Chapman & Anor v Simon

Factual and Procedural Background

Daneford School, a comprehensive boys' school in The City, had a significant increase in pupils of Bangladeshi origin by 1990. The school was initially run by Company A and later by Company B. Plaintiff, a black female teacher of Afro-Caribbean origin, joined the school in 1981 and held senior positions in the science department. Defendant, a white female headteacher, took over the school in 1988 during a period of poor standards and instability, and improved the school's ethos.

Conflicts arose between Plaintiff and another white female teacher, witnessed by the latter and reported to Defendant. Defendant treated these reports as complaints and convened a meeting with Plaintiff without notifying her in advance, leading to Plaintiff's upset and absence from school. Defendant referred the complaints to Company A's disciplinary section, alleging Plaintiff refused to apologise or change behavior. Plaintiff also absented herself without permission to attend Company A's offices.

Plaintiff requested an "open report" from Defendant multiple times to assist in seeking employment elsewhere. Although Defendant produced a report, Plaintiff found it unsatisfactory, and no finalised report was agreed. Subsequently, Plaintiff received a written warning following upheld complaints by Company A. Plaintiff lodged formal complaints about Defendant and later filed a racial discrimination claim under the Race Relations Act 1976 with an Industrial Tribunal.

The Industrial Tribunal heard the case over nine days and issued a decision in April 1990. Defendant and Company B appealed the Tribunal's findings to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), which partially upheld their appeal. Defendant and Company B now appeal to the Court with leave of the EAT, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's racial discrimination claim. Plaintiff cross-appeals seeking restoration of certain Tribunal findings.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Defendant's conduct constituted unlawful racial discrimination against Plaintiff under the Race Relations Act 1976.
2. Whether the Industrial Tribunal erred in law by finding racial discrimination based on matters not specifically complained of by Plaintiff.
3. Whether the failure to provide a finalised open report constituted racial discrimination.
4. The proper approach to drawing inferences of racial discrimination from primary facts in the absence of direct evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Industrial Tribunal's finding of racial discrimination based on Defendant's alleged prejudgment was flawed because Plaintiff did not complain of this matter.
• An error in procedure does not necessarily amount to unlawful discrimination under the Race Relations Act.
• Defendant was not in a position to judge the complaint and acted within her functions by seeking reports and following procedure.
• There was no evidence that Defendant's conduct interfered with the disciplinary enquiry or prejudiced Plaintiff.
• Defendant's conscious attitude to race was impeccable, and there were no primary facts supporting inference of subconscious or unconscious racial prejudice.
• The failure to provide a finalised open report was not shown to be on racial grounds, and Plaintiff did not allege discrimination in this respect.

Respondent's Arguments

• Plaintiff alleged less favourable treatment compared to white colleagues in three respects: referral of absences to Company A, formal complaint handling, and refusal to provide a supportive report.
• The Industrial Tribunal majority found racial discrimination in Defendant's prejudgment of complaints and failure to provide a finalised open report, inferring subconscious racial prejudice.
• There was evidence of differential treatment and breach of statutory provisions under the Race Relations Act 1976.
• Defendant's conduct caused detriment to Plaintiff, constituting unlawful discrimination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully examined the Industrial Tribunal's findings and the EAT's judgment. It identified that the Tribunal had made a finding of racial discrimination based on Defendant's alleged prejudgment of complaints, but this was not a matter formally complained of by Plaintiff. The court emphasized that jurisdiction is limited to complaints made to the Tribunal, and it is impermissible to find discrimination on uncomplained acts.

The court stressed the necessity of findings of primary fact to justify inferences of racial discrimination. It found that the Tribunal failed to identify sufficient primary facts supporting an inference of subconscious or unconscious racial prejudice by Defendant, especially given the finding that Defendant's conscious attitude to race was impeccable.

Regarding the failure to provide a finalised open report, the court noted Plaintiff did not allege racial discrimination in providing such a report, nor did the Tribunal find comparative treatment with other teachers. The Tribunal's inference of racial discrimination was unsupported by primary facts and failed to address Defendant's professional justification.

The court reaffirmed legal principles from precedents requiring clear factual bases for discrimination findings and rejected speculative or intuitive conclusions. It held that the EAT was correct to overturn the Tribunal's majority finding on prejudgment and to be cautious about the open report finding.

Holding and Implications

The appeal by Defendant and Company B is allowed, and Plaintiff's cross-appeal is dismissed.

The court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint of racial discrimination. The direct effect is that Defendant and Company B are not found liable for racial discrimination in the matters before the Tribunal. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the decision reinforces existing principles requiring clear factual findings to support inferences of discrimination and limits Tribunal jurisdiction to matters properly complained of.