Gibson, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff is a retired medical practitioner subject to disciplinary proceedings before the Professional Conduct Committee ("the PCC") of the General Medical Council ("the GMC") for alleged professional misconduct. The Plaintiff seeks judicial review of two decisions made by the PCC at a preliminary hearing approximately five weeks prior: first, the refusal to stay proceedings despite alleged delays; second, the refusal of his application for voluntary erasure from the Medical Register, which would have resulted in a stay of proceedings. The substantive hearing was scheduled for 11 November, prompting expedited consideration.

The Plaintiff had been a Consultant Pathologist at a hospital from 1974, with alleged misconduct relating to his work between 1990 and 1995 in the cytology and histopathology departments. Concerns arose regarding the cervical screening programme, leading to multiple reviews and reports, including an independent inquiry chaired by Sir William Wells in 1997, which identified significant management and operational failings in the pathology laboratory.

Following the Wells Inquiry, the GMC investigated the Plaintiff’s professional practice and conduct. Complaints from eleven women were submitted to the GMC in 2000, with five being pursued in the current case. Civil proceedings against the hospital Trust had been settled without public hearings. The GMC referred the case to the PCC in 2003 after a screening process. The Plaintiff raised issues of delay and applied for voluntary erasure, both of which were considered and rejected by the relevant committees.

The allegations concern errors in the Plaintiff's cytological and histological analyses relating to five patients, with claims that these errors amounted to serious professional misconduct. The Plaintiff contends the delays in proceedings and his voluntary erasure application should have resulted in a stay of the disciplinary process.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the PCC erred in refusing to stay disciplinary proceedings on grounds of delay, including alleged abuse of process and breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
2. Whether the PCC erred in refusing the Plaintiff's application for voluntary erasure from the Medical Register, which would have stayed the proceedings.
3. Whether disciplinary proceedings constitute a special category where delay alone, without demonstrated prejudice, justifies a stay.
4. The proper application and relevance of a statutory instrument limiting referral of misconduct complaints more than five years old.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The delays in hearing the case were so extensive as to constitute an abuse of process or a breach of Article 6 ECHR, warranting a stay.
• The statutory instrument limiting referrals after five years, although not directly applicable, should have influenced the PCC's discretion to stay proceedings.
• Disciplinary proceedings should be treated differently from criminal proceedings, with delay alone sufficient to stay the case without requiring proof of prejudice.
• The refusal to allow voluntary erasure was wrong; given the Plaintiff’s retirement and the nature of complaints as poor performance, erasure would adequately protect the public interest.
• The procedural arrangement whereby complainants’ solicitors prosecuted the case, funded by the GMC, was unfair and unsatisfactory.

Respondent's Arguments

• The common law and Article 6 principles require proof of serious prejudice or unfairness to justify a stay; delay alone is insufficient.
• The PCC was entitled to find that a fair hearing remained possible despite delays, as relevant evidence and expert testimony remain available.
• The statutory instrument was not applicable retrospectively and thus irrelevant to the PCC’s discretion.
• Disciplinary proceedings attract the safeguards of Article 6 and should not be treated as a special category exempt from standard delay principles.
• The refusal of voluntary erasure was a lawful exercise of discretion balancing public interest, complainants’ interests, and the Plaintiff’s interests, especially given the seriousness of allegations including dishonesty.
• The involvement of complainants’ solicitors as prosecutors, funded by the GMC, was permitted under the rules and did not result in unfairness.
• There was no legal basis to grant permission to appeal as the legal principles were settled and the PCC’s decisions were factual determinations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the delay issue under both common law abuse of process principles and Article 6 ECHR. It confirmed that a stay for delay requires proof that the delay causes serious prejudice making a fair hearing impossible or that continuing would be unfair to the extent of abuse of process. Mere delay without prejudice is insufficient.

The court rejected the Plaintiff's submission that disciplinary proceedings form a special category where delay alone warrants a stay, noting established authority that disciplinary hearings attract full Article 6 protections and must balance public interest and complainants’ rights.

The court found the PCC's conclusion that a fair hearing remained possible was reasonable, given the availability of key evidence and expert testimony despite some loss of records and witnesses. It held the PCC was entitled to assume charges were properly brought and not question prosecutorial motives.

Regarding the statutory instrument limiting referrals after five years, the court held it was not retrospectively applicable and therefore irrelevant to the PCC’s discretion. The PCC acted lawfully in following legal advice to that effect.

On voluntary erasure, the court explained the relevant regulations and the PCC's balancing of public interest, complainants’ interests, and the Plaintiff’s circumstances. The PCC properly considered the seriousness of allegations, including one tantamount to dishonesty, and the need for public scrutiny. The court rejected claims that legal advice errors or failure to consider certain factors vitiated the decision.

The court expressed concern about the prosecutorial role of complainants’ solicitors but found no actual unfairness had arisen and noted future rule changes to prevent such arrangements.

Finally, the court declined to grant permission to appeal, finding no sufficient legal uncertainty or novel principle justifying further review.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Plaintiff’s application for judicial review.

The PCC’s decisions not to stay the proceedings on grounds of delay and to refuse voluntary erasure were upheld as lawful and reasonable. The disciplinary hearing was permitted to proceed as scheduled. No new legal precedent was established, and the decision primarily affects the parties by allowing the substantive disciplinary process to continue without interruption.