The Society of Lloyd's v Longtin

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application relating to the enforcement of a judgment obtained by Company A against Defendant. The judgment was entered on 11 March 1998 for a sum due to Company B, with interest accruing thereafter. Enforcement was initially stayed pending an appeal application, which was refused, making the judgment enforceable from 31 July 1998. Defendant was resident in Quebec, Canada at the time and reportedly had no assets within the jurisdiction of England and Wales.

Company A sought enforcement of the judgment in Canada, beginning with Ontario where recognition and enforcement were granted and upheld on appeal. Subsequently, Company A applied for recognition and enforcement in Quebec. Defendant raised a defence in Quebec arguing that the judgment was no longer enforceable in England due to the passage of more than six years since the judgment date.

In England, Company A applied for permission to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment despite the lapse of more than six years. Permission was granted by Master Ungley on 9 September 2005. Defendant subsequently applied to set aside this permission, which is the matter before the court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the court should grant permission to issue a writ of execution to enforce a judgment more than six years after its date.
2. What principles govern the court’s discretion in granting leave to enforce a judgment beyond the six-year limitation period.
3. The relevance of delay and reasons for delay in seeking enforcement after six years.
4. The effect of such permission on recognition and enforcement proceedings in foreign jurisdictions.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

• Defendant is entitled to apply to set aside the order made without notice.
• The burden is on Company A to show adequate grounds to grant leave to enforce after six years.
• As a general principle, courts do not extend time beyond six years; delay alone usually justifies refusal.
• It must be "demonstrably just" to depart from the general rule.
• Company A failed to explain the delay in applying for enforcement after the defence was filed in Quebec, causing prejudice and an ambush effect.
• Defendant is elderly with modest means and should not face unexpected enforcement attempts late in foreign proceedings.

Company A's Arguments

• Permission to enforce a judgment over six years old is not automatic; each case depends on its facts.
• Company A began enforcement proceedings in Ontario first, then in Quebec, as part of a broader international enforcement strategy.
• The application for permission in England was to clarify enforceability for the Quebec court, not to execute against assets in England.
• Delay was partly due to the complexity and scale of enforcement efforts worldwide.
• Accusations of ambush are unfounded; Company A consented to adjournments and attempted proper service of the order.
• Company A’s conduct was appropriate, firm, and prompt in pursuing enforcement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that enforcement of judgments by writ of execution after six years requires permission under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 46 Rule 2. The court considered whether facts existed to justify departing from the general rule denying enforcement after six years.

The court noted that the judgment debtor was aware from the outset that Company A intended to enforce the judgment. Company A’s extensive efforts to enforce the judgment internationally, starting in Ontario and then Quebec, were reasonable and justified. The court found no prejudice to Defendant from the delay, and the delay of approximately six months in applying for permission was not sufficient to deny relief.

The court rejected the argument that unexplained delay automatically disentitles the applicant, distinguishing this case from Patel. The court also found no evidence of deliberate ambush by Company A, considering their conduct appropriate and cooperative.

Although the application was somewhat academic, intended to assist the Canadian court, the court exercised its discretion to affirm the grant of permission to issue a writ of execution.

Holding and Implications

The court dismissed the Defendant’s application to set aside the order granting permission to issue a writ of execution.

The court affirmed that permission to enforce a judgment beyond six years is a discretionary matter directed to doing justice between the parties. The decision confirms that delay alone, especially of moderate duration and in the context of extensive enforcement efforts, does not preclude leave. The direct effect is that Company A may proceed with enforcement by writ of execution in England, which supports their position in foreign recognition and enforcement proceedings. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of established principles.