Saumitra Dayal Singh, J.:— The present writ petition has been filed against the order dated 11.10.2017 passed by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India, in a revision application filed by the petitioner under Section 35EE of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). That revision had been filed against the order/s-in-appeal dated 16.12.2013 and 21.03.2014 passed by the Commissioner, Central Excise (Appeals-I), Kolkata. Those appeals had arisen from the order(s)-in-original dated 03.09.2013, 16.09.2013 and 29.01.2014. By those orders-in-original, the claims for rebate from duty (by the petitioner on export of Camphor USP) were rejected, as time barred.

2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner is a manufacturer of Camphor USP falling under Chapter sub-heading 29142120 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. By Central Excise Notification No. 19/2004 dated 06.09.2004, the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’), in supersession of earlier notifications, granted rebate on the whole of the duty paid on all excisable goods falling under the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, when exported to any country, other than Nepal and Bhutan. The said rebate was made subject to the conditions, limitations and procedures specified in that notification. Rule 18 of the Rules read as under:

“Rule 18. Rebate of duty. - Where any goods are exported, the Central Government may, by notification, grant rebate of duty paid on such excisable goods or duty paid on materials used in the manufacture or processing of such goods and the rebate shall be subject to such conditions or limitations, if any, and fulfillment of such procedure, as may be specified in the notification.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this rule, “export”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means taking goods out of India to a place outside India and includes shipment of goods as provision or stores for use on board a ship proceeding to a foreign port or supplied to a foreign going aircraft.”

3. The conditions and limitations for providing the rebate are contained in clause (2) of that notification. They read as below:

“(2) Conditions and limitations:—

(a) that the excisable goods shall be exported after payment of duty, directly from a factory or warehouse, except as otherwise permitted by the Central Board of Excise and Customs by a general or special order;

(b) the excisable goods shall be exported within six months from the date on which they were cleared for export from the factory of manufacture or warehouse or within such extended period as the Commissioner of Central Excise may in any particular case allow;

(c) that the excisable goods supplied as ship's stores for consumption on board a vessel bound for any foreign port are in such quantities as the Commissioner of Customs at the port of shipment may consider reasonable;

(d) the rebate claim by filing electronic declaration shall be allowed from such place of export and such date, as may be specified by the Board in this behalf;

(e) that the market price of the excisable goods at the time of exportation is not less than the amount of rebate of duty claimed;

(f) that the amount of rebate of duty admissible is not less than five hundred rupees;

(g) that the rebate of duty paid on those excisable goods, export of which is prohibited under any law for the time being in force, shall not be made.”

4. As to the presentation of claim for rebate to Central Excise, the procedure is prescribed under clause 3(b) and 3(c) of that notification. They read as under:

“3(b) Presentation of claim for rebate to Central Excise:—

(i) Claim of the rebate of duty paid on all excisable goods shall be lodged alongwith original copy of the application to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction over the factory of manufacture or warehouse or, as the case may be, the Maritime Commissioner;

(ii) The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction over the factory of manufacture or warehouse or, as the case may be, Maritime Commissioner of Central Excise shall compare the duplicate copy of application received from the officer of customs with the original copy received from the exporter and with the triplicate copy received from the Central Excise Officer and if satisfied that the claim is in order, he shall sanction the rebate either in whole or in part.

3(c) Claim of rebate by electronic declaration:- An exporter may enter the requisite information in the shipping bill filed at such place of export, as may be specified by the Board, for claiming rebate by electronic declaration on Electronic Data Inter-change system of Customs. The details of the corresponding application shall be entered in the Electronic Data Inter-change system of Customs upon arrival of the goods in the Customs area. After goods are exported or order under Section 51 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) has been issued, the rebate of excise duty shall, if the claim is found in order, be sanctioned and disbursed by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or the Deputy Commissioner of Customs.”

5. Undisputedly, the petitioner exported its final product, namely Camphor USP to countries other than Nepal and Bhutan. The disputed transactions are ten such transactions performed between the period February 2012 to October 2012. Again, undisputedly, the petitioner claimed rebate from payment of duty on such exports beyond one year from the date of shipment being dispatched. Thus, the refund claims were made during the period February 2013 to October 2013, such that in each case the claim came to be made more than a year after the actual shipment of the goods.

