Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
Atkinson v. Director of Public Prosecutions
Factual and Procedural Background
The case arises from an alleged traffic offence involving a motor scooter recorded exceeding the speed limit in Warrington on 13 November 2010. The registered keeper of the scooter, the Appellant, was sent a Notice of Intended Prosecution by the police requesting the identity of the driver. The Appellant responded that she did not know the driver's identity, explaining that the scooter had been offered for sale and a prospective buyer had test driven it without providing personal details. The police subsequently forwarded the matter for prosecution, and the Appellant was summonsed under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 for failing to provide the requested information.
The central procedural issue before the court was the interpretation of the duty imposed on the vehicle keeper under s.172(2) and the scope of the defence under s.172(4), specifically the timing at which "reasonable diligence" to ascertain the driver's identity should be assessed. The Magistrates' Court had concluded that the Appellant failed to act with reasonable diligence at the time she allowed the scooter to be driven, rather than at the time of the police request. The Appellant appealed this decision by case stated.
Legal Issues Presented
- At what time is the keeper's exercise of "reasonable diligence" to ascertain the identity of the driver to be assessed: at the time of the driving, at the time the keeper first became aware the vehicle was being driven by another, or at the time of the police request for information?
- Whether the Appellant acted with reasonable diligence in failing to obtain the driver's details before allowing the scooter to be driven.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The obligation to provide driver details arises only when the police make a request under s.172(2).
- The assessment of reasonable diligence should focus on the keeper’s conduct at the time of the police request and afterwards, not at any earlier point.
- By the time the request was made, the Appellant could do nothing further to identify the driver.
Respondent's Arguments
- The duty on the keeper is a continuing one, beginning at the time the keeper becomes aware that someone else is driving the vehicle.
- The keeper should have exercised reasonable diligence beforehand by obtaining identifying details of the prospective driver to be able to respond to any future police inquiry.
- The legislative intent supports effective enforcement of road traffic laws in the interest of public safety, preventing keepers from evading responsibility by deliberately not knowing the driver’s identity.
- Section 172(6) supports the view that the defence requires prior diligence in record-keeping or knowledge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 | Public interest in effective enforcement of road traffic legislation; balancing enforcement with defendants' rights. | Used to illustrate the public policy underpinning the statutory scheme, emphasizing the importance of identifying drivers to enforce road traffic offences. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began its analysis with a detailed statutory construction of section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, focusing on the language and context of the provision. It identified that the offence arises only upon a request by or on behalf of the police for information about the driver’s identity. The defence in s.172(4) applies if the keeper "did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained" the driver’s identity.
The court rejected the Respondent’s argument that reasonable diligence should be assessed from the time the keeper first knew the vehicle was driven by another, concluding that the statutory wording, particularly the use of past tense verbs, indicates that knowledge and diligence must be assessed at the time of the police request. This interpretation avoids unfair consequences, such as penalizing a keeper who genuinely forgot the driver’s identity or who had no duty to know at the time of driving.
The court emphasized that there is no general legal duty on a keeper to know the identity of the driver at the time of driving, although it may be advisable. The offence is triggered only by the request, and the defence requires the keeper to show that at the time of that request they did not know and could not have ascertained the driver’s identity despite reasonable efforts.
The court found that the Respondent’s interpretation would render subsection (6) redundant and produce illogical and unfair results. It also noted that the statutory scheme presupposes that the keeper may not know the driver but must try to find out when requested.
Both judges agreed that the defence is made out if at the time of the request the keeper does not know and cannot ascertain with reasonable diligence who the driver was. The court also considered and rejected policy arguments favoring the Respondent’s view, finding that the plain language of the statute must prevail.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed. The court held that the assessment of reasonable diligence under section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 must be made at the time the police request for information is received, not at the time the vehicle was driven or when the keeper first became aware the vehicle was driven by another person.
The direct effect of this ruling is to overturn the Magistrates' Court’s conclusion that the Appellant failed to act with reasonable diligence at the time she allowed the scooter to be driven. Since the Respondent did not seek to remit the case for reconsideration, the appeal succeeds without further proceedings.
No new precedent is established beyond clarifying the timing of the diligence assessment under s.172(4). The decision reinforces the requirement that the keeper’s defence depends on their knowledge and efforts at the time of the police request, aligning statutory interpretation with principles of fairness and legislative coherence.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.
Comments