Bateman, R (on the application of) v South Cambridgeshire District Council & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns a claim for judicial review brought by the Claimants, Dr. and Mrs. Bateman, challenging a grant of planning permission by South Cambridgeshire District Council ("the Council") in favour of Company A for the extension of a grain storage and handling facility near the village of West Wratting. The Claimants sought to quash the Council’s decision on the basis that the planning officer’s screening opinion, which concluded on 17th April 2009 that an environmental impact assessment ("EIA") was not required, failed to comply with the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) 1999 Regulations ("the Regulations"), rendering the planning permission unlawful.

Company A, an agricultural co-operative, had constructed a successful storage facility between 2008 and 2009 and planned a substantial expansion involving 60 additional silos and associated infrastructure, which would significantly increase lorry traffic. The Regulations implement Council Directive 85/337/EEC and require a screening opinion to determine if an EIA is necessary for Schedule 2 developments likely to have significant environmental effects.

Following a request by Company A’s agent, Savills, the Council issued a screening opinion stating that an EIA was not required. Planning permission was subsequently granted on 9th July 2009. The Claimants challenged the adequacy of the reasons given in the screening opinion and the lawfulness of the planning permission.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Council’s screening opinion complied with the legal requirements under the Regulations and relevant European case law, particularly the adequacy of reasons provided for deciding that an EIA was not required.
2. Whether the planning permission granted following the screening opinion was lawful given any flaws in the screening process.
3. The appropriate standard of reasoning and information required in a screening opinion declining the need for an EIA.
4. The proper interpretation of the terms "likely to have significant effects" and "significant" within the context of the Regulations and Directive.
5. The appropriate form of relief if the screening opinion was found to be legally flawed.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimants' Arguments

• The screening opinion was illogical, irrational, and lacked sufficient reasoning to comply with the Regulations and the European Court of Justice’s judgment in R (Mellor) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.
• The planning officer’s reference to guidance in Circular 02/99 was muddled and failed to properly apply the relevant thresholds for EIA screening.
• The officer did not adequately consider the main environmental effects identified—traffic increases, landscape impact, and noise disturbance—or explain why these effects were not significant.
• The expression "likely to have" should be interpreted broadly as "may possibly have," which would require an EIA in many cases where any environmental effect is possible.
• The reasons given did not allow interested parties to understand or challenge the decision effectively as required by EU law and case law.

Defendant's Arguments (Council and Company A)

• The screening opinion, read with the detailed request letter from Savills, provided sufficient reasons and information to meet the requirements of the Regulations and the judgment in Mellor.
• The planning officer’s reasons, though concise, were adequate and demonstrated that the Council had carefully considered the relevant criteria and the likely environmental effects.
• The development was not of more than local importance, was not in an environmentally sensitive location, and did not have unusually complex or hazardous effects.
• The screening opinion is a preliminary administrative decision, not requiring the detailed reasoning expected in substantive planning decisions.
• If the screening opinion were flawed, the appropriate remedy would be to direct a fresh screening opinion rather than quashing the planning permission outright.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by outlining the statutory and regulatory framework governing environmental impact assessments, including the relevant European Directive and the 1999 Regulations. It emphasized that the key question was whether the proposed development was likely to have significant environmental effects, requiring the planning authority to consider criteria in Schedule 3 of the Regulations and guidance in Circular 02/99.

The Claimants argued that the planning officer’s screening opinion was legally deficient because it failed to provide adequate reasoning, particularly regarding the main environmental concerns of traffic, landscape, and noise. The court acknowledged that the officer’s reasoning was expressed in broad terms, largely reciting the general criteria from the Circular without clearly explaining why these effects were not significant.

However, the court also recognized that a screening opinion is necessarily a preliminary and less detailed administrative decision than a substantive planning permission. It does not require a full assessment of environmental impacts but must provide sufficient information to allow interested parties to understand and challenge the decision.

Applying the principles from Mellor, the court found that the reasons given did not clearly explain why the development was not likely to have significant effects, falling short of the required standard. This lack of clarity meant the screening opinion did not comply fully with EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice.

Nevertheless, one judge dissented, reasoning that the screening opinion, when read with the detailed representations submitted by Company A’s agent, was sufficiently clear and concise to meet the legal requirements. The dissent emphasized that more elaborate reasoning is not necessary for a negative screening opinion and that the Council’s approach was consistent with the purpose of the screening process.

Regarding the remedy, the court rejected the suggestion that a fresh screening opinion could be adopted without quashing the planning permission, reasoning that an error in the screening opinion taints the entire planning permission process and thus requires quashing the permission.

Holding and Implications

The majority of the court held that the screening opinion issued by the Council did not comply with the requirements of the Regulations and EU law as interpreted in Mellor because it failed to provide adequate reasons explaining why an EIA was not required. Consequently, the grant of planning permission based on that screening opinion was unlawful and must be quashed. The claimants’ application for judicial review was therefore allowed.

The dissenting judgment would have dismissed the claim, finding the screening opinion adequate and the planning permission lawful.

The direct effect of the majority decision is to invalidate the planning permission granted to Company A, requiring the Council to undertake a lawful screening opinion process before any further planning permission can be granted. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the application of existing principles from Mellor and related case law on the adequacy of reasons in screening opinions.