6. All ten claims came to be rejected by separate orders dated 03.09.2013, 16.09.2013 and 29.01.2014, as time barred under the provisions of Section 11B of the Act. For ready reference, the relevant extract of Section 11B of the Act is quoted below:

“SECTION [11B. Claim for refund of [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty].-(1) Any person claiming refund of any [duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty] may make an application for refund of such [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] to the [Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise] before the expiry of [one year] [from the relevant date] [[in such form and manner] as may be prescribed and the application shall be accompanied by such documentary or other evidence (including the documents referred to in section 12A) as the applicant may furnish to establish that the amount of [duty of excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty] in relation to which such refund is claimed was collected from, or paid by, him and the incidence of such [duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty] had not been passed on by him to any other person:

… … … … …

[Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-

(A) “refund” includes rebate of duty of excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of India;

(B) “relevant date” means,-

(a) in the case of goods exported out of India where a refund of excise duty paid is available in respect of the goods themselves or, as the case may be, the excisable materials used in the manufacture of such goods,-

(i) if the goods are exported by sea or air, the date on which the ship or the aircraft in which such goods are loaded, leaves India, or

(ii) if the goods are exported by land, the date on which such goods pass the frontier, or

(iii) if the goods are exported by post, the date of dispatch of goods by the Post Office concerned to a place outside India;”

7. The petitioner's appeals against the aforesaid orders also came to be rejected. Those orders have been affirmed by the revising authority by the order impugned in the present writ petition.

8. Heard Shri Nishant Mishra assisted by Shri Tanmay Sadh and Shri Kartikeya Narain, Advocates, for the petitioner and Shri Ramesh Chandra Shukla, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the revenue.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits, in the first place, the scheme for grant of rebate from payment of excise duty was a separate scheme under the Rules read with Notification no. 19/2004 dated 06.09.2004 distinct from the scheme for levy of excise duty under the Act. The petitioner did not claim refund of excise duty paid by it rather, it made a separate and distinct claim of rebate. Section 11B of the Act inter alia prescribed the period of limitation to make a claim for refund only. It had no applicability to a claim for rebate. Therefore, in is his submission the provisions of Section 11B of the Act that provide for refund of duty paid in excess are not applicable to claims of rebate from excise duty claimed by the present petitioner.

10. Alternatively, it has been submitted, even if the claim of rebate being claimed is treated at par with a claim for refund (in view of the language of Explanation (A) appended to Section 11B of the Act) then, the rebate from excise duty on goods exported by the petitioner was a special beneficial scheme. Section 11B of the Act has no applicability in the same.

11. Then, referring specifically to the method of presentation of claim for rebate provided under clauses 3(b) and 3(c) of the notification, it has been further submitted that the Central Government had provided a special procedure for making a claim for rebate from payment of excise duty. It stipulated lodging of that claim with the designated authority in original. Moreover, under clause 3(c) of the notification, that claim had been permitted and provided to be made by electronic declaration. While providing that special procedure, again, the Central Government did not deem fit to provide for a period of limitation or to incorporate the period of limitation provided under Section 11B of the Act.

12. Rule of limitation of one year cannot be read into such special procedure to bar the claim made by the petitioner within and otherwise reasonable period. Here, it would be the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that being money claim, the reasonable period cannot be assumed to be lesser than three years as contemplated under the general rule under the Limitation Act.

13. Then, referring to Notification No. 18 of 2016 dated 01.03.2016, it has been submitted, later, the Central Government had specifically introduced the rule of limitation in the scheme of rebate from excise duty, arising under Notification No. 19/2004 dated 06.09.2004. With effect from 01.03.2016, it provided, such claims be made before expiry of the period specified under Section 11B of the Act. Thus, the delegate of the legislature had, for the first time, amended the stipulation of limitation provided under the notification dated 06.09.2004 and consequently introduced a further condition by way of rule of limitation to make a claim for rebate.

14. The aforesaid amendment having been made prospectively, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the same cannot be read into the fact situation of the present case. The claim of the petitioner had arisen about two years prior to the amendment to that law. The same was wholly valid and maintainable and would be governed by the unamended law.

15. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector Of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (India) Ltd., 2000 (118) ELT 311 (SC), as followed in CCE v. Ram Swarup Electricals Ltd., 2007 (217) ELT 12 (All.); DCCE v. Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd., 2015 (321) ELT 45 (Mad); and JSL Lifestyle Ltd. v. UOI, 2015 (326) ELT 265 (P&H). Also, great stress has been laid to distinguish the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Everest Flavours Ltd. v. UOI, 2012 (282) ELT 481 (Bom). In that regard, it has been submitted that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of that report had remained from being considered by the Bombay High Court. Therefore, that decision does not lay down the correct law. On the other hand, stress has been laid on the decisions of the Madras and Punjab and Haryana High Courts in the cases of Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and JSL Lifestyle Ltd. (supra) noted above, to submit, those decisions had taken note of the complete ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) and, therefore, they lay down the correct law.

