Makudi v Baron Triesman of Tottenham in London Borough of Haringey

Factual and Procedural Background

The Defendant applied for an order striking out the Plaintiff's libel claim and for summary judgment in the Defendant's favor. The Plaintiff was, at the relevant time, the president of Company A (Football Association Thailand) and a member of the Executive Committee of The University (FIFA). The Defendant, a member of the House of Lords, had been Chairman of Company B (Football Association Limited) and involved in the England 2018 World Cup bid.

The claim form was issued shortly before the limitation period expired and included claims for slander and libel arising from references made outside Parliament to the Defendant's Parliamentary evidence given to a House of Commons Committee. The Parliamentary evidence itself was protected by absolute privilege and not the basis of the claim. The claims focused on four publications, including oral and written statements to an investigator appointed by Company B, and reports made by that investigator to Company B and The University.

Following the Parliamentary evidence and resultant publicity, Company B appointed an independent QC to investigate the Defendant's allegations. The four complained publications emerged from this investigation process and subsequent reports. The Plaintiff alleged defamatory meanings and malicious falsehoods arising from these publications, including claims for general and special damages, some of which related to events before the complained-of publications.

The Defendant sought to strike out the claim on grounds including abuse of process, no reasonable grounds for the claim, qualified privilege defenses, and lack of a real prospect of success. The court considered these issues in the context of the pleadings, the nature of the publications, and relevant legal principles.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff's claim based on publications after 20 May 2011 discloses a reasonable cause of action or has a real prospect of success.
2. Whether the alleged publications were made on occasions of qualified privilege or if the Plaintiff can show otherwise.
3. Whether there is an arguable case of malice sufficient to defeat the defense of qualified privilege.
4. Whether the publications amount to a real and substantial tort justifying continuation of the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

• The claim is an abuse of process as it seeks to circumvent absolute privilege protecting Parliamentary statements by suing on subsequent references.
• The publications complained of do not amount to a real and substantial tort and are occasions of qualified privilege.
• The Plaintiff has failed to identify loss flowing directly from the complained-of words and has exaggerated damages claims, some predating the publications.
• The defamatory meanings pleaded are not capable of being borne by the complained-of words, which are qualified and do not allege actual guilt.
• The malicious falsehood claim lacks a viable case of malice and causation linked to the complained-of words.
• The Plaintiff's case on malice would require inquiry into Parliamentary proceedings, which is prohibited by law.

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Defendant repeated and adopted defamatory statements made in Parliament in subsequent oral and written evidence to the investigator.
• The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's statements to the investigator and the reports published to Company B and The University were defamatory and maliciously false.
• The Plaintiff contends the Defendant did not believe the truth of the defamatory statements, supporting a plea of malice.
• The Plaintiff seeks damages and an injunction to prevent further publication of defamatory material.
• The Plaintiff disavows any intention to sue for the Parliamentary evidence itself but relies on subsequent publications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified that the Parliamentary evidence itself was absolutely privileged and not actionable. The claims related only to subsequent publications outside Parliament. The court examined the four publications separately, noting that Publications 1 and 2 involved the Defendant’s oral and written statements to the investigator, while Publications 3 and 4 involved reports by the investigator to Company B and The University.

Applying the legal tests on defamatory meaning, the court found that the complained-of words in Publications 1 and 2 could not reasonably bear the meaning of actual guilt of corruption as pleaded by the Plaintiff. The Defendant’s statements were qualified and cautious, and the hypothetical reasonable reader, a legal professional, would not interpret them as allegations of actual guilt.

Similarly, Publications 3 and 4, being further removed in context and containing additional material, were also incapable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meanings. The court also found that the Plaintiff had failed to plead properly the basis on which the Defendant authorized the investigator’s reports, weakening the case against the Defendant.

The claim based on the website republication was struck out for lack of particularity, as the Plaintiff failed to specify the words published or the readers.

The court held that all four publications were made on occasions of qualified privilege, given the professional and investigatory context and the mutual interest of the parties involved. As such, the claim would fail unless the Plaintiff could show malice.

Regarding malice, the court emphasized that malice requires dishonesty and that the Plaintiff’s case necessarily involved inquiry into the Defendant’s Parliamentary statements, which is prohibited by law. The possibility that the Defendant was mistaken rather than dishonest was equally probable. Therefore, no real prospect of proving malice existed.

The court also addressed the abuse of process issue, concluding that the claim included exaggerated damages claims relating to events before the complained-of publications and attempts to recover for absolutely privileged Parliamentary statements. This constituted an abuse of process.

Given these findings, the court concluded there was no real and substantial tort to justify continuation of the claim, and no prospect of granting an injunction given the absence of any threat of repetition.

Holding and Implications

The court struck out the Plaintiff's claims and entered summary judgment for the Defendant.

The publications complained of were all made on occasions of qualified privilege, and the Plaintiff failed to present a case of malice that could be left to a jury. The Plaintiff’s claims for damages relating to events predating the complained-of publications and for Parliamentary statements were deemed an abuse of process and struck out. No opportunity was granted to amend the pleadings due to the fundamental nature of the defects.

This decision directly disposes of the Plaintiff’s claims without establishing new precedent but reinforces established principles regarding absolute and qualified privilege, the limits of malice in defamation claims, and the court’s vigilance against abuse of process in defamation litigation.