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Mr. William Jeffrey Miles v. The National Assembly for Wales
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application pursuant to section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act") brought by the Plaintiff challenging a decision of the first Defendant, the National Assembly for Wales ("the Assembly"), dated 2 June 2006. The decision upheld the dismissal by a planning inspector of the Plaintiff's appeal against the refusal by the second Defendant, Caerphilly County Borough Council ("Caerphilly CBC"), of an application for a certificate of lawful development ("LDC").
On 26 January 2005, the Plaintiff applied to Caerphilly CBC under section 191 of the 1990 Act for an LDC regarding the use of land at a farm owned by the Plaintiff's father, described as "use of land for recreational motorcycling activities and farming." This application was refused on 13 May 2005. The Plaintiff appealed to the Assembly under section 195 of the 1990 Act. A public inquiry was held, and the inspector dismissed the appeal on 2 June 2006.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the planning inspector exceeded his powers in refusing to grant the LDC by failing to properly consider all evidence of recreational motorcycling activities.
- Whether the inspector erred in law by concluding that the period during which motorcycling activities ceased due to the foot and mouth disease outbreak did not count towards the ten-year period necessary to establish immunity from enforcement action.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The inspector erred in law by not having regard to all evidence of recreational motorcycling activities and by unreasonably analyzing the evidence.
- The inspector wrongly concluded that the interruption caused by the foot and mouth disease outbreak prevented the accrual of immunity from enforcement action.
- The inspector should have considered the totality of recreational motorcycling activities, including individual use, when assessing whether the permitted temporary use limits were exceeded.
- The inspector failed to fulfill the duty under section 191(4) of the 1990 Act to issue a certificate in respect of lawful individual motorcycling use, and the decision should be quashed and remitted for reconsideration.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Panton and Farmer v Secretary of State for the Environment (1999) 78 P. & C.R. 186 | Accrued planning use rights can only be lost by abandonment, formation of a new planning unit, or material change of use. | Distinguished by the court as concerning accrued rights and their loss, not the accrual of immunity from enforcement action. |
Secretary of State for the Environment v Terry Holding and Thurrock Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 226 | Clarifies that enforcement action must be taken within statutory time limits or immunity accrues; interruptions of significant duration stop the accrual of immunity. | Applied to conclude that the foot and mouth outbreak interruption stopped the accrual of immunity. |
Swale Borough Council v First Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 1568 | Reinforces that the unlawful use must be continuous to accrue immunity and supports the interpretation of interruptions stopping the immunity period. | Followed to support the conclusion that the period of non-use during the foot and mouth outbreak cannot count towards immunity. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully examined the statutory framework governing certificates of lawful development, enforcement, and permitted development rights under the 1990 Act and the General Permitted Development Order 1995 ("GPDO"). It noted the distinction made by the planning inspector between two categories of motorcycling activities: individual use (pleasure riding, practice, skill development) and event-based use (formal motorcycling events). This distinction aligns with the GPDO Class B provisions, which impose different limits on temporary uses.
The court upheld the inspector's approach that these two categories must be treated separately and cannot be aggregated to establish immunity from enforcement action. Aggregating would undermine the legislative scheme by allowing circumvention of the permitted temporary use limits.
Regarding the interruption caused by the foot and mouth disease outbreak, the court accepted the inspector's conclusion that the 18-month cessation of motorcycling activities was a significant interruption that stopped the accrual of immunity. The court relied on established case law confirming that immunity requires continuous use and that interruptions of such length prevent immunity from arising.
The court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the interruption period should count towards immunity simply because enforcement action could theoretically have been taken during that time. It emphasized that no enforcement action was possible during the outbreak restrictions, and thus the immunity period did not run.
Finally, the court addressed the Plaintiff's contention that the inspector should have issued an LDC in respect of individual motorcycling use. It found that the appeal was not presented on that basis, no application to amend was made, and the inspector was not asked to consider a more limited certificate. Therefore, it was not appropriate to quash the decision on this ground.
Holding and Implications
The court held that the planning inspector did not exceed his powers in refusing to grant a certificate of lawful development in respect of the use claimed, namely "use of land for recreational motorcycling activities" including "motorcycle racing including trials of speed and practising for these activities." The Plaintiff had failed to establish immunity from enforcement action for the event-based use as required by law.
The direct effect of this decision is the dismissal of the Plaintiff's application challenging the inspector's refusal of the LDC. No certificate was granted, and no immunity from enforcement was established. The court did not set any new precedent but applied existing legal principles concerning the accrual of immunity and the interpretation of permitted development rights.
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