16. The reasoning of the revising authority, insofar as it has followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra), has been assailed as incomplete. The points of distinction noted by the Madras High Court and Punjab & Haryana High Court in their respective decisions, flowing from the ratio embedded in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. has been completely misread or not appreciated by the revising authority. Also, it has been submitted, the revising authority has otherwise failed to independently consider the submission advanced by the petitioner that the rule of limitation contained in section 11B of the Act could not be applied to the claim of rebate made by the petitioner (prior to the amendment), has not been decided.

17. Opposing the present petition, Shri Shukla, learned standing counsel for the revenue submitted, the decision in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) is wholly distinguishable. In that case, the question involved was with respect to recovery of MODVAT wrongly availed. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the provisions of Section 11A of the Act and Rule 57-I of the old Rules (with respect to grant of MODVAT). In that context it had been reasoned that Section 11A of the Act is not an omnibus provision of limitation for all or any kind of action taken under the Act or the Rules but that it would attract only to cases where duty of excise had not been levied or paid or had been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded. That position of law was distinguished and held inapplicable to enforce a recovery of MODVAT wrongly availed.

18. In that case, it was the manufacturer who claimed the benefit of Section 11A of the Act by stating - no recovery could be made from him beyond the period of one year limitation under Section 11A of the Act. The Supreme Court negated that claim, amongst others, on the reasoning - a recovery contemplated under Section 11A is different and distinct from recovery of MODVAT wrongly claimed. For reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the separate nature of duty liabilities contemplated under Section 11A of the Act and the MODVAT scheme enforced by Rule 57A to 57P of the old Rules.

19. The above position does not arise in the present case, inasmuch as by virtue of Explanation (A) appended to Section 11B, all claims of rebate from excise duty have been specifically included in the statutory definition of claims for refund. By virtue of that statutory inclusion, any distinction that may otherwise have existed between the true meaning, purport and scope of a refund claim and a rebate claim, has been rendered inconsequential and extraneous.

20. Therefore, in his submission, under the Act, their do not exist two separate provisions providing limitation to file claims for refund and rebate. A claim of rebate and claim of refund are one and same for the purpose of Section 11B of the Act. Consequently, in his submission, the rule of limitation provided under Section 11B of the Act would apply with equal force to a claim of rebate. He has placed full faith in the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra).

21. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, it would be fruitful to consider the ratio of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra). As noted above, it was a case where the revenue was seeking to recover from the manufacturer MODVAT wrongly availed. While the entitlement to availment of MODVAT arose to the manufacturer with effect from 10.03.1987, it availed MODVAT credit with respect to inputs purchased by it with effect from 01.03.1987. This ultimately gave rise to the dispute of Rs. 41,872.68/- which the manufacturer refused to reverse, despite notice by the revenue. According to the manufacturer, that demand had been made beyond of limitation (one year) under Section 11A of the Act.

22. Upon consideration of the provisions of Section 11A of the Act as also Rule 57-I of the Rules, both prior to the amendment and after the amendment made on 05.10.1988, the Supreme Court held - the provisions of Section 11A of the Act were not an omnibus provision and that the situation arising before it had to be dealt with according to the unamended Rule 57-I of the Rules because section 11A was the law to provide for recoveries of excise duty not-levied or not-paid or short-levied or short-paid while Rule 57-I was the law for availment of MODVAT credit, a completely separate or different contingency, not covered under section 11A of the Act. Insofar as the Rule 57-I did not provide for any period of limitation and did not borrow the rule of limitation from Section 11A of the Act, by way of first reason, the Supreme Court rejected the defence set up by the manufacturer and held the recovery sought by the revenue to be within time.

23. However, the above was not the only reason given the Supreme Court to reject the defence set up by the manufacturer. By way of an alternative but equally binding reasoning contained in paragraph no. 14 of the report, it was held, even if the first reasoning were not to operate or be applicable, then, applying the rule - special law would prevail over a general law. It was held the MODVAT scheme was a special scheme while the rule of limitation contained in Section 11A was a general law. The scheme of MODVAT was found to be a special scheme with self-contained procedure, manner and method for its implementation, providing for its own remedies to undo any mischief committed by the manufacturer and any abuses thereof.

24. In such facts the provisions of the scheme (special law), alone were found to govern the situation. It was held - there was no scope to read the stipulations (of limitation) contained in the general provision of law (Section 11A of the Act), in the special law. Then, by way of third reasoning, it was further held, in any case, the MODVAT scheme underwent an amendment on 06.10.1988 whereby period of limitation of six months was introduced to Rule 57-I. That amendment being purely prospective in nature, it was held that it did not apply to past transactions.

