non-disclosure of evidence and found no miscarriage of justice.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the Defendant’s appeal, affirming the safety of the conviction.
The direct effect of this decision is the upholding of the murder conviction despite non-disclosure issues related to the Defendant’s informer status. The court did not establish new legal precedent but reaffirmed existing principles regarding disclosure obligations, particularly that no duty exists to disclose to the defence information already known to the accused. The ruling underscores the balance between public interest in protecting informers and the accused's right to a fair trial.
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