McFarland, Re (Northern Ireland)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted of indecent assault in a magistrates’ court after changing an initial plea of not guilty to guilty during proceedings. The plea change followed a private discussion between the magistrate and counsel, the gist of which was communicated to the Appellant. He served four months of an eight-month sentence. A Divisional Court later quashed the conviction, holding that the magistrate’s comments left the Appellant with no meaningful choice, and ruled out a retrial. The Appellant then sought compensation from the Respondent under statutory and ex gratia schemes. The Respondent refused. The High Court and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland upheld that refusal. The present appeal to the House of Lords challenges the legality of the Respondent’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the quashing of the Appellant’s conviction entitled him to compensation under article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. Whether, under the ex gratia compensation scheme announced by the Home Secretary in 1985, a magistrate is “a member of a public authority” whose serious default can justify an award.
3. Whether the magistrate’s conduct amounted to “serious default” within the meaning of that scheme.
4. Whether the Respondent misunderstood or misapplied the Divisional Court’s judgment when refusing compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The conviction was “reversed” within the ordinary meaning of that word, satisfying article 14(6) ICCPR and, by analogy, section 133 of the 1988 Act.
• Even if the statutory route failed, the first limb of the 1985 ex gratia scheme applied because the quashing of the conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice.
• Alternatively, under the second limb, the magistrate was a member of a public authority whose serious default (the chamber discussion and misstatement of sentencing powers) caused the wrongful imprisonment.
• The Respondent misconstrued the Divisional Court’s findings by minimising the seriousness of the magistrate’s conduct.

Respondent's Arguments

• Section 133 confines compensation to cases meeting its strict definition of “reversed,” which the Appellant’s case does not.
• Parliament’s enactment of section 133 superseded any overlapping part of the 1985 ex gratia statement that mirrors article 14(6) ICCPR.
• Judges and magistrates are not members of “some other public authority” for the purposes of the ex gratia scheme; prior authority consistently supports this view.
• Even if the magistrate were a public authority, the conduct criticised in the Divisional Court was not characterised as “serious default.”

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The leading opinion, delivered by Judge Bingham, held:

• The statutory route failed because the conviction was not “reversed” on the basis of a new or newly discovered fact showing a miscarriage of justice, as required by section 133 and article 14(6).
• Parliament’s enactment of section 133 was intended to replace the identical portion of the 1985 ex gratia statement; therefore a claimant who cannot satisfy section 133 cannot rely on that portion of the policy.
• Previous authority consistently treats judges and magistrates as outside the phrase “some other public authority.” The court found this interpretation “plain” and unpersuasive to treat a magistrate as a public authority for compensation purposes.
• Because the magistrate is not a public authority, the question of “serious default” did not arise. However, the court noted that any criticism of the magistrate in the Divisional Court’s judgment was mild and unlikely to meet the high threshold of seriousness.
• The Respondent accurately understood the Divisional Court’s judgment and was entitled to rely on it when refusing compensation.
• Alternative grounds advanced by the Appellant, including alleged misunderstanding by the Respondent, lacked merit.

Separate concurring opinions agreed with the outcome. Judge Steyn expressed concern over excluding judicial misconduct from the definition of “public authority” but ultimately accepted the majority view. Judges Scott, Rodger, and Walker added constitutional reflections on the limited scope of judicial review over prerogative-based ex gratia schemes.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Respondent’s refusal to award compensation stands. The decision confirms that:

• Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 exclusively governs statutory compensation for wrongful convictions.
• Under the current ex gratia policy, judicial officers are not regarded as members of a “public authority,” significantly narrowing eligibility where judicial error is alleged.
• Court scrutiny of prerogative compensation decisions is confined to irrationality and procedural unfairness. No broader precedent was set, but the majority view may prompt policy makers to clarify or amend the ex gratia scheme.