Jayasuriya v. Meat Hygiene Service & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Industrial Tribunal in Nottingham considered whether the Second Respondent was properly joined in a discrimination claim brought by the Applicant, an inspector of Asian origin employed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Executive Agency - the Meat Hygiene Service. The Applicant inspected a turkey slaughterhouse operated by the Second Respondent, Company B. The Applicant worked under statutory regulations and was provided a small office by Company B. Laundry services were contracted out and paid for by the Ministry. Except for occasional use of Company B's telephone and office equipment, the Applicant functioned as an independent inspector at the slaughterhouse.

The Applicant alleged that he was subjected to racial taunts by employees of Company B, which caused him distress and detriment. He further alleged that those employees conspired to fabricate a complaint against him, leading to his suspension and dismissal by the First Respondent. The Tribunal identified a key factual issue as the conduct of Company B’s employees, who were under the control of Company B.

The Tribunal framed the central issue as whether the allegations against Company B could be brought under the relevant anti-discrimination legislation (the Act). The Tribunal found difficulty because the Applicant was not a traditional contract worker employed by Company B, but a statutory official with no contractual relationship with Company B. The Tribunal concluded that no contract existed between the First and Second Respondents and that Company B was not a "principal" under Section 7 of the Act. The Tribunal declined to extend the statutory wording to cover this situation, noting that employment legislation generally excludes statutory appointments.

The Tribunal heard skilled legal arguments, including submissions that a contract could be implied despite the statutory foundation. However, the Tribunal rejected these submissions after reviewing relevant case law and statutory provisions.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Second Respondent (Company B) was properly joined as a principal under Section 7 of the Race Relations Act in relation to the Applicant's claim of racial discrimination.
2. Whether a contractual relationship existed or could be implied between the Meat Hygiene Service (First Respondent) and Company B (Second Respondent) sufficient to engage liability under the Act.
3. Whether the Applicant "worked for" Company B within the meaning of the Act.
4. Whether the Tribunal had the power to extend the statutory definition of principal to include Company B in the context of statutory inspectors.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• A contractual relationship could be implied between the Meat Hygiene Service and Company B despite the statutory basis of the Applicant’s role.
• The statutory foundation did not preclude the existence of a contract for the purposes of Section 7 of the Act.
• A purposive construction of the legislation should be adopted to provide protection against racial discrimination, consistent with the wide remedial purpose of the Act.

Respondents' Arguments

• No contract existed between the Meat Hygiene Service and Company B; the Applicant was a statutory official, not an employee or contractor of Company B.
• Company B was not a "principal" under Section 7 of the Act because the relationship was statutory and not contractual.
• The Applicant did not "work for" Company B; rather, he was answerable to the Ministry and its appointed veterinary officer.
• The statutory framework imposes obligations on Company B but does not create contractual liability or employment status.
• Modern discrimination law may provide remedies, but not under Section 7 in this context.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal began by examining the statutory framework governing the Applicant's role as a meat inspector, noting that the position was created and regulated by statute rather than contract. The Tribunal emphasized that Company B's obligation to provide accommodation and pay charges was statutory, not contractual. The Tribunal considered the language and purpose of Section 7 of the Race Relations Act, which applies to individuals "working for" a principal under a contract with a third party.

After extensive review of case law, the Tribunal concluded that no contractual relationship existed between the Meat Hygiene Service and Company B. The Tribunal recognized the wide remedial purpose of the Act in addressing racial discrimination but held that it could not rewrite the statute to impose contractual liability where none existed. The Tribunal highlighted the importance of freedom of contract and voluntary choice, which were absent in this statutory appointment context.

The Tribunal further reasoned that the Applicant did not "work for" Company B within the meaning of the Act, as his supervisory role was to protect public interest and was answerable to the Ministry and its veterinary officer, not Company B. The Tribunal rejected the argument that an implied contract or vicarious liability could be recognized in these circumstances.

On procedural matters, the Tribunal exercised discretion to hear the substantive appeal despite issues regarding the timing of the appeal. The Tribunal declined to decide on the procedural timing point without full argument, suggesting it be referred to higher authorities for guidance.

Holding and Implications

The Tribunal held that the Second Respondent (Company B) is not a principal under Section 7 of the Race Relations Act and that no contractual relationship existed between the Meat Hygiene Service and Company B.

The appeal was dismissed on the basis that the Applicant did not "work for" Company B and thus could not bring claims against Company B under Section 7. The Tribunal acknowledged the Applicant's difficult position and the serious nature of racial discrimination but emphasized the limits of the statutory framework. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing statutory interpretation principles. The Tribunal noted that alternative remedies might be available under modern discrimination law but were not considered in this decision.