25. The above decision of the Supreme Court was followed by the division bench of this Court in the case of Ram Swarup Electricals Ltd. (supra), though in that case, the question was different (from the one involved here), being whether short availed MODVAT credit would constitute refund claim and accordingly be subject to the rule of limitation contained in Section 11B of the Act. The division bench, after taking note of the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the case of the Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15, held as below:

“7. In view of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) provisions of Sections 11A of the Act is not attracted and cannot be imparted in respect of the Rules framed for availing of the Modvat, the same principle would apply for the purpose of Section 11B of the Act also. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Wipro Ltd. (supra) cannot be said to be a good law any more. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that provisions of Section 11B of the Act is not attracted in the case of Modvat which is governed by Rules 57A to 57P. Further, during the relevant period no limitation had been provided for availing of the Modvat credit and the amendment in Rule 57G prescribing the limit of six months was introduced on 29 June, 1995 which has prospective effect. Thus, the respondents were within their right to avail the short fall in the Modvat credit at any time.”

26. Thus, it was held that the claim of the MODVAT would remain governed by Rule 57A to Rule 57B of the old Rules and Section 11B of the Act would have no application.

27. The Bombay High Court in the case of Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra) was considering a case of rebate from payment of duty under the same notification which falls for consideration in the present case. Again, an objection had been taken by the revenue that the claim was time barred, it having been filed beyond one year from the relevant date, The decision of the Supreme Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) and the single judge decision of the Madras High Court in Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) were cited. Plainly, the division bench of the Bombay High Court negated the challenge raised on the reasoning that the claim for rebate was time barred. It held the reasoning in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) was not applicable to the claim for rebate from duty made in view of the fact that a claim for rebate from duty had been brought within the purview of Section 11B of the Act, under Explanation (A) thereto. It was held, since the application for rebate from excise duty had been specifically included within the ambit of refund, therefore, the ratio in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) was inapplicable.

28. Thereafter, the division bench of the Bombay High Court considered the ratio of Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) of the Madras High Court and distinguished it for the reason noted above. However, it clearly appears (from plain reading of its decision), that the second and the third limb of reasoning in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) had not been relied before the Bombay High Court. For that reason, it does not appear to have been considered or dealt with.

29. On the other hand, the decision of learned single judge of the Madras High Court in Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) became a subject matter on intra-court appeal before that court wherein division bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra) was relied by the revenue. The decision in the case of Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was also a case of rebate from excise duty, claimed under the same notification as is under consideration in the present case. The division bench of the Madras High Court took note of Rule 12 of the old Rules governing rebate, which provisions are reflected and are pari materia to Rule 18 of the Rules under consideration in the present case. Also, the distinction between the rebate claimed and a refund claim with reference to the judgement, decree or order of the Court had also been taken note of and relied upon to bring out a distinction as to the start of period of limitation for the purpose of Section 11B of the Act.

30. Further, it had been noted, prior to introduction of notification dated 06.09.2004, under the pre-existing notification, there was a time period prescribed for making a claim. The same was done away by the notification under consideration. Therefore, an intendment of the delegate of the legislature had been inferred, to not prescribe any period of limitation to make a rebate claim. That period was however re-introduced by the subsequent amendment vide notification dated 01.03.2016. The decision of the Bombay High Court was thus distinguished. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of JSL Lifestyle Ltd. v. UOI (supra) where again the revenue sought to rely upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra). Again, the Punjab & Haryana High Court considered the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra). Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra) was distinguished on count of the second and third limb of the reasoning contained in paragraph nos. 14 and 15 of the decision of the Supreme Court having not been considered by the Bombay High Court. It may be a fact that the special leave petitions filed against the decision of the Madras and the Bombay High Courts may have been dismissed. However, it may not be decisive of the issue as it is not the case of either party that either of those special leave petitions were decided by any detailed order.

31. First, there can be no doubt that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the case of Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) does not apply with all force, inasmuch as the first reasoning contained in that case arose on account of a complete difference between a claim for recovery of duty not-levied or not-paid or short-levied or short-paid and recovery of MODVAT wrongly availed. There was no provision under Section 11A of the Act whereby recovery for MODVAT wrongly availed could be considered the same or treated at parity with duty not-levied or not-paid or short-levied or short-paid. To that extent, the decision of the Supreme Court is wholly distinguishable, in view of the clear intendment of the statute where under by virtue of Explanation (A) to section 11B of the Act, a claim for rebate of duty has been specifically included in a claim for refund of duty.

32. However, it still falls for consideration whether in view of the further reasoning of the Supreme Court there exists any special law governing the claims for rebate from excise duty and whether the amendment made introduces the rule of limitation, only prospectively. Looking into the clear language of the notification, it appears that in the first place, the delegate of the legislature i.e. Central Government, in exercise of the powers under Rule 18 of the Rules read with Section 37 of the Act provided that the claim for rebate from excise duty shall be subject to the conditions, limitations and procedures specified in the notification itself.

33. The notification, read in its entirety, does not, in any way or manner suggest that it adopts the rule of limitation contained in Section 11B of the Act or that the conditions and limitations imposed under the notifications are in addition to those contained under the general provisions of the Act. It is also not the case of the revenue that other than the Section 11B of the Act, there existed any other provision of law as may have expressed an intendment of the legislature to restrict the claims for rebate from duty, in any other manner. In fact, under the scheme of the Act, the rebate provisions are not provided for by any Act of principal legislation but only through delegate legislation.

34. Even otherwise, the scheme for rebate under Rule 18 of the Rules read with Notification No. 19 of 2004 dated 06.09.2004 is a special law granting rebate from excise duty to exporters. It is not a scheme for general rebate (under section Explanation A to 11B of the Act). The rebate is not a general rebate from excise duty (that may be otherwise available under the Act). The scheme to grant rebate from excise duty on goods exported by the petitioner was a special beneficial scheme provided under Section 37 of the Act read with Rule 18 of the Rules and notification No. 19 of 2004 dated 06.09.2004, to provide incentive to manufacturers to export their manufactured goods. It was a self contained scheme. The conditions, limitations and procedures for grant of such rebate were (under the scheme of the Act) governed especially by the procedures and conditions stipulated under the notification dated 06.09.2004. The Central Government while issuing that notification, acted on its wisdom and provided for only such conditions and limitations as were considered fit and necessary for the purpose of granting the rebate.

35. None of the conditions and limitations provided under the aforesaid notification were such as may be read to contain a stipulation of limitation of one year from the relevant time or from the date of shipment etc. for the purpose of making a claim for rebate. There is no room to add to those conditions and limitations by reading the general provisions of section 11B of the Act into it.

36. Looked from that perspective, it does appear, all the conditions and limitations the legislature wanted to introduce for grant of special rebate from excise duty (in the case of export of excisable goods), were stipulated in the notification itself. It was self contained. Even for the purposes of the presentation of a claim for rebate, the manner and mode had been prescribed under clauses 3(b) and 3(c) of the notification alone. Again there was no suggestion to limit those claims by the general prescription of time contained in section 11B of the Act.

37. Further, in that background, the amendment notification is relevant. Thereby under Clause 3(b), sub-paragraph (I), the words “before the expiry of the period specified in Section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)” have been introduced for the first time. Clearly, that amendment has been made prospectively from 01.03.2016 and there is no intendment either explicit or implied to make it retrospective. As discussed by the Madras High Court in Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), with which I find myself in agreement, the pre-existing law and the post amendment law would clearly bring out that the amendment to the notification in question was wholly amendatory and not clarificatory.

38. The division bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Swarup Electricals Ltd. (supra) had adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) in entirety and no distinction has been made thereto. To that extent the view of the Bombay High Court is found not consistent with that of the division bench of this Court. For that reason also, it looses its persuasive value.

39. It is also relevant to note that the Supreme Court had itself clarified that the rule of special law prevailing over the general law may not be ignored even if that special law be contained in the Rule i.e. a delegated legislation while the general law may be found contained in a principal legislation. To that extent, it is relevant to extract the observation made by the Supreme Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra):

“The question as to the relative nature of the provisions general or special has to be determined, with reference to the area and extent of their application either generally in all circumstances or specially in particular situations and not on the ground that one is a mere provision in the Act and the other is a provision in the Rule. We are not also concerned in this case with any challenge to the inconsistency of a rule with any statutory provision in the Act.”

40. Thus, in view of the reasoning offered by the Supreme Court in Raghuvar (India) Ltd. (supra) that special law even though contained in the Rule may govern the special situation covered by it and be not governed by the general rule of limitation contained in the principal legislation and in view of the further reasoning contained in paragraph no. 15 of that report that the subsequent introduction of rule of limitation (by amendment) would not be clarificatory but amendatory, the present writ petition deserves to be allowed. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Everest Flavours Ltd. (supra) is found to be distinguished in view of the reasoning given above. Thus, I find myself bound by the view taken by the division bench of this Court in Ram Swarup Electricals Ltd. (supra) and in agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court in Dorcas Market Makers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) as well as the Punjab & Haryana High Court in JSL Lifestyle Ltd. (supra).

41. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The matter is remitted to the original authority to pass necessary order within a period of three months